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ABSTRACT 
 
A Study of the Impact of the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) 
on the Hong Kong Housing Markets 
 
by 
 
YEUNG Fai Yip 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
The Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS), the public housing privatization programme, 
which commenced in the first quarter of 1998 in Hong Kong, has received much 
attention from urban economists. However, few empirical studies have been carried 
out to examine its impact on the housing market and the entire economy. This study 
uses time-series regression analysis to distinguish the effect of the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC) from that of the TPS on the transaction volume and the real transaction 
value in the second-hand HOS market (focusing on the HOS free market), the 
secondary property market, and the overall property market. In addition, a 
“Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model” is used to estimate the 
effect of TPS on the HOS market using cross-sectional analysis. The empirical 
findings for the time-series analysis show that the TPS has affected the HOS free 
market much more seriously than the AFC. The effect then extends to the secondary 
property market and finally the overall property market. The cross-sectional analysis 
suggests that the HOS market will have led to a loss of more than 82,000 potential 
buyers over a period of 10 years as a result of the introduction of TPS. It also 
discovers that resource is inefficiently allocated by the large-scale survey. This 
dissertation also provides an analysis of the pitfalls of present TPS and discusses 
three alternative public housing privatization schemes. (The HKCER Model, the 
Wong Model and the Ho Model) It seems that the “Conditional Bidding” proposed in 
the Ho Model is the most appropriate policy for the change of present TPS because 
his model suits the criteria of economic efficiency, policy efficiency and equity best.   
I declare that this thesis?A Study of the Impact of the Tenants Purchase Scheme 
(TPS) on the Hong Kong Housing Markets?is the product of my own research and 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Significance 
 
It is generally believed that Hong Kong’s unprecedented economic downturn in 1998 
was wholly caused by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC)1 . However, both the 
historical review and the comparisons of economic recovery among other Asian 
countries after the AFC suggest that there may be other explanations for Hong Kong 
gone through such a serious economic disaster.  
 
In fact, Hong Kong had experienced the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution of 
1966 - 682 ; the two major oil crises during the seventies ; the plunge of the Heng 
Seng Index from over 1700 to less than 200 of 1973 - 75 ; the unprecedented interest 
rate hikes with prime rate momentarily up to 20% of 1981 - 82 ; the banking crises of 
1965 - 66 and 1982 - 863 and the Tiananmen incident of 1989. Actually, among 
these gigantic setbacks, Hong Kong’s growth engine never failed and it was only in 
1998 that Hong Kong experienced negative economic growth since 1961. Moreover, 
the rebound was extremely weak in 1999 when compared with the rebounds that 
followed earlier recessions. The rebounds were 11.3% in 1969, 16.2% in 1976 and 
                                                   
1 Hong Kong recorded negative economic growth (-5.3%) in 1998.  
2 The Cultural Revolution started on the Mainland but spread rapidly to Hong Kong. People were killed in 
street riots, bombs were set off and property prices slumped. 
3 With multiple bank failures from 1982 to 1986, it aroused widespread panic and serious currency 
depreciation. As a result, the linked exchange rate system was set up in 1983.  
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10.8% in 1986. The rebound, however, was only 3.1% in 1999. Since there was a 
negative (-5.3%) economic growth in 1998, the small rebound (3.1%) in 1999 meant 
that the aggregate output after 1999 was still below that in 1997.  
 
On the other hand, the economies among other Asian countries were less adversely 
affected by the AFC. Ho (2000) pointed out that given Hong Kong’s tight links with 
China and the United States, both of which registered strong growth in 1998, and 
Singapore’s tight links with the ASEAN countries, Hong Kong should have fared 
better than Singapore. Nevertheless, the results were just opposite that Hong Kong 
registered a negative 5.3% growth while Singapore registered a positive 1.3% growth 
in 1998. He argued that Hong Kong should have been in much better shape than the 
debt-ridden South Korea. But by the second half of 1999, South Korea’s GDP had 
rebounded to well over the pre-crisis level. After declining by 5.8% in 1998, the 
rebound was 10% in 1999. The difference was so large when compared with Hong 
Kong’s 3.1% rebound at the same time. He further analyzed that Hong Kong’s trade 
figures started to improve markedly in 1999 and by the first quarter of 2000, Hong 
Kong appeared to be well on its way to recovery, with a 14% year-on-year growth. 
Although the strength of the external sector was great, it scarcely benefited domestic 
consumption through late 1999. Actually, most of Hong Kong citizens continued to 
feel the crunch of the recession.   
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There is no doubt that Hong Kong’s economic growth is closely related to the change 
of property market historically. In the past, the persistent rapid economic growth was 
quite attributed to the active and prosperous property market. According to Census 
and Statistics Department and Centaline Property Agency Ltd, the economic growth 
rate since 1993 is positively related to the changes of Overall Private Domestic 
Property Price Index. Ho (2000) pointed out that the transmission mechanism for the 
AFC to burst the property price bubble was lacking. He mentioned that :  
 
“First, foreign participation in the housing has never been significant. 
There is no evidence that a big withdrawal of foreign capital from 
the housing market produced a collapse. Second, although 
inter-bank interest rates went up in the wake of the currency 
troubles in South East Asia, mortgage rates had been relatively 
stable. Hong Kong had seen bigger mortgage rate hikes before, but 
had never encountered such serious depression in the housing 
market. Third, it is not true to say that confidence collapsed 
overnight. Actually, many people, including veteran analysis, were 
expecting a moderate recovery in property prices. That expected 
recovery simply never came.” (p.3) 
 
He further added that the economy lost 12% of its GDP in the first quarter of 1998. 
Furthermore, there was indeed one interest rate dropping and the currency turmoil 
had shown signs of stabilizing at that time. To put all these analyses together, it is 
questionable to judge that the AFC was the sole factor for the property market 
collapse and the deep recession since 1998. 
 
The Chief Executive (CE), Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, in his first Policy Address of 
October 1997 explicitly called for increasing the home ownership ratio from 50% to 
70% in ten years. He tried to achieve it through an ambitious public housing 
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privatization program, the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS)4. (For full context, please 
see Appendix I & II) The Director of Housing, Mr. Tony Miller, in a speech made in 
late 1997, argued that :  
 
“The TPS would foster a sense of belonging and would give owners a 
greater sense of security. Besides, it would provide purchasers with a 
first step on the housing ladder, and would enhance opportunities for 
upward mobility. As a result, it would help the flow of housing 
market. Furthermore, it promoted the release of scarce public 
housing resources for those in need.” (See Appendix Q2) 
 
In contrast, Ho (2000) argued that the economic decline was the direct and 
immediate result of misguided housing policy, particularly its motivation to increase 
ownership in the property market. His hypothesis is summarized as follows : 
 
“By selling public housing cheaply to tenants and allowing resale of 
these units in the open market, the attractiveness of Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS) was reduced dramatically. Price declines 
of HOS housing spread to housing of a more superior quality 
because the latter depends on HOS owners trading up. Lacking 
buyers from among HOS owners, the owners of these units could not 
trade up either. A result of this domino effect is collapse of the entire 
housing market and an unprecedented recession.” (Abstract p.1)  
 
With his own theoretical framework, Ho applied the regression analysis to prove that 
the TPS had an additional and very significant dampening effect on the second-hand 
transaction volume in the housing market over and above the effect of the AFC. 
                                                   
4 The TPS is a scheme introduced by the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) to assist tenants of the HKHA to buy 
the flats they currently rent. At least 250,000 public housing flats will be offered for sale over the n xt ten years, 
commencing with 27,525 in early1998. 
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The diametrically opposite analyses clearly deserve further study. It is no easy matter 
to assess the validity of the two different hypotheses. While it is possible that the 
TPS may have an adverse effect on the purchase of HOS housing, the observed 
decline in the demand for HOS housing may also be due to the negative economic 
growth rate induced by the AFC. 
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1.2 Objectives of the Research 
 
The research aims at providing comprehensive study for the impact of TPS on Hong 
Kong housing markets and there are twelve objectives for it. (The first five 
objectives are the most important.) 
 
1*. To distinguish the effect of AFC from that of the TPS on the transaction 
volume and the real transaction value on the overall property market, the 
secondary property market and the second-hand HOS market5 (focusing 
on the HOS free market) by time-series analysis ; 
 
2*. To find out the net effect of TPS on the HOS market by cross-sectional 
analysis ; 
 
3*. To find out the effect of TPS on the policy efficiency6 of resource allocation 
by cross-sectional analysis ; 
 
4*. To evaluate the pitfalls of the TPS ; 
 
5*. To recommend various appropriate policy alternatives to replace the 
current wrong TPS ; 
                                                   
5 The second-ha  HOS market is composed of HOS secondary market and HOS free market. HOS secondary market 
is designed for those HOS flats entering into third year that can be sold to he HKHA w th no need to pay the land 
premium to the government. As to the HOS free market, it is designed for those HOS flats entering into sixth year that 
can be sold to the public with the need to pay the land premium to the government. 
6 Ho (1995) defin s “Policy Efficiency” as the degree of achieving a stipulated policy objective given the resources 
devoted to the purpose. 
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6. To find out whether TPS tenants intend “To Buy Public Rental Housing (PRH)” 
or “Not to Buy PRH” ; 
 
7. To identify reasons/motivating factors contributing to making their decisions 
whether to purchase PRH or not ;  
 
8. To find out whether TPS tenants intend “To Buy HOS flat in the Short 
Run/Long Run” or “Not to Buy HOS flat” if there had been no TPS ; 
 
9. To identify reasons/motivating factors contributing to making their decisions 
whether to purchase HOS flat in the short run/long run or not to buy at all if 
there had been no TPS ; 
 
10. To find out whether TPS tenants intend “To Buy HOS flat” or “Not to Buy HOS 
flat” after the resale of PRH is permitted ; 
 
11. To identify reasons or/and motivating factors contributing to making their 
decisions whether to purchase HOS flat or not after the resale of PRH is 
permitted and finally ; 
 
12. To find out their attitudes towards the TPS. 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology  
 
Actually, the research hypothesis is fundamental of Professor Ho’s. There are two 
parts in the empirical research, the time-series analysis and the cross-sectional 
analysis. For the time-series analysis, this study applies 8 variants of Professor Ho’s 
regression model. They are used for comparing the separate effects of AFC and TPS 
on the overall property market, the secondary property market and the second-hand 
HOS market (only focusing on the HOS free market). The transaction volume and 
the real transaction value in existing homes in each market are used as the dependent 
variables. On the other hand, five dummy variables, AFCDUMMY and 4 kinds of 
TPS DUMMIES, are adopted to analyze the real cause of the property market 
collapse since late 1997. Modifying Ho’s calculation, the difference between the spot 
exchange rate and the one-month forward exchange rate is used to proxy the 
financial crisis. (The reason behind is explained in Chapter 3.)  The AFCDUMMY 
is non-binary, which is normalized from 0 to 1 starting from 1998 Q1 and ending at 
1998 Q4 and afterwards. The pattern for TPSDUMMY1 is : 1997 Q4 and before = 0, 
1998 Q1 = 0.25, 1998 Q2 = 0.50, 1998 Q3 = 0.75, 1998 Q4 and afterwards = 1. The 
pattern for TPSDUMMY2 is : 1997 Q4 and before = 0, 1998 Q1 = 0.33, 1998 Q2 = 
0.66, 1998 Q3 and afterwards = 1. The pattern for TPSDUMMY3 is : 1997 Q4 and 
before = 0, 1998 Q1 = 0.50, 1998 Q2 and afterwards = 1. The pattern for 
TPSDUMMY4 is : 1997 Q4 and before = 0, 1998 Q1 and afterwards = 1. Using four 
different definitions of TPS Dummies allow to test alternative speeds of phasing in 
the TPS.  
 
For the cross-sectional analysis, a “Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder 
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Model7” is developed. In this model, emphasis is placed on the behaviour of public 
housing tenants under the TPS and in its absence. In particular, it focuses on the net 
effect of TPS on the desire to buy HOS flats and the policy efficiency of resource 
allocation. A large-scale survey (N=950) of TPS tenants was conducted in Phase 1, 
Phase 2 and Phase 3 for all the eighteen TPS public rental estates from mid June to 
Mid November. For the sake of obtaining unbiased samples, a stratified sampling8, a 
kind of standard probability sampling, is adopted as the research methodology so that 
the final sample is representative enough of the total population from which the 
sample is drawn. 10 part-time enumerators were employed for conducting such a 
large-scale face-to-face interview. They were actively trained in the aspects of 
interviewing techniques and housing policies. It was extremely important that all the 
interviewers interpreted questions and answers in the same way, otherwise 
information from different interviewees will not be comparable. Briefing sessions 
were therefore organized for interviewers before the main survey. A pilot survey was 
conducted in Kin Sang Estate on 20 June 2000. Following the trial run, some 
amendments on the questionnaire were made. The main survey lasted for nearly five 
months, commencing in late June and ending in mid November 2000. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
7 This is a behaviourial model in which analysis is stick into how different TPS tenants respond differently 
based on the timing (s ort ru  or long run) and the action (buy HOS flat or not with and without TPS). 
8 This is a procedure that consists of stratifying the population into a number of non-overlapping 
sub-population and then taking a sample from each stratum. If the items select d from each stratum 
constitute simple random samples, the entire procedure – first stra ification and then random sampling – is 
called stratified sampling. 
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1.4  Research Structure  
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two reviews the literature on 
the historical background of the evolution of TPS, the housing privatization in 
general, the Ho’s model and his empirical findings, and three crucial concepts for the 
policy analysis and evaluation. Chapter three is the theoretical frameworks for both 
the time-series analysis and the cross-sectional analysis and chapter four covers the 
research methodologies for them. Chapter five takes up both the econometric 
analysis (by EViews3.1) and the cross-sectional statistical analysis (by SPSS9.0), and 
the discussion of their results. Chapter six contains an evaluation of current TPS and 
offers policy recommendations. Finally, it draws a conclusion in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remark* : In this research, both published and unpublished (self-adjusted) 
monthly time-series data are used to do the regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first one briefly describes the historical 
background of the evolution of TPS. The second one provides a framework for 
understanding housing privatization in general. The third one is concerned with the 
theoretical framework developed by Ho (2000) and his empirical findings, and the 
fourth one introduces three crucial concepts for the policy analysis and evaluation.  
 
2.1 The Historical Background of the Evolution of TPS 
 
Since 1987, the Hong Kong government has favoured the expansion of owner 
occupation on both political and social grounds. By doing so, the HKHA introduced 
a pilot scheme to sell PRH to sitting tenants in 1991. Forrest and Murie pointed out 
that the scheme followed the general principle of “The Right to Buy (RTB)” which 
had been in operation in the UK for over fifteen years and over 1.6 million public 
sector dwellings had been sold under the scheme. It attempted to make a significant 
contribution towards achieving a higher rate of home ownership.  
 
The HKHA twice attempted to initiate similar schemes in 1991 and in 1992, but they 
failed. In 1991, only 7.4% of tenants opted for the scheme because of undesirable 
sale prices, poor physical conditions of the flats and stringent resale restrictions. In 
fact, the prices of flats represented about one third of prices of private sector flats of 
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similar sizes. Some tenants were concerned about the condition of their flats and the 
likely future costs of repair and maintenance. As to the second attempt in 1992, the 
revised proposal was nevertheless vetoed by the Executive Council. It was because 
the proposed terms of offer were not considered sufficiently attractive to achieve a 
high take-up rate, and that the proposed 30% threshold could lead to problems of 
management in a mixed ownership situation. As a result, the scheme was not pursued 
further. The failure, in effect, reduced about 1.4% of the home ownership rate in the 
public sector. 
 
With housing a top priority, the Chief Executive (CE), Mr. Tung Chee Hwa in his 
Policy Address set the target of achieving a 70% home ownership rate by 2007. This 
represented a major improvement on the existing rate of 52%. On top of an 
increasing supply of housing stock, there were two instruments to achieve it. The 
first one was a major expansion of existing subsidized home ownership and loan 
schemes, such as Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS), Sandwich Class Housing 
Scheme (SCHLS), Home Starter Loan Scheme (HSLS) and Mortgage Subsidy 
Scheme (MSS). The second one was to launch a scheme to sell public rental flats to 
existing tenants. To serve this purpose, the TPS revived in January 1998. Having 
gone through the two previous failures, the sale prices, the physical conditions and 
the resale restrictions were altered so as to attract more tenants to buy their own 
rental flats. In fact, the sale prices were set at 12% of their assessed market value. 
Besides, flexible mortgage arrangements would be negotiated with financial 
institution. The condition of flats was checked and essential renovation work was 
carried out before sale. Furthermore, the maintenance fund was established with 
contributions. All of these changes had attracted the sale of public rental flats among 
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sitting tenants, with 75% in Phase 1, 67% in Phase 2 and 69% in Phase 3 respectively. 
In flat, PRH tenants received a subsidy of about $230 a month for a rental flat in 
1997-98. Despite receiving heavy subsidization, many well-off PRH tenants 
continued to live in the rental flats even they owned properties. Worse still, the 
HKHA was running at an increasing deficit in managing the 670,000 PRH families. 
The success of the revival of TPS solved this problem to a certain extent. 
 
2.2 A Framework for Understanding Housing Privatization In 
General 
 
Lundqvist (1992) did a comparative study of the four advanced European economies 
with the housing privatization experience and suggested three general patterns of 
privatization. They were definancing, dispossession and deregulation. On the other 
hand, Heald (1984) identified four main types of privatization, including 
user-charges, contracting out, load shedding and liberalization. Lau (1997) believed 
that both of their categorizations were inadequate for understanding privatization of 
public housing in China. In his study of the Shenzhen housing privatization 
programme, there were fives types of housing privatization. They were definancing, 
disposal, deregulation, disengagement and delimitation. Since they were all started 
with the letter “D”, they were named as “five Ds of housing privatization 
strategies”. 
 
2.11 Definancing 
 
Ambrose and Barlow (1987) pointed out that government intervention might concern 
                                                                                   
 14 
 
finance. The government could change either the housing price or the purchasing 
power of households. This could take many forms, such as grant, interest free loan, 
low-interest loan, mortgage tax relief and concessionary land grant. Lau (1997) 
defined definancing occurred when the government refrained from financing. 
Alternatively, government might ask public housing service beneficiaries to pay a 
higher charge. This meant public housing users would bear a higher cost and heavier 
financial responsibility and it was part of government’s move to recover cost 
partially or fully from the consumers. 
 
2.12  Disposal 
 
Murie (1993) defined demunicipalisation as the reduction of municipal ownership 
and development activity. Examples included transfers of council housing to sitting 
tenants and independent organizations, and restricting capacity for new building by 
local housing authorities. Lunqvist (1992) also used the term “dispossession” to 
mean the same thing. Actually, the public sector would be restructured. 
  
2.13  Deregulation 
 
Lau stated that government intervention could also take the form of regulation of the 
quantity, quality and price of production factors, housings produced and housings in 
the stock. Regulatory intervention might concern how households and dwellings 
were matched, that was, the criteria for allocation and distribution. He further added 
that regulations also affected power. Examples included the forms and conditions for 
the resale of public sector housing and the forms of housing possession available. 
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Murie (1993) defined deregulation as a process of reducing or removing state 
regulation of private activity. Lau defined deregulation as a reduction of government 
involvement in the regulatory intervention activities. He believed that the 
government could also deregulate or relax its own resale restrictions over the public 
sales flats. This would promote more resale within the public sale flats market.   
 
2.14 Disengagement 
 
Lau used disengagement to mean the disengagement from the role of manager of its 
housing stocks and that of the direct provider of social housing. The most obvious 
examples of disengagement strategy are contracting out the management services to 
private sector or providing loan, rent allowances and housing vouchers to enable 
needy families to purchase or rent in the housing market. Other examples include the 
transfer of government responsibility to private individuals by encouraging self-help 
housing projects. 
 
2.15  Delimitation 
 
Lau used delimitation to describe government’s conscious and proactive attempts to 
delimit its role to be a housing provider, financier or regulator. As a result, it created 
space for the involvement of private developers in meeting housing demand. He 
further added that the slowdown or reduction of house building programme was also 
considered part of the move of government’s delimitation strategy. In fact, the 
delimitation strategy of housing privatization adopted by the government was subject 
to change due to the interaction of competitive forces within society. The clearer and 
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the smaller was the government’s role in housing, the greater the private sector 
housing developers’ involvement in the housing market and the higher the proportion 
of households in the home purchase market.  
 
Lau added that there were five main points when the Shenzhen government adopted 
the urban housing reform programme as the key instrument of housing privatization 
and marketisation. (p.8-10) 
 
1. The “welfare housing” approach, which required the government to take all the 
responsibilities, was worse than giving all the housing free of charge to sitting 
tenants. It was estimated that the total amount or recurrent subsidy paid for 20 
years on a flat was sufficient to build a new flat. 
 
2. If the urban housing reform started late, the cost of subsidy would be higher and 
the change of the existing housing system would become more difficult. 
 
3. The new arrangement would be less costly for the government. It was because 
the government was kept to be property owner when rent increase was 
supplemented by rent subsidy without selling the flats to sitting tenants. 
Therefore, the government had to continue to pay the recurrent subsidy.  
  
Using a cost and benefit analysis framework, Lau showed that the state would 
have to bear a higher cost with reference to Gaige’s findings. (see Table 2.1, 
Option B) According to the Shenzhen Housing Reform Office’s Assessment 
made in 1988, Option C was able to reduce the amount of government’s subsidy 
                                                                                   
 17 
 
when it was compared with Option A or B. The government could have saved 
about 190.5449 million yuan per annum by adopting Option C. 
 
Table 2.1  Urban Housing Reform Options Considered in 1988 
 Option A Option B Option C 
At 1987 price 
(Unit : Million Yuan) 
Status Quo : Low Rent 
(Note 1) and No Sale 
Rent Increase (Note 2) 
with Housing Subsidy 
(Note 3) but No Sale 
Rent Increase with 
Housing Subsidy and 
Sale of Flats to Sitting 
Tenants 
Total Expenditure per 
annum 
312.2303 433.3114 353.4391 
Total Revenue per annum 16.693 130.4639 248.4467 
Total Revenue minus 
Total Expenditure per 
annum (Negative Value 
indicates Level of Subsidy 
Required) 
-295.5373 -302.8475 -104.9924 
Note 1 : Rent remains low at 0.14 yuan per square metre construction space. 
Note 2 : Rent increased to 2.06 yuan per square metre construction space. 
Note 3 : Housing subsidy is equivalent to 22.06% of workers’ basic salary.  
Source : Shenzhen City Housing System Reform Office (1992) (ed.) Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Zhufang 
Zhidu Gaige (Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Housing System Reform), Shenzhen, Haitian 
Publishing House, p.131 
 
4. Urban housing reform would succeed only if the flats were sold to sitting 
tenants and prospective tenants. Through the sale scheme, workers would spend 
their housing subsidy on home purchase and the government would get the sale 
proceeds for use in constructing new housing for sale. As a result, the housing 
problem was solved. The transfer of property nominally owned by the state to 
the individual housing consumers would reduce the financial burden of the state. 
This was because it stopped paying for the subsidy on recurrent deficits of its 
housing stocks. This would also provide an opportunity for tenants to own the 
flats, which would eventually become a commodity available for exchange in 
the market. 
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5. The government would obtain revenue from housing consumers through the 
sale of public flats scheme. It would enable to circulate the housing funds that 
would help promoting the formation of a real estate market. The circulation 
started with selling the existing public flats to sitting tenants. Then, proceeds 
obtained would be used to build new flats for sale in the following round. 
Afterwards, proceeds from the sale of newly completed flats would be used to 
finance the building of new flats for sale. The sale of flats to workers was 
expected to reduce the financial burden of the government and enable people to 
spend their income and savings more on housing and housing-related items and 
less on unnecessary expensive items. As a result, inflation was expected to be 
checked and price of other commodities would be stabilized. 
 
Lau also pointed out three changes were required by turning housing into a market 
commodity. The first one was from allocation in kind to allocation in cash. The 
second one was drawing in individual finance while the third one was from welfare 
housing to commodified housing. 
 
 
2.2  Ho’s Theoretical Framework and His Empirical Findings 
 
Ho (2000) applied the time-series regression analysis to his own model for 
distinguishing the effect of AFC from that of the TPS on second-hand transaction 
volume in the housing market. Firstly, he applied his model to explain change in 
domestic demand of private sector in Hong Kong, which was the sum of private 
consumption and investment. S1 and S3 were seasonal dummies for the first and the 
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third quarters in 1998. GOVER90R was the rate of change of real government 
expenditures on goods and services. He indicated that such expenditures should have 
an impact on domestic demand of private sector through the multiplier effect9. 
Similarly, EXPORT90R and EXPORT90R(+1), which were the rates of change of 
real exports, current and leading one quarter, also had an impact on domestic demand 
of private sector through the multiplier effect. Because production preceded actual 
exports, the lag structure was advanced one quarter relative to that of government 
expenditures. A priori, he expected that both exports and government expenditures 
had positive effects on domestic demand. He found that the real interest rate10 and 
the inflation rate had negative effects on domestic demand. Table 2.2 shows his 
empirical findings. 
 
Table 2.2 : Dependent Variable : NETDOMDER (1984Q2 to 1997Q4) 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant term 7.0249 2.8052*** 
S1 -8.9173 -2.9421*** 
S3 -7.7852 -5.8722*** 
GOVER90R 0.26317 1.9948** 
EXPORT90R 0.18427 1.6075 
EXPORT90R(+1) 0.16797 2.4505** 
REALMRA(-1) -0.31523 -1.4794 
GDPDEFRA(-1) -0.23405 -1.1353 
R-bar squared = 0.61719 
DW - statistics = 2.0674 
* statistically significant at 10% level 
** statistically significant at 5% level 
*** statistically significant at 1% level 
Source : Ho, L.S. (2000) Principles of Public Policy Practice. Netherlands : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. p.190. 
                                                   
9 Multiplier effects usually take many quarters to work out. However, since it is working with year-on-year 
rate of change, there is already an implicit time delay factor for the multiplier effect. 
10 This is the standard mortgage rate, equal to the prime rate +1.75 up to February 1996, but declining 
smoothly to a weighed mortgage rate applicable at the st rt of 1999, minus th  quarter-to-quarter GDP 
implicit deflator inflation rate annualized. 
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Based on the estimated parameters and the actual values of the growth of real 
government expenditures, real exports, real interest rates and the actual rate of 
inflation from 1984 Q2 to 1997 Q4, he then forecasted the effects of the rate of 
change on domestic private demand. Along with the actual values of change, the 
forecast values are shown in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3 : Forecast for NETDOMDER from 1998Q1 to 1999Q3 (Units in per cent) 
Observation Actual Prediction Error 
1998Q1 -9.4982 -4.1557 -5.3425 
1998Q2 5.1774 3.3680 1.8094 
1998Q3 -7.2065 -1.3093 -5.8972 
1998Q4 -3.9714 -0.6435 -3.3279 
1999Q1 -8.9805 -3.1268 -5.8537 
1999Q2 8.6339 5.8449 2.7890 
1999Q3 4.8060 0.4650 4.3410 
Source : Ho, L.S. (2000) Principles of Public Policy Practice. Netherlands : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. p.190. 
  
As indicated in Table 2.3, the actual declines in 1998 Q1, 1998 Q3 and 1998Q4 are 
much larger than the predicted one. The huge error, amounting to 129%, 450% and 
517% of the predicted values in respective quarters, begs an explanation and cannot 
be attributed to random factors. To have an in-depth analysis, he further used a 
similar regression model but adding an additional, non-binary, CRISISDUMMY to 
capture any independent effect of the AFC that might have effects other than through 
exports and real interest rates. CRISISDUMMY was the forward rate discount of the 
HK dollar over the spot rate normalized to take on values between 0 and 1. Table 2.4 
shows the results. 
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Table 2.4 : Dependent Variable : NETDOMDER (1984Q2 to 1997Q4) 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant term 7.0875 2.8043*** 
S1 -8.7331 -2.8381*** 
S3 -7.6637 -5.6434*** 
GOVE90R 0.25724 1.9267* 
EXPORT90R 0.18491 1.6002 
EXPORT90R(+1) 0.15887 2.2242** 
REALMRA(-1) -0.31721 -1.4765 
GDPDEFRA(-1) -0.24168 -1.1600 
CRISISDUMMY -1.4681 -0.50375 
R-bar squared = 0.61102 
DW - statistics = 2.0539 
* statistically significant at 10% level 
** statistically significant at 5% level 
*** statistically significant at 1% level 
Source : Ho, L.S. (2000) Principles of Public Policy Practice. Netherlands : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. p.191. 
 
It shows that CRISISDUMMY carries the expected negative sign but it is not 
statistically significant at 5%. In the same way, the equation can be used to do a 
forecast, which is presented in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5 : Forecast for NETDOMDER from 1998Q1 to 1999Q3 (Units in per cent) 
Observation Actual Prediction Error 
1998Q1 -9.4982 -5.0188 -4.4794 
1998Q2 5.1774 1.9839 3.1935 
1998Q3 -7.2065 -2.6994 -4.5071 
1998Q4 -3.9714 -0.9596 -3.0118 
1999Q1 -8.9805 -3.6761 -5.3044 
1999Q2 8.6339 5.5848 3.0491 
1999Q3 4.8060 0.2956 4.5104 
Source : Ho, L.S. (2000) Principles of Public Policy Practice. Netherlands : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. p.192. 
 
Table 2.5 shows that adding the CRISISDUMMY does generally reduce the 
predicted growth rates in the forecast period. Any negative errors of the forecasts are 
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reduced, but it also increases the positive errors. Ho accounted that it explained part 
of the economic declines, but it was overly pessimistic in explaining the recovery. 
That is, given the subsiding of the AFC after 1999 Q1, the model reflects that the 
economy should have recovered faster, but the economy did not behave as predicted. 
 
Based on the previous empirical findings, he analyzed the effects of the TPS, neatly 
described as a disruption to the ecology of the housing market, in a sequential order. 
Nevertheless, they took effect immediately. He mentioned that : 
 
“This is like a train engine pushing a series of linked 
carriages. Even though the force comes from the 
engine at the end of the chain, there is virtually no 
difference in the timing of the motion of the first 
carriage as compared with the last. Moreover, we have 
good reasons to believe that the prices of luxury 
homes, which corresponds to the theoretically last 
‘carriage’ affected, would fall even more than the 
entry-level home do. Luxury homebuyers are almost 
always already homeowners and such owners may 
depend entirely on their ability to sell their existing 
homes before they could buy better ones. On the other 
hand, the entry-level homebuyers have never owned 
homes before and have all along depended on their 
cash savings for their buying power.” (p.19) 
 
He added that the collapse in turnover in the housing market was particularly 
damaging for the Hong Kong economy. Since quite a lot of key sectors depended on 
housing turnover for their business, the collapse in turnover virtually eroded the basis 
of their survival. The most serious one was the property brokerage sector. Others also 
hit seriously included decorators, movers, lawyers, bankers, stockbrokers, retailers, 
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construction materials’ sellers and real estate developers. As the values of properties 
and collaterals fell, the banks had to curtail their lending activities. 
 
To complement the previous time-series regression analysis, Ho adopted another 
model to distinguish the effect of AFC from that of the TPS on second-hand 
transaction volume in the housing market. He used the volume of transaction in 
existing homes as the dependent variable, and he used the difference between the 
Spot Exchange Rate (SER) and the one-year Forward Exchange Rate (FER) to proxy 
the financial crisis. This CRISISDUMMY was non-binary, but normalized to have a 
minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 1. The TPSDUMMY9712 was a 
dummy variable that was 0 for all months before December 1997 and 1 for all 
months in December 1997 and onwards. PRIMR was a price appreciation variable11, 
which showed the percentage change of year-on-year property price increase over the 
previous 6 months. 
 
Table 2.6 : Dependent Variable : Second-hand Transaction Volume (1996M3 to 
2000M2) 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant term 10261.0 12.067*** 
CRISISDUMMY -2949.1 -1.7952* 
TPSDUMMY9712 -3965.3 -2.8409*** 
PRIMR 33.289 1.5030 
R-bar squared = 0.49601 
DW -statistics = 2.0709 (AR(1) procedure was used to adjust for serial correlation) 
* statistically significant at 10% level 
*** statistically significant at 1% level 
Source : Ho, L.S. (2000) Principles of Public Policy Practice. Netherlands : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. p.189. 
                                                   
11 In general, price appreciation provides an incentive and a greater ability for homeowners to trade up, thus 
pushing up second-hand transaction. 
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As shown in Table 2.6, although both the CRISISDUMMY and TPSDUMMY9712 
carry the expected negative sign, only TPSDUMMY9712 is statistically significant at 
1%. Besides, the slope coefficient of TPSDUMMY9712 is greater than that of 
CRISISDUMMY by approximately 2.5 times. 
 
2.3  Three Crucial Concepts for the Policy Analysis and 
Evaluation 
 
To have an in-depth analysis of the impact of TPS on the Hong Kong housing market, 
it is vital to introduce the concepts of economic efficiency, policy efficiency and 
equity. As a result, the evaluation of the implementation by the HKHA can be 
objectively analyzed and it provides the way for the policy recommendations to be 
made in Chapter Six. 
 
2.31  Economic Efficiency 
 
Economic efficiency in the economic literature conceptually simply means making 
the most out of given, limited resource.12 Ho (1995) pointed out that economic 
efficiency could be attained in the absence of technological externalities and 
monopolization in the following way. Devoting resources to produce what was 
valued by consumers (consumers’ sovereignty), producing on the production frontier 
(production efficiency) and maximizing the value of consumption (consumption 
efficiency) by letting both final goods and factors of production realize their 
maximum values in the open market. Therefore, economic efficiency has to be 
                                                                                   
 25 
 
improved by allowing greater choices over the utilization of the existing public 
housing units, including the right to resell them in the open market.13 
 
In general, from a static point of view, economic efficiency in the use of any resource 
would require open competition for its use. Removing restrictions to resale by 
purchasers will contribute to economic efficiency because resale in open market will 
guarantee that the housing unit will go to whoever making the most out of its use in 
the long run. From a dynamic point of view, however, one must further consider 
possible disruption to the market and particularly destruction of market value as a 
result of opening up of competition. 
 
2.32   Policy Efficiency 
 
Beside economic efficiency, another important concept of efficiency, dubbed “Policy 
efficiency”, was defined by Ho (1995) as the degree of achieving a stipulated policy 
objective given the resources devoted to the purpose. Given the policy goal, the TPS 
should be evaluated for its effectiveness of providing the target group households 
with better housing. It should, of course, also be evaluated against the general 
criterion of economic efficiency. Without doubt, the provision of public housing is 
originally targeted at helping the lower income households through an in-kind 
transfer14. Therefore, policy efficiency means to give the greatest help for the lower 
income households out of the public resources available in a given period of time. 
                                                                                                                                                
12 Pareto efficiency is a more technical spelling out of what is required to be economically efficient. 
13 Ng (1983) showed that although externalities and different degrees of monopolization abound in the real 
world , the first-best rules “maximizes expected benefit” in a “third best” world. As a result, the welfare 
assumed to be improved by removing restrictions to the use of assets.  
14 In-kind transfer means that the subsidy is in the form of direct subsidized housing, but not the cash grant. 
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2.33  Equity 
 
In the public finance literature, equity has two meanings. The first one is horizontal 
equity while the second one is vertical equity. According to Ho (1995), horizontal 
equity was “the equal treatment of equals”, while vertical equity was the “equitably 
differentiated treatment of unequals”. An extension of the meaning of equal 
treatment of equals requires equal rights of players in the market, or free competition 
in the open market. He considered that auctioning off an item was therefore more 
equitable than a lottery draw or allocation on a “first-come-first-served basis”. 
Actually, open market among eligible households for public housing units is both 
equitable and efficient, as it will better match the housing units to the real needs of 
tenants. Today, queuing15 and lottery draws are still heavily used in the allocation of 
public housing units among prospective tenants and the allocation of HOS flats 
among prospective buyers. He considered that these methods of allocation are 
arbitrary and thus inequitable. 
                                                   
15 As of 2000, the average waiting time for PRH is 6 years.
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR BOTH THE 
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS AND THE CROSS-SECTIONAL 
ANALYSIS  
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework for the Time-series Analysis   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Ho (2000) distinguished the effect of AFC from that of 
the TPS on the second-hand transaction volume in the housing market by the 
time-series regression analysis. Followed with his model, three major types of 
models are developed to compare the separate effects of AFC and TPS on the overall 
property market, the secondary property market and the second-hand HOS market 
(focusing on the HOS free market). There are 8 dependent variables. They are : the 
transaction volume (in no. of units) of overall property market (OPMVOL), the real 
transaction value (in constant $) of overall property market (OPMRTV), the 
transaction volume of secondary property market (SPMVOL), the real transaction 
value of secondary property market (SPMRTV), the transaction volume of 
second-hand HOS market (SHHOSVOL), the real transaction value of second-hand 
HOS market (SHHOSRTV), the transaction volume of HOS free market 
(HOSFMVOL) and the real transaction value of HOS free market (HOSFMRTV). 
On the other hand, there are 5 independent variables. They are : the Asian Financial 
Crisis Dummy (AFCDUMMY) and 4 patterns of the Tenants Purchase Scheme 
DUMMIES (TPSDUMMY1, TPSDUMMY2, TPSDUMMY3 and 
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TPSDUMMY4). Modifying Ho’s calculation, the difference between the Spot 
Exchange Rate (SER) and the one-month Forward Exchange Rate (FER) is used to 
proxy the financial crisis. To explain the reason for it, it is essential to introduce both 
the linked exchange rate system in Hong Kong. 
 
Under the linked exchange rate system, three note-issuing banks (the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Standard Chartered Bank and the China Bank) 
will pay the government’s Exchange Fund for additional Certificates of Indebtedness 
in US dollars at a fixed rate of HK $7.8 = US $1 when new bank-notes are issued. 
When bank-notes are withdrawn from circulation and the note-issuing banks 
surrender Certificates of Indebtedness, the Exchange Fund will pay them the 
equivalent in US dollars at the same fixed rate. The exchange rate of the US dollars, 
which a bank customer will obtain, however, will continue to be determined by 
market forces. This means that there are two exchange rates between the HK dollar 
and the US dollar, that are, the linked rate and the market rate. 
 
If traders expect the HK dollar to devalue or lack confidence in the HK dollar, they 
will buy US dollar in the forward market. This will raise the forward value of the US 
dollar. The premium compared to the spot value can be considered as an insurance 
premium which gives traders protection against large exchange losses. 
  
Therefore, the spot-forward exchange rate differential is a good proxy variable for 
the AFC. Besides, instead of one-year forward rate, the one-month forward rate is 
used as alternative variable because it appears to be even more sensitive to changes 
in the mood of the market, although it may be caused by the intervention of market 
                                                                                   
 29 
 
noise.    
 
In fact, there are some other key independent variables that are relevant to the 
transaction volume and the real transaction value of the overall property market, 
secondary property market and the second-hand HOS market in Hong Kong. The 
most obvious one is the quality issue. In fact, the quality of HOS gets worse and 
worse than before and it probably lowers both the transaction volume and the real 
transaction value of second-hand HOS market. Although the quality issue is an 
important factor to affect the Hong Kong housing market, it is difficult to have an 
objective standard to measure it. Moreover, the research only aims at distinguishing 
the effect of AFC from that of the TPS on the overall property market, the secondary 
property market and the second-hand HOS market. Therefore, the quality issue is not 
selected to be an independent variable for analyzing the transaction volume and the 
real transaction value of overall property market, secondary property market and the 
second-hand HOS market. The same logic is applicable to other relevant variables, 
such as the employment rate and the economic growth rate. 
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3.2 Postulates for the Effects of TPS on the Overall Property 
Market, the Secondary Property Market and the Second-hand 
HOS Market for the Time-series Analysis 
 
If the slope coefficients of TPSDUMMIES are larger and more statistically 
significant than that of the AFCDUMMY on the OPMVOL and the OPMRTV, the 
effect of the TPS on the overall property market is concluded to be greater than that 
of the AFC, and vice versa. Similarly, if the slope coefficients of TPSDUMMIES are 
larger and more statistically significant than that of the AFCDUMMY on the 
transaction volume and the real transaction value on the secondary property market, 
the second-hand HOS market and HOS free market, it can be concluded that the 
effects of TPS are greater than that of the AFC on these respective markets.  
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Figure 3.1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS 
 
 
HO’S MODEL  
Explanation of Unprecedented 
Deep Recession in 1998 
  
 
          Dependent Variable               Independent Variables 
 
               Transaction Volume of            Asian Financial Crisis Dummy 
          Secondary Property Market        Tenants Purchase Scheme Dummy 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -   
RESEARCH MODEL  
Explanation of Collapse of Overall Property Market, 
Secondary Property Market and Second-hand HOS Market 
by Asian Financial Crisis and Tenants Purchase Scheme since 1998 
 
 
 
   Overall Property Market          Secondary Property Market       Second-hand HOS Market 
  Dependent Variables      Independent Variables     Dependent Variables         Independent Variables    Dependent Variables          Independent Variable 
Transaction Volume            AFCDummy.           Transaction Volume            AFCDummy.           Transaction Volume          AFCDummy 
 of Overall Property Market ;      TPSDummy1, TPSDummy2,       of Secondary Property Market ;      TPSDummy1, TPSDummy2,     of Second-hand HOS Market ;     TPSDummy1, TPSDummy2, 
 Real Transaction Value            TPSDummy3, TPSDummy4.       Real Transaction Value            TPSDummy3, TPSDummy4. Real Transaction Value        TPSDummy3, TPSDummy4. 
of Overall Property Market                              of Secondary Property Market                          of Second-hand HOS Market ;            
                                                                                                        Transaction Volume of  
HOS Free Market ;  
Real Transaction Value   
of HOS Free Market 
                                                                                   
 32 
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
Since the TPS has been implemented for 3 years only up to date, the time-series 
analysis is still subject to limitations in distinguishing the effects of AFC from that of 
the TPS on the overall property market, the secondary property market and the 
second-hand HOS market. (only focusing on the HOS free market) To provide an 
alternative test for the validity of the hypothesis other than the time-series regression 
model, a “Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model” is developed for 
estimating the effect of TPS on the HOS market using cross-sectional analysis. In 
this model, emphasis is placed on the behaviour of public housing tenants under the 
TPS and in its absence. It focuses on the net ownership effect of TPS on the purchase 
of HOS flat and the policy efficiency of resource allocation. A large-scale survey is 
conducted to ask the tenants who live in Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 316 of TPS. 
Actually, there are three core questions. In particular, the interviewers will first ask 
the tenants about their tenure choices of buying PRH. There are three options for 
them to choose from. The first one is “Intend to Buy PRH”, the second one is “Has 
Already Bought PRH” and the third one is “Will Not Buy the PRH”. Afterwards, the 
interviewers will ask the target tenant whether he/she would buy a HOS flat or not if 
the TPS had not been implemented. The “target tenants”17 here refers to those who 
either intend to buy or have already bought their PRH. There are also three options 
for them to choose from. The first one is “Purchase a HOS Flat in the Short Run”, the 
second one is “Purchase a HOS Flat in the Long Run” and the third one is “Do Not 
Purchase a HOS Flat in both the Short Run and the Long Run”. Then, the 
                                                   
16 There are 27525 TPS tenants for Phase 1, 27161 for Phase 2 and 27415 for Phase 3. 
17 There are 20272(75%) TPS target tenants for Phase 1, 18394(67%) for Phase 2 and 19012(69%) for Phase 3. 
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interviewers further ask the target tenant whether he/she will buy a HOS flat or not 
after the resale of PRH is permitted. There are two options for them to choose from. 
The first one is “Will Purchase a HOS Flat” and the second one is “Will Not 
Purchase a HOS Flat”. With reference to these three questions, it constitutes the 
theoretical framework of the model. To sum up, there are six effects for the TPS on 
the purchase of HOS flat for the target tenants. Three effects are either positive or 
negative and the remaining three are neutrals. It should be noted that one of them 
involves the concept of time-shift. They are defined as the short-run negative effect, 
the long-run negative effect, the long-run positive effect, the short-run negative but 
long-run positive effect and the neutral effects. The following Decision Diagram 
shows the options facing PRH tenants under the TPS. 
34 
Figure 3.2 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
TIME-SHIFT MULTI-DIMENSIONAL HOUSING LADDER MODEL 
(Decision Diagram for Option Facing PRH Tenants under the TPS) 
 
Will Buy a TPS flat ? Will Buy a HOS Housing Will Buy a HOS Housing Will Buy a HOS Housing After the 
 in the Short Run Without 
TPS ? 
in the Long Run Without 
TPS ? 
Resale of PRH Housing is Permitted ? 
   Yes 
 Yes NA (Short-Run Negative but Long-Run Positive Effect) 
   No 
   (Short-Run Negative Effect) 
   Yes 
Yes  Yes Neutral Effect 
   No 
   Long-Run Negative Effect 
 No  Yes 
   (Long-Run Positive Effect) 
  No No 
   Neutral Effect 
The following part is not the study focus because its effects on the HOS market are probably small.* 
 Have you applied for HOS Have you applied for HOS  
 from 1994 to 1998 ? since 1998 ? Collaborative Analysis 
    
 Yes Yes No Effect 
    
No  No Negative Effect 
    
 No Yes Positive Effect 
    
  No No Effect 
* It should be noted that the total population for those who say no to buying TPS is so large that, though the  
marginal effect is small, the total effect may be quite significant. 
                                                                                   
 35 
 
3.4 Definitions of the Operational Concepts for the Cross-sectional 
Analysis  
 
Short-Run Negative Effect is defined as : if there had not been the TPS, the target 
tenant would buy a HOS flat in the Short Run. However, after the resale of PRH is 
permitted, he/she will not buy any HOS flat. 
 
Long-Run Negative Effect is defined as : if there had not been the TPS, the target 
tenant would buy a HOS flat in the Long Run. However, after the resale of PRH is 
permitted, he/she will not buy any HOS flat. 
 
Long-Run Positive Effect is defined as : if there had not been the TPS, the target 
tenant would not buy a HOS flat both in the Short Run and the Long Run. However, 
after the resale of PRH is permitted, he/she will buy a HOS flat. 
 
Short-Run Negative but Long-Run Positive Effect is defined as : if there had not 
been the TPS, the target tenant would buy a HOS flat in the Short Run. However, the 
target tenant, who buy a PRH flat in the short run, will trade up a HOS flat in the 
long run. 
 
Short Run is defined as Within Three Years in this model. 
 
Long Run is defined as Beyond Three Years in this model. 
 
To sum up, there are two layers for the target tenants being analyzed. 
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First Layer   :  1. If there had not been the TPS, the target tenant would buy a 
HOS flat in the Short Run. 
 
2. If there had not been the TPS, the target tenant would buy a 
HOS flat in the Long Run. 
 
3. If there had not been the TPS, the target tenant would still not 
buy a HOS flat in both the Short Run and the Long Run. 
 
Second Layer  : 4. After the resale of PRH is permitted, the target tenant will buy 
a HOS flat. 
5. After the resale of PRH is permitted, the target tenant will not 
buy a HOS flat. 
 
The Analyses of the Combinations for the First Layer and the Second Layer 
(Focusing on the Ownership Effect) : 
 
The combination of 1 & 4 will induce the substitution of a PRH and a HOS flat 
between the Short Run and the Long Run by the TPS. 
 
The combination of 1 & 5 will adversely affect the Housing Ladder due to the 
decrease on the purchase of HOS flat by the TPS in the short run. 
 
The combination of 2 & 4 will cause no effect on the Housing Ladder. 
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The combination of 2 & 5 will adversely affect the Housing Ladder due to the 
decrease on the purchase of HOS flat by the TPS in the long run. 
 
The combination of 3 & 4 will contribute the Housing Ladder due to the increase on 
the purchase of HOS flat by the TPS in the long run. 
 
The combination of 3 & 5 will cause no effect on the Housing Ladder. 
 
The Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model can also be clarified 
through the following Cross-tabulation Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38
Figure 3.3 
Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model 
(Cross-tabulation Analysis) 
 
 After the resale of PRH is 
permitted,  
 
will you buy a HOS flat ?  
 Yes No Total 
If there is no TPS?      Buy in the Short Run  Count  
will you buy a HOS flat?   (within 3 years)  
 
Short-Run Negative but  
Long-Run Positive Effect 
Short-Run Negative Effect  
                      Buy in the Long Run  
Count    
                      (beyond 3 years) 
Neutral Effect 
 
 
 
Long-Run Negative Effect  
                      Not Buy in both      
Count 
                      the SR & the LR  
 
Long-Run Positive Effect 
 
 
Neutral Effect  
                                      Total  
 
 
   
                                                                                   
 39 
 
3.5 Measurement of the Definitions for the Cross-sectional Analysis  
 
Short-Run Negative Effect is measured by the Short-Run Negative Coefficient 
(SRNC). It is calculated by the total number of target tenants, indicating the choices 
of 1 & 5, divided by the total number of the total population studied. 
 
Long-Run Negative Effect is measured by the Long-Run Negative Coefficient 
(LRNC). It is calculated by the total number of target tenants, indicating the choices 
of 2 & 5, divided by the total number of the total population studied. 
 
Long-Run Positive Effect is measured by the Long-Run Positive Coefficient 
(LRPC). It is calculated by the total number of target tenants, indicating the choices 
of 3 & 4, divided by the total number of the total population studied. 
 
Short-Run Negative but the Long-Run Positive Effect is measured by the 
Short-Run Negative but the Long-Run Positive Coefficient (SRNLRPC)18. It is 
calculated by the total number of target tenants, indicating the choices of 1 & 2, 
divided by the total number of the total population studied. 
 
 
 
                                                   
18 Since this coefficient involves two different parts, its measurement should also be divided into two 
different focuses. The first part is “Short-Run Negative” while the econd part is “Long-Run Posit ve” 
When this coefficient focuses on the analysis of Short Run, we should only calculate it  Short-Run 
Negative Effect. In the contrast, when this coefficient focuses on the analysis of Long Run, we should only 
calculate its Long-Run Po itive Effect.  
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3.6 Equations for the “Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder 
Model” for the Cross-sectional Analysis by Cross-tabulation 
 
With the above-captioned fundamental theoretical framework, definitions of operational 
concepts and its measurements in the model, a cross-tabulation statistical analysis is 
developed for estimating the net ownership effect of TPS on the HOS market. Based on 
this model, four equations are set up.  
 
Equation 1 (For 1998 – 2001, Short-Run Effects Only) 
 
Effect on Qty of HOSt demanded in year t = [SRNC + SRNLRPC (SRNC)] x TPSt  
 
where    Qty of HOSt  = Decline in demand for HOS flats among TPS buyers over ten 
years 
             SRNC = Short-Run Negative Coefficient (absolute value) 
  SRNLRPC (SRNC) = Short-Run Negative but Long-Run Positive Coefficient (With 
Short-Run Negative As Calculation Focus) (absolute value) 
             TPSt = Number of Households in TPS Estates in Each Phase 
  
Equation 2 (For 2002 – 2007, Both Short-Run Effects & Long-Run Effects Included) 19 
 
Effect on Qty of HOSt demanded in year t = [SRNC + SRNLRPC (SRNC)] x TPSt  
                        + [LRNC – LRPC – SRNLRPC(LRPC)] x TPSt-3 
  
where         LRNC = Long-Run Negative Coefficient (absolute value) 
             LRPC  = Long-Run Positive Coefficient (absolute value) 
   SRNLRPC (LRPC)  = Short-Run Negative but Long-Run Positive Coefficient (With 
Long-Run Positive As Calculation Focus) (absolute value) 
 
                                                   
19 Since the LRNC, the LRPC and the SRNLRPC (LRPC) only take effects after 3 years, the relevant 
subscript (t - 3) is added to them. 
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Equation 3 (Average for 1998 – 2001, Short Run Effects Only) 20     
 
Effect on Qty of HOSt demanded in year t = [SRNC + SRNLRPC(SRNC)] x (TPSt +TPSt-1 +TPSt-2) 
                 3 
 
Equation 4 (Average for 2002 – 2007, Both Short Run Effects & Long Run Effects Included)    
 
Effect on Qty of HOSt demanded in year t = [SRNC + SRNLRPC (SRNC)] x (TPSt +TPSt-1 +TPSt-2) 
                 3 
          +[LRNC-LRPC-SRNLRPC (LRPC)] x (TPSt-3 + TPSt-4+ TPSt-5) 
                                    3    
 
    
One should bear in mind that the above three equations only work well when there is 
“Smooth Market Flow21” for both the supply and the demand of the purchase and 
sale of the PRH and the HOS flat both in the short run and the long run.  
 
 
3.8 Postulates for the Implementation of TPS on the Purchase of 
HOS Flat for the Cross-sectional Analysis by Cross-tabulation 
 
Proposition 1 : If the net effect of the Short-Run Negative Coefficient, the 
Long-Run Negative Coefficient and the Short-Run Negative but the Long-Run 
Positive Coefficient (with the Short-Run Negative Coefficient as the Calculation 
Focus) is greater than that of the Long-Run Positive Coefficient and the Short-Run 
Negative but the Long-Run Positive Coefficient (with the Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient as the Calculation Focus), the purchase of HOS flat by the target TPS 
                                                                                                                                                
 
20 Since both equation 1 and 2 calculates all the effects by exact one year only, they may also be divided by 
3 on average. Besides, it is assumed that the percentage of TPS tenants whose intentions to purchase HOS 
are affected in different ways staying the same for all phases of TPS estates. 
21 The Smooth Market Flow here refers to the potential demanders and the potential suppliers in the market 
are large enough so that the normal transaction in the free market mechanism is kep  without any blockage.  
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tenants will decrease. Consequently, the housing ladder will then be adversely 
affected, and vice versa. 
 
Proposition 2 : It is implicit that there must be some changes on the target TPS 
tenants’ intention to purchase HOS flat due to the TPS. This means that there must 
be some decreases of the target tenants of the combinations 1 & 5 and 2 & 5 on the 
one hand. On the other hand, there must be some increases of the target tenants of the 
combination of 3 & 4. Based on the principle of policy efficiency of resource 
allocation, the wealthier PRH tenants should shift to buy HOS flat while the poorer 
PRH tenants should either remain as PRH renters or become PRH owners. Therefore, 
if the wealth of target tenants for the combinations of 1 & 5 and 2 & 5 is greater than 
that of the target tenants for the combination of 3 & 4, the resource reallocation is 
concluded to be ‘policy inefficient’, and vice versa.  
 
To sum up, both the theoretical frameworks for the time-series analysis and the 
cross-sectional analysis are complementary to analyze the effect of TPS on the HOS 
market, the secondary property market and the overall property market. The research 
framework is summarized on the next page. 
Figure 3.4 
Research Framework for both the Time-series Analysis and the Cross-sectional Analysis 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES FOR BOTH THE 
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS AND THE CROSS-SECTIONAL 
ANALYSIS  
 
4.1 Research Methodology for the Time-series Analysis  
 
The research methodologies employed for the time-series analysis are the data 
collection and the data manipulation of secondary data from the HKHA, the 
Centaline Property Agency Ltd22 and the Monthly Report on the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). 
   
4.2 Data Collection 
    
The data of the monthly transaction volume of overall property market, the monthly 
nominal transaction value of overall property market, the monthly transaction 
volume of secondary property market, the monthly nominal transaction value of 
secondary property market, the monthly transaction volume of second-hand HOS 
market and the monthly nominal transaction value of second-hand HOS market are 
all collected from the Centaline Property Agency Ltd. On the other hand, the data of 
the monthly transaction volume of HOS secondary market and the monthly nominal 
transaction value of HOS secondary market are collected from the HKHA. The price 
                                                   
22 The Centaline Property Agency Ltd is one of the biggest property agents in Hong Kong. 
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deflator is collected from the Monthly Report on the CPI. The data of the SER and 
the one-month FER are obtained by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). 
 
4.3 Data Manipulation 
 
Since the data of the monthly transaction volume of HOS free market and the 
monthly nominal transaction value of HOS free market do not exist directly, they are 
calculated by the monthly transaction volume of second-hand HOS market and the 
monthly transaction value of second-hand HOS market minus the monthly 
transaction volume of HOS secondary market and the monthly nominal transaction 
value of HOS secondary market respectively. Mr. Wong Leung Sing, the Market 
Research Manager of Centaline Property Ltd, through the telephone interview, 
explained that : 
 
“Both the sale and purchase of second-hand HOS flat in the HOS 
secondary market and the HOS free market had to register at Land 
Registry WITHIN one month after the formal contract had been 
signed. He pointed out that the purchaser of second-hand HOS flat 
in the HOS free market generally signed the formal contract after 
they had signed the temporary contract two weeks later. On the 
other hand, as to the HOS secondary market, the figures provided by 
the HKHA were based on the Day of Registration of Ownership23. 
Therefore, the figures had to be re-counted based on the Temporary 
Contract Date24 so that the realistic timing of housing market flow 
was precisely estimated. He further added that it was general for a 
purchaser in the HOS secondary market to sign from temporary 
                                                   
23 The Day of Registration of Ownership is the date marked by the Hong Kong Housing Department 
internally for administrative purpose only. 
24 The Temporary Contract Date is the date for both prospective HOS buyer and prospective HOS seller to 
first signed up semi-legally in the process of HOS transaction.  
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contract to formal contract ranging from half a month to one and 
half month.”  
 
As a result, the best way to estimate both the transaction volume and the nominal 
transaction value of HOS Free Market is as follows. Firstly, it takes one month as 
the time lag for the transaction volume and the nominal transaction value of 
second-hand HOS Market minus the transaction volume and the nominal 
transaction value of HOS Secondary Market respectively. Secondly, it uses 
QUARTER as the analytical unit. Therefore, the bias can be minimized.  
 
As to the AFCDUMMY, it is firstly calculated by the difference between the 
one-month FER minus the SER. Then, the largest quarter difference is set at 1 and 
the smallest is set at zero in the normalization.  It should be remarked that the 
calculations for all the time-series regression models are on the “Real Value”. 
Therefore, all the above-mentioned “Nominal Values” have to be divided by the 
Price Deflator. The Price Deflator here used is “Composite Consumer Price Index”. 
The figures for them are shown in Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.    
    TRANSACTION VOLUME AND REAL TRANSACTION VALUE OF HOS HOUSINGS 
       Second-hand HOS Market     HOS Secondary Market (Regist. Day)HOS Secondary Market (Temp. Contract)                   HOS Open Market
Year Price DeflatorVolume NTV ($M) RTV ($M) Volume NTV ($M) RTV ($M) Volume NTV ($M) RTV ($M) Volume NTV ($M) RTV ($M)
01/96 104.70 415 566.650 541.213 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 415 566.65 541.213
02/96 105.70 341 517.390 489.489 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 341 517.39 489.489
03/96 106.30 479 700.440 658.928 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 479 700.44 658.928
96Q1 1235 1,784.480 1,689.630 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1235 1,784.480 1,689.630
04/96 107.60 363 534.800 497.026 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 363 534.80 497.026
05/96 107.80 761 1,180.100 1,094.712 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 761 1,180.10 1,094.712
06/96 108.40 448 738.790 681.541 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 448 738.79 681.541
96Q2 1572 2,453.690 2,273.279 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1572 2,453.690 2,273.279
07/96 108.40 555 827.020 762.934 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 555 827.02 762.934
08/96 108.60 515 785.440 723.241 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 515 785.44 723.241
09/96 109.70 581 887.450 808.979 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 581 887.45 808.979
96Q3 1651 2,499.910 2,295.154 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1651 2499.910 2295.154
10/96 110.50 674 1,033.820 935.584 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 674 1,033.82 935.584
11/96 110.90 747 1,174.980 1,059.495 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 747 1,174.98 1,059.495
12/96 111.40 677 1,121.590 1,006.813 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 677 1,121.59 1,006.813
96Q4 2098 3330.390 3001.892 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2098 3330.390 3001.892
01/97 111.30 785 1,336.290 1,200.620 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 785 1,336.29 1,200.620
02/97 112.30 570 1,028.150 915.539 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 570 1,028.15 915.539
03/97 112.50 651 1,183.650 1,052.133 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 651 1,183.65 1,052.133
97Q1 2006 3548.090 3168.292 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2006 3548.090 3168.292
04/97 113.60 1204 2,470.090 2,174.375 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1204 2,470.09 2,174.375
05/97 114.00 924 1,928.770 1,691.904 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 924 1,928.77 1,691.904
06/97 114.50 654 1,452.170 1,268.271 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 654 1,452.17 1,268.271
97Q2 2782 5851.030 5134.549 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2782 5851.030 5134.549
07/97 115.30 984 2,351.240 2,039.237 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 984 2,351.24 2,039.237
08/97 115.50 588 1,355.350 1,173.463 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 588 1,355.35 1,173.463
09/97 115.90 576 1,290.590 1,113.538 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 576 1,290.59 1,113.538
97Q3 2148 4997.180 4326.238 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2148 4997.180 4326.238
10/97 116.80 671 1,534.770 1,314.015 165 318.861 272.997 159 295.126 252.676 671 1,534.77 1,314.015
11/97 117.00 762 1,743.380 1,490.068 117 204.377 174.681 111 201.474 172.200 603 1,448.254 1,237.392
12/97 117.20 333 702.670 599.548 127 212.504 181.317 109 170.855 145.781 222 501.196 427.348
97Q4 1766 3980.820 3403.632 409 735.742 628.996 379 667.455 570.657 1496 3484.220 2978.755
01/98 117.30 343 653.140 556.812 73 102.360 87.263 81 108.882 92.824 234 482.285 411.031
02/98 117.70 339 553.030 469.864 85 120.949 102.760 83 111.092 94.386 258 444.148 377.041
03/98 118.00 561 938.550 795.381 94 123.867 104.972 99 131.966 111.836 478 827.458 700.996
98Q1 1243 2144.720 1822.057 252 347.176 294.996 263 351.940 299.045 970 1753.891 1489.067
04/98 119.00 399 695.960 584.840 95 121.769 102.327 79 101.843 85.582 300 563.994 473.005
05/98 119.20 394 653.670 548.381 71 90.321 75.773 78 96.904 81.295 315 551.827 462.799
06/98 119.00 302 470.420 395.311 75 90.048 75.671 82 111.139 93.394 224 373.516 314.016
98Q2 1095 1820.050 1528.532 241 302.138 253.770 239 309.886 260.272 839 1489.337 1249.819
07/98 119.00 337 470.200 395.126 100 119.720 100.605 84 94.487 79.401 255 359.061 301.732
08/98 118.60 362 542.560 457.470 56 67.271 56.721 47 58.037 48.935 278 448.073 378.070
09/98 118.80 266 353.230 297.332 57 69.554 58.547 72 82.945 69.819 219 295.193 248.397
98Q3 965 1365.990 1149.928 213 256.545 215.873 203 235.469 198.155 752 1102.327 928.198
10/98 116.90 265 337.710 288.888 77 88.790 75.954 105 126.384 108.113 193 254.765 219.069
11/98 116.10 391 493.860 425.375 189 224.620 193.471 311 369.641 318.382 286 367.476 317.262
12/98 115.30 694 888.010 770.173 395 465.269 403.529 512 613.670 532.238 383 518.369 451.792
98Q4 1350 1719.580 1484.436 661 778.679 672.954 928 1109.695 958.732 862 1140.610 988.123
01/99 116.00 851 1,083.010 933.629 791 966.935 833.565 663 809.341 697.708 339 469.340 401.392
02/99 115.60 841 1,088.460 941.574 302 375.653 324.959 246 314.881 272.388 178 279.119 243.867
03/99 114.90 796 1,045.470 909.896 260 333.477 290.232 241 312.699 272.149 550 730.589 637.507
99Q1 2488 3216.940 2785.099 1353 1676.065 1448.756 1150 1436.921 1242.245 1067 1479.048 1282.765
04/99 114.50 543 740.510 646.734 193 252.700 220.699 253 330.887 288.984 302 427.811 374.585
05/99 114.40 672 907.430 793.208 345 444.304 388.378 391 512.391 447.894 419 576.543 504.224
06/99 114.10 777 1,069.480 937.318 395 521.916 457.420 433 565.847 495.922 386 557.089 489.424
99Q2 1992 2717.420 2377.260 933 1218.920 1066.496 1077 1409.125 1232.801 1107 1561.443 1368.232
07/99 112.40 946 1,273.330 1,132.856 496 654.735 582.504 361 479.479 426.583 513 707.483 636.934
08/99 111.40 867 1,157.420 1,038.977 306 399.686 358.785 271 350.264 314.420 506 677.941 612.394
09/99 111.60 680 894.510 801.532 245 313.860 281.237 253 326.466 292.532 409 544.246 487.112
99Q3 2493 3325.260 2973.365 1047 1368.281 1222.526 885 1156.209 1033.535 1428 1929.670 1736.440
10/99 112.00 569 728.710 650.634 266 339.947 303.524 308 384.711 343.492 316 402.244 358.102
11/99 111.30 619 799.800 718.598 291 360.989 324.339 275 338.526 304.156 311 415.089 375.106
12/99 110.70 543 680.210 614.463 263 324.442 293.082 259 318.429 287.650 268 341.684 310.306
99Q4 1731 2208.720 1983.695 820 1025.378 920.945 842 1041.666 935.299 895 1159.017 1043.514
01/00 109.80 668 814.440 741.749 257 312.850 284.927 255 311.941 284.099 409 496.011 454.098
02/00 109.70 510 630.600 574.840 196 238.712 217.604 180 216.907 197.727 255 318.659 290.741
03/00 109.20 591 712.030 652.042 273 325.392 297.978 275 333.889 305.759 411 495.123 454.315
00Q1 1769 2157.070 1968.631 726 876.954 800.510 710 862.737 787.586 1075 1309.793 1199.154
04/00 109.50 569 681.290 622.183 239 288.962 263.892 222 259.813 237.272 294 347.401 316.423
05/00 109.30 581 698.020 638.628 209 242.046 221.451 202 231.737 212.019 359 438.207 401.355
06/00 108.90 471 553.870 508.604 198 223.767 205.479 210 237.920 218.476 269 322.133 296.585
00Q2 1621 1933.180 1769.415 646 754.775 690.823 634 729.470 667.767 922 1107.741 1014.364
07/00 108.80 505 562.950 517.417 215 244.220 224.467 225 250.363 230.113 295 325.030 298.942
08/00 108.40 565 642.190 592.426 264 289.681 267.233 336 376.055 346.914 340 391.827 362.313
09/00 108.70 659 734.030 675.281 374 417.702 384.270 408 449.574 413.592 323 357.975 328.366
00Q3 1729 1939.170 1785.124 853 951.603 875.971 969 1075.992 990.619 958 1074.832 989.621
10/00 108.90 741 849.790 780.340 385 428.776 393.734 305 346.778 318.437 333 400.216 366.748
11/00 109.10 732 833.690 764.152 190 212.199 194.500 116 126.324 115.787 427 486.912 445.715
12/00 108.70 389 438.750 403.634 79 88.520 81.435 61 66.021 60.737 273 312.426 287.847
00Q4 1862 2122.230 1948.126 654 729.495 669.668 482 539.123 494.961 1033 1199.554 1100.310
NTV ($M) = Nominal Transaction Value (Measured in $ million)
RTV ($M) = Real Transaction Value (Measured in $ million)
Table 4.2    TRANSACTION VOLUME AND REAL TRANSACTION VALUE OF HOS HOUSINGS 
       Second-hand HOS Market     HOS Secondary Market (Regist. Day)HOS Secondary Market (Temp. Contract)                    HOS Open Market
Year Price DeflatorVolume NTV ($M) RTV ($M) Volume NTV ($M) RTV ($M) Volume NTV ($M) RTV ($M) Volume NTV ($M) RTV ($M)
01/96 104.70 415 566.650 541.213 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 415 566.65 541.213
02/96 105.70 341 517.390 489.489 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 341 517.39 489.489
03/96 106.30 479 700.440 658.928 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 479 700.44 658.928
96Q1 1235 1,784.480 1,689.630 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1235 1,784.480 1,689.630
04/96 107.60 363 534.800 497.026 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 363 534.80 497.026
05/96 107.80 761 1,180.100 1,094.712 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 761 1,180.10 1,094.712
06/96 108.40 448 738.790 681.541 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 448 738.79 681.541
96Q2 1572 2,453.690 2,273.279 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1572 2,453.690 2,273.279
07/96 108.40 555 827.020 762.934 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 555 827.02 762.934
08/96 108.60 515 785.440 723.241 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 515 785.44 723.241
09/96 109.70 581 887.450 808.979 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 581 887.45 808.979
96Q3 1651 2,499.910 2,295.154 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1651 2499.910 2295.154
10/96 110.50 674 1,033.820 935.584 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 674 1,033.82 935.584
11/96 110.90 747 1,174.980 1,059.495 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 747 1,174.98 1,059.495
12/96 111.40 677 1,121.590 1,006.813 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 677 1,121.59 1,006.813
96Q4 2098 3330.390 3001.892 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2098 3330.390 3001.892
01/97 111.30 785 1,336.290 1,200.620 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 785 1,336.29 1,200.620
02/97 112.30 570 1,028.150 915.539 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 570 1,028.15 915.539
03/97 112.50 651 1,183.650 1,052.133 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 651 1,183.65 1,052.133
97Q1 2006 3548.090 3168.292 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2006 3548.090 3168.292
04/97 113.60 1204 2,470.090 2,174.375 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1204 2,470.09 2,174.375
05/97 114.00 924 1,928.770 1,691.904 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 924 1,928.77 1,691.904
06/97 114.50 654 1,452.170 1,268.271 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 654 1,452.17 1,268.271
97Q2 2782 5851.030 5134.549 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2782 5851.030 5134.549
07/97 115.30 984 2,351.240 2,039.237 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 984 2,351.24 2,039.237
08/97 115.50 588 1,355.350 1,173.463 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 588 1,355.35 1,173.463
09/97 115.90 576 1,290.590 1,113.538 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 576 1,290.59 1,113.538
97Q3 2148 4997.180 4326.238 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 2148 4997.180 4326.238
10/97 116.80 671 1,534.770 1,314.015 165 318.861 272.997 159 295.126 252.676 671 1,534.77 1,314.015
11/97 117.00 762 1,743.380 1,490.068 117 204.377 174.681 111 201.474 172.200 603 1,448.254 1,237.392
12/97 117.20 333 702.670 599.548 127 212.504 181.317 109 170.855 145.781 222 501.196 427.348
97Q4 1766 3980.820 3403.632 409 735.742 628.996 379 667.455 570.657 1496 3484.220 2978.755
01/98 117.30 343 653.140 556.812 73 102.360 87.263 81 108.882 92.824 234 482.285 411.031
02/98 117.70 339 553.030 469.864 85 120.949 102.760 83 111.092 94.386 258 444.148 377.041
03/98 118.00 561 938.550 795.381 94 123.867 104.972 99 131.966 111.836 478 827.458 700.996
98Q1 1243 2144.720 1822.057 252 347.176 294.996 263 351.940 299.045 970 1753.891 1489.067
04/98 119.00 399 695.960 584.840 95 121.769 102.327 79 101.843 85.582 300 563.994 473.005
05/98 119.20 394 653.670 548.381 71 90.321 75.773 78 96.904 81.295 315 551.827 462.799
06/98 119.00 302 470.420 395.311 75 90.048 75.671 82 111.139 93.394 224 373.516 314.016
98Q2 1095 1820.050 1528.532 241 302.138 253.770 239 309.886 260.272 839 1489.337 1249.819
07/98 119.00 337 470.200 395.126 100 119.720 100.605 84 94.487 79.401 255 359.061 301.732
08/98 118.60 362 542.560 457.470 56 67.271 56.721 47 58.037 48.935 278 448.073 378.070
09/98 118.80 266 353.230 297.332 57 69.554 58.547 72 82.945 69.819 219 295.193 248.397
98Q3 965 1365.990 1149.928 213 256.545 215.873 203 235.469 198.155 752 1102.327 928.198
10/98 116.90 265 337.710 288.888 77 88.790 75.954 105 126.384 108.113 193 254.765 219.069
11/98 116.10 391 493.860 425.375 189 224.620 193.471 311 369.641 318.382 286 367.476 317.262
12/98 115.30 694 888.010 770.173 395 465.269 403.529 512 613.670 532.238 383 518.369 451.792
98Q4 1350 1719.580 1484.436 661 778.679 672.954 928 1109.695 958.732 862 1140.610 988.123
01/99 116.00 851 1,083.010 933.629 791 966.935 833.565 663 809.341 697.708 339 469.340 401.392
02/99 115.60 841 1,088.460 941.574 302 375.653 324.959 246 314.881 272.388 178 279.119 243.867
03/99 114.90 796 1,045.470 909.896 260 333.477 290.232 241 312.699 272.149 550 730.589 637.507
99Q1 2488 3216.940 2785.099 1353 1676.065 1448.756 1150 1436.921 1242.245 1067 1479.048 1282.765
04/99 114.50 543 740.510 646.734 193 252.700 220.699 253 330.887 288.984 302 427.811 374.585
05/99 114.40 672 907.430 793.208 345 444.304 388.378 391 512.391 447.894 419 576.543 504.224
06/99 114.10 777 1,069.480 937.318 395 521.916 457.420 433 565.847 495.922 386 557.089 489.424
99Q2 1992 2717.420 2377.260 933 1218.920 1066.496 1077 1409.125 1232.801 1107 1561.443 1368.232
07/99 112.40 946 1,273.330 1,132.856 496 654.735 582.504 361 479.479 426.583 513 707.483 636.934
08/99 111.40 867 1,157.420 1,038.977 306 399.686 358.785 271 350.264 314.420 506 677.941 612.394
09/99 111.60 680 894.510 801.532 245 313.860 281.237 253 326.466 292.532 409 544.246 487.112
99Q3 2493 3325.260 2973.365 1047 1368.281 1222.526 885 1156.209 1033.535 1428 1929.670 1736.440
10/99 112.00 569 728.710 650.634 266 339.947 303.524 308 384.711 343.492 316 402.244 358.102
11/99 111.30 619 799.800 718.598 291 360.989 324.339 275 338.526 304.156 311 415.089 375.106
12/99 110.70 543 680.210 614.463 263 324.442 293.082 259 318.429 287.650 268 341.684 310.306
99Q4 1731 2208.720 1983.695 820 1025.378 920.945 842 1041.666 935.299 895 1159.017 1043.514
01/00 109.80 668 814.440 741.749 257 312.850 284.927 255 311.941 284.099 409 496.011 454.098
02/00 109.70 510 630.600 574.840 196 238.712 217.604 180 216.907 197.727 255 318.659 290.741
03/00 109.20 591 712.030 652.042 273 325.392 297.978 275 333.889 305.759 411 495.123 454.315
00Q1 1769 2157.070 1968.631 726 876.954 800.510 710 862.737 787.586 1075 1309.793 1199.154
04/00 109.50 569 681.290 622.183 239 288.962 263.892 222 259.813 237.272 294 347.401 316.423
05/00 109.30 581 698.020 638.628 209 242.046 221.451 202 231.737 212.019 359 438.207 401.355
06/00 108.90 471 553.870 508.604 198 223.767 205.479 210 237.920 218.476 269 322.133 296.585
00Q2 1621 1933.180 1769.415 646 754.775 690.823 634 729.470 667.767 922 1107.741 1014.364
07/00 108.80 505 562.950 517.417 215 244.220 224.467 225 250.363 230.113 295 325.030 298.942
08/00 108.40 565 642.190 592.426 264 289.681 267.233 336 376.055 346.914 340 391.827 362.313
09/00 108.70 659 734.030 675.281 374 417.702 384.270 408 449.574 413.592 323 357.975 328.366
00Q3 1729 1939.170 1785.124 853 951.603 875.971 969 1075.992 990.619 958 1074.832 989.621
10/00 108.90 741 849.790 780.340 385 428.776 393.734 305 346.778 318.437 333 400.216 366.748
11/00 109.10 732 833.690 764.152 190 212.199 194.500 116 126.324 115.787 427 486.912 445.715
12/00 108.70 389 438.750 403.634 79 88.520 81.435 61 66.021 60.737 273 312.426 287.847
00Q4 1862 2122.230 1948.126 654 729.495 669.668 482 539.123 494.961 1033 1199.554 1100.310
NTV ($M) = Nominal Transaction Value (Measured in $ million)RTV ($M) = Real Transaction Value (Measured in $ million)
Source : For Second-hand HOS Market (Centaline Property Agency Ltd) ; for HOS Secondary Market (Hong Kong Housing Authority) ; For HOS Free Market (Self-adjusted)  
Table 4.3 CALCULATION OF AFCDUMMY AND TPSDUMMIES
AFC Effect TPS Effect
Year SER FER DifferentialABS DifferentialAFCDummy TPSDummy1 TPSDummy2 TPSDummy3 TPSDummy4
01/96 7.7326 8 0.2674 0.2674 0.0006 0 0 0 0
02/96 7.7322 -4 -11.7322 11.7322 0.0273 0 0 0 0
03/96 7.7321 -9 -16.7321 16.7321 0.0389 0 0 0 0
96Q1 28.7317 0.037 0 0 0 0
04/96 7.7343 -15 -22.7343 22.7343 0.0528 0 0 0 0
05/96 7.7363 -13 -20.7363 20.7363 0.0482 0 0 0 0
06/96 7.7400 2 -5.74 5.7400 0.0133 0 0 0 0
96Q2 49.2106 0.0637 0 0 0 0
07/96 7.7373 1 -6.7373 6.7373 0.0157 0 0 0 0
08/96 7.7341 -2 -9.7341 9.7341 0.0226 0 0 0 0
09/96 7.7326 -1 -8.7326 8.7326 0.0203 0 0 0 0
96Q3 25.2040 0.0326 0 0 0 0
10/96 7.7322 0 -7.7322 7.7322 0.0180 0 0 0 0
11/96 7.7323 3 -4.7323 4.7323 0.0110 0 0 0 0
12/96 7.7356 1 -6.7356 6.7356 0.0157 0 0 0 0
96Q4 19.2001 0.0248 0 0 0 0
01/97 7.7396 -14 -21.7396 21.7396 0.0505 0 0 0 0
02/97 7.7471 4 -3.7471 3.7471 0.0087 0 0 0 0
03/97 7.7460 9 1.254 1.254 0.0029 0 0 0 0
97Q1 26.7407 0.0346 0 0 0 0
04/97 7.7480 5 -2.748 2.7480 0.0064 0 0 0 0
05/97 7.7424 24 16.2576 16.2576 0.0378 0 0 0 0
06/97 7.7430 47 39.257 39.2570 0.0912 0 0 0 0
97Q2 58.2626 0.0754 0 0 0 0
07/97 7.7452 55 47.2548 47.2548 0.1098 0 0 0 0
08/97 7.7429 133 125.2571 125.2571 0.2911 0 0 0 0
09/97 7.7438 127 119.2562 119.2562 0.2772 0 0 0 0
97Q3 291.7681 0.3776 0 0 0 0
10/97 7.7325 366 358.2675 358.2675 0.8327 0 0 0 0
11/97 7.7307 323 315.2693 315.2693 0.7328 0 0 0 0
12/97 7.7448 107 99.2552 99.2552 0.2307 0 0 0 0
97Q4 772.792 1.0000 0 0 0 0
01/98 7.7430 433 425.257 425.2570 0.9884 0.25 0.33 0.5 1
02/98 7.7415 76 68.2585 68.2585 0.1586 0.25 0.33 0.5 1
03/98 7.7458 27 19.2542 19.2542 0.0448 0.25 0.33 0.5 1
98Q1 512.7697 0.6635 0.25 0.33 0.5 1
04/98 7.7489 24 16.2511 16.2511 0.0378 0.50 0.66 0.50/0.66/1 1
05/98 7.7481 109 101.2519 101.2519 0.2353 0.50 0.66 0.50/0.66/1 1
06/98 7.7467 286 278.2533 278.2533 0.6467 0.50 0.66 0.50/0.66/1 1
98Q2 395.7563 0.5121 0.50 0.66 0.50/0.66/1 1
07/98 7.7479 160 152.2521 152.2521 0.3539 0.75 1 0.75/1 1
08/98 7.7480 438 430.252 430.252 1.0000 0.75 1 0.75/1 1
09/98 7.7485 187 179.2515 179.2515 0.4166 0.75 1 0.75/1 1
98Q3 761.7556 0.9857 0.75 1 0.75/1 1
10/98 7.7477 41 33.2523 33.2523 0.0773 1 1 1 1
11/98 7.7435 28 20.2565 20.2565 0.0471 1 1 1 1
12/98 7.7468 8 0.2532 0.2532 0.0006 1 1 1 1
98Q4 53.7620 0.0696 1 1 1 1
01/99 7.7482 44 36.2518 36.2518 0.0843 1 1 1 1
02/99 7.7487 47 39.2513 39.2513 0.0912 1 1 1 1
03/99 7.7491 26 18.2509 18.2509 0.0424 1 1 1 1
99Q1 93.7540 0.1213 1 1 1 1
04/99 7.7494 7 -0.7494 0.7494 0.0017 1 1 1 1
05/99 7.7528 5 -2.7528 2.7528 0.0064 1 1 1 1
06/99 7.7572 29 21.2428 21.2428 0.0494 1 1 1 1
99Q2 24.745 0.0320 1 1 1 1
07/99 7.7601 50 42.2399 42.2399 0.0982 1 1 1 1
08/99 7.7635 66 58.2365 58.2365 0.1354 1 1 1 1
09/99 7.7663 31 23.2337 23.2337 0.0540 1 1 1 1
99Q3 192.4764 0.2491 1 1 1 1
10/99 7.7694 17 9.2306 9.2306 0.0215 1 1 1 1
11/99 7.7715 9 1.2285 1.2285 0.0029 1 1 1 1
12/99 7.7727 -12 -19.7727 19.7727 0.0460 1 1 1 1
99Q4 30.2318 0.0391 1 1 1 1
01/00 7.7786 -34 -41.7786 41.7786 0.0971 1 1 1 1
02/00 7.7815 0 -7.7815 7.7815 0.0181 1 1 1 1
03/00 7.7845 -11 -18.7845 18.7845 0.0437 1 1 1 1
00Q1 68.3446 0.0884 1 1 1 1
04/00 7.7877 14 6.2123 6.2123 0.0144 1 1 1 1
05/00 7.7907 15 7.2093 7.2093 0.0168 1 1 1 1
06/00 7.7934 -17 -24.7934 24.7934 0.0576 1 1 1 1
00Q2 38.2150 0.0495 1 1 1 1
07/00 7.7967 -36 -43.7967 43.7967 0.1018 1 1 1 1
08/00 7.7993 -50 -57.7993 57.7993 0.1343 1 1 1 1
09/00 7.7984 -21 -28.7984 28.7984 0.0669 1 1 1 1
00Q3 130.3944 0.1687 1 1 1 1
10/00 7.7978 -47 -54.7978 54.7978 0.1274 1 1 1 1
11/00 7.7990 -64 -71.799 71.799 0.1669 1 1 1 1
12/00 7.7990 -28 -35.799 35.799 0.0832 1 1 1 1
00Q4 162.3958 0.2101 1 1 1 1
Source : For SER & FER (Hong Kong Monetary Authority)
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4.4 Data Processing 
 
After collecting all the secondary data, they are put together and then run by using 
EViews Version 3.1. The empirical findings are analyzed in Chapter Five. 
 
4.5 Research Methodology for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
The research methodologies employed for the cross-sectional analysis are survey. 
Actually, a large-scale survey (n = 950) of TPS tenants in Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 
3 for all the eighteen TPS estates was conducted from mid June to mid November 
2000. The objectives of the survey, sampling method, sampling procedure, content of 
the questionnaire, employment of part-time enumerators, briefing and training, pilot 
survey & main survey, data processing and defects are described as follows. 
 
4.6 Objectives of the Large-scale Survey 
 
The objectives of the large-scale survey are as follows : 
 
1. To find out the net effect of TPS on the HOS market using the cross-sectional 
analysis ; 
 
2. To find out the effect of TPS on the policy efficiency of resource allocation 
using the cross-sectional analysis ;  
 
3. To find out whether the TPS tenants intend “To Buy PRH” or “Not to Buy 
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PRH” ; 
 
4. To identify reasons/motivating factors contributing to making their decisions 
whether to purchase PRH or not ; 
 
5. To find out whether the TPS tenants intend “To Buy HOS flat in the Short 
Run/Long Run” or find out how many intend to buy as compared with those 
who do “Not to Buy HOS flat” if there had been no TPS ; 
 
6. To identify reasons/motivating factors contributing to making their decisions 
whether to purchase HOS flat in the short run/long run and not buy at all if there 
had been no TPS ; 
 
7. To find out whether the TPS tenants intend “To Buy HOS flat” or “Not to Buy 
HOS flat” after the resale of PRH is permitted ; 
 
8. To identify reasons or/and motivation factors contributing to making their 
decisions whether to purchase HOS flat or not after the resale of PRH is 
permitted and finally ; 
 
9. To find out their attitudes towards the TPS. 
 
4.7  The Total Population 
 
The unit of investigation in the survey is a household, including owner-households 
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and tenant-households who live in the eighteen TPS Estates in Phase 1, Phase 2 and 
Phase 3 during the period from 26 June 2000 to 19 November 2000. At the time of 
sampling, the target total population contains 82,904 flats, which is broken down into 
27,525 flats in Phase 1, 27,161 flats in Phase 2 and 27,415 flats in Phase 3. There are 
various types, sizes, price of sales and years of intake of the total population of TPS 
studied. There are four block types, that is, Trident, Slab, New Slab and Linear & 
Trident built in all the eighteen estates studied. The sizes of the flats range from 
9.41sq.M to 60.90sq.M. The flats are composed of one-bed room to three-bed room 
with living room. They are self-contained (with kitchen and bathroom/toilet). The 
sale prices range from $62,500 to $340,300 whereas the years of intake range from 8 
years to 14 years. 
 
All the units are now either partly managed or supervised by the HKHA, namely the 
eighteen Estate Offices under respective Housing Managers of Wah Kwai, Fung Tak, 
Heng On, Cheung On, Wan Tau Tong and Kin Sang of Phase 1 (1998) ; Yiu On, Wah 
Ming, Tsui Wan, Tin King, Chuk Yuen North and Tak Tin of Phase 2 (1999) ; Choi 
Ha, Hin Keng, Fung Wah, Tai Wo, Fu Heng and Tin Ping of Phase 3 (2000) at the 
time of the survey. Eleven of the eighteen estates are located in New Territories, three 
in Hong Kong Islands and four in Kowloon.  
 
4.8 The Sampling Method and the Sampling Procedure 
 
For the sake of obtaining unbiased samples, probability sampling is adopted so that 
the final sample is representative enough of the total population from which it is 
drawn. The fundamental principle of probability sampling is to choose a sample very 
                                                                                   
 53 
 
likely to be representative if it is selected by a principle called EPSEM, which stands 
for the “Equal Probability of Selection Method25”.  
 
The EPSEM sampling technique of this research is stratified sampling26 . This 
technique is very desirable because it guarantees that the sample will be 
representative on the selected traits. To apply this technique, the population list is 
first stratified (or divided) into sub-lists according to some relevant traits and sample 
from the sub-list. Since different locations affect the tenure choice of the respondents 
much, the samples are stratified into different sizes and different wings of lower, 
middle and upper floors of all blocks in the 18 estates. If a visit to the sample flat 
failed for whatever reasons, the investigators would visit families living in the 
adjacent flats until a successful sample is obtained. All the interviews are conducted 
face-to-face. This system of sampling has proved to be very satisfactory as a 
subsequent check of size, orientation and level of units against the corresponding 
number of flats under management confirmed, the sample acknowledged to be 
representative. 
 
4.9 The Questionnaire 
 
The survey data are got through one questionnaire for a household and the entire 
questionnaire is seen in Appendix III. It is an eight-page questionnaire comprising 
                                                   
25 The EPSEM principle is that every element or case in the population must have a  equal probability of 
being selected for the sample. 
26 This is a procedure that consists of stratifying (or dividing) the population into a number of 
non-overlapping sub-population, or strata, and then taking a sample from each stratum. If the items selected 
from each stratum constitute simple random samples, the entire procedure – first stratification and hen
random sampling – is called stratified sampling. 
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thirty-seven questions, which can be classified into eight parts. 
 
The most important parts of the survey are directed at obtaining information for 
estimating the net ownership effect of TPS on the HOS market. It is obtained by two 
core questions to the target tenant. The first one is “the tenure choice of purchasing 
HOS flat in the Short Run/Long Run or not if the HKHA had not implemented the 
TPS” and the second one is “the tenure choice of purchasing HOS flat or not after the 
resale of PRH is permitted”. The reasons/motivating factors are important because it 
explains the real effect of TPS on the HOS market. Their attitude towards the TPS is 
also vital because the survey would reveal their views after becoming TPS owners 
(or startup as tenants), particularly during the persistent economic downturn. 
 
4.10  Employment of Part-time Enumerators 
 
A large sample size (n = 1000) was set in order to obtain the most accurate analysis. 
By doing so, ten part-time enumerators were employed to conduct such a large-scale 
face-to-face interview. Two of them were university graduates, seven of them were 
post-secondary students and the remaining one was part-time helper.  
 
4.11 Briefing and Training 
 
The research method taken for this survey was a face-to-face interview. Eleven 
interviewers (including the author) had taken part in the survey. They were actively 
trained in the aspects of interviewing techniques and housing policies. It was 
extremely important that all interviewees interpreted questions and answers in the 
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same way, otherwise information from different interviewees would not be 
comparable. Briefing sessions were therefore organized for interviewers so that they 
would ask questions in a way that would not be ambiguous in meaning. For examples, 
the interviewers did not actively give the options for the interviewees to choose the 
questions 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33 and 34 unless they could not answer. 
The aim was to avoid any bias for the choices of the interviewees made. Besides, the 
information relating to the personal particulars was placed at the beginning of the 
questionnaire. During the interview, however, the order was reversed and the 
interviewees were asked for the information at a later stage so as to avoid 
embarrassment caused to them. 
 
4.12  Pilot Survey    
 
A pilot survey was conducted in Kin Sang Estate on 20 June 2000. There were 
totally ten interviewers for doing it. The purpose of the trial test was to check the 
questionnaire and the time possibly required on completing each sample in the main 
survey. More than three hundred families were contacted but only sixty households 
successfully responded to the survey.  
 
Following the trial run, some amendments on the questionnaire were made. A few 
options in which the respondents felt important were added and not important were 
dropped. Besides, the visiting time required was kept from 10 to 15 minutes for a 
successful visit on average. 
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4.13  Main Survey 
 
The main survey lasted for nearly five months, commencing in late June and ended 
in mid November 2000. The interviewers (including the author) usually visited the 
target estates either from 3:00p.m. to 6:00p.m. or/and from 6:00p.m. to 9:00p.m.  
 
Without the help from the Estate Offices, the response rate of the interviewees was 
relatively low. Out of approximately 5,700 households visited, only 950 respondents 
were successfully interviewed, which were about 16.67% of the sample. To avoid a 
biased outcome, the interviewers were requested to interview either the head or 
his/her spouse of household as far as possible, who was usually the decision-maker, 
and in no circumstances should they interview the children. 
 
4.14  Data Processing 
 
On return of the questionnaire, they were collected, scrutinized, and checked for 
mistakes, incomplete parts and inconsistency. Since the responses to the questions 
were pre-coded, the information was read directly from the questionnaire and 
inputted into computers. All nine hundred and fifty successful interview cases were 
put together and run by SPSS Version 9.0. The empirical findings are analyzed in 
Chapter Five. 
 
4.15  Defects 
 
It was impractical to survey 5% of the total population in the eighteen TPS Estates, 
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which would be desirable. Therefore, blocks were stratified into high, middle and 
low floor sectors at the pilot stage of sampling. The population of selected areas was 
then further stratified and visited if the one proceeding refused to be interviewed. 
Another defect was that there was a high incidence of refusal or no response from the 
selected households, with a total of approximately 4750 households (83.33%). 
Non-response was felt to be potentially a large problem though interviewers tried 
their best to be patient. On the other hand, even if the sample size of 1000 was 
originally set, the final valid sample size was reduced to 950 after dropping those 
invalid cases. 
  
For the roughly 4750 households who had refused an interview, it was found that 
their doors were either locked or the tenants refused to be interviewed. The 
unsuccessful cases probably distorted the results and might cause some bias. 
 
4.16  Conclusion 
 
The survey is regarded as successful because it has fulfilled the objectives of the 
study. The data is analyzed with standard statistical and econometric techniques. 
They are reported in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR BOTH THE TIME-SERIES 
ANALYSIS AND THE CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Empirical Findings for the Time-series Analysis 
 
There are 64 multiple regression equations estimated by using EViews3.1. In 
particular, there are 8 types of multiple regression models to distinguish the effect of 
AFC from that of the TPS on the overall property market, the secondary property 
market and the second-hand HOS market (focusing on the HOS free market). They 
are shown as follows. 
 
Table 5.1 : Dependent Variable : Transaction Volume of Overall Property 
Market (OPMVOL) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant term 50086.39 
(7.72***) 
49384.44 
(8.22***) 
50435.57 
(7.31***) 
51217.52 
(7.37***) 
AFCDUMMY - 20068.94 
(- 3.55***) 
- 17025.26 
(- 3.22***) 
- 19308.76 
(- 3.51***) 
- 20617.28 
(- 4.23***) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 23055.54 
(- 3.15***) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 22222.06 
(- 3.32***) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 21686.41 
(- 3.09***) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 20766.75 
(- 3.50***)   
R-bar squared 0.736 0.743 0.745 0.790 
F-statistics 17.729*** 18.343*** 18.517*** 23.588*** 
DW 1.997 (AR1) 1.901 (AR1) 2.097 (AR1) 1.979 (AR1) 
** means statistically significant at 5% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
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F-statistics, t-ratios for AFCDUMMY and TPSDUMMY are statistically significant 
at 1% level, with the values of R-bar squared more than 70% and DW with AR1 to 
successfully adjust the serial correlation at 5% level. All the slope coefficients for 
TPSDUMMY are higher than that of AFCDUMMY. Specifically, the slope 
coefficients for TPSDUMMY are much higher than that of AFCDUMMY for model 
1, model 2 and model 3. It can be concluded that the effect of TPS is much serious 
than that of the AFC on the sharp reduction of transaction volume of overall property 
market since early 1998.  
 
Table 5.2 : Dependent Variable : Real Transaction Value of Overall Property 
Market (OPMRTV) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 Equation 8 
Constant term 155583.0 
(6.05***) 
148898.3 
(6.94***) 
154464.3 
(6.05***) 
146471.7 
(6.08***) 
AFCDUMMY - 64021.95 
(- 3.81***) 
- 51632.66 
(- 3.24***) 
- 61154.63 
(- 3.81***) 
- 62262.81 
(- 3.87***) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 88952.53 
(- 3.29***) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 81265.57 
(- 3.60***) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 80269.45 
(- 3.29***) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 64580.57 
(- 3.35***)   
R-bar squared 0.810 0.807 0.818 0.817 
F-statistics 26.571*** 26.161*** 28.029*** 27.762*** 
DW 1.702 (AR1) 1.637 (AR1) 1.738 (AR1) 1.774 (AR1) 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.2 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
F-statistics, t-ratios for AFCDUMMY and TPSDUMMY are statistically significant 
at 1% level, with the values of R-bar squared more than 80% and DW with AR1 to 
successfully adjust the serial correlation at 5% level. All the slope coefficients for 
TPSDUMMY are higher than that of AFCDUMMY. Specifically, the slope 
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coefficients for TPSDUMMY are much higher than that of AFCDUMMY for model 
5, model 6 and model 7. It can be concluded that the effect of TPS is much more 
serious than that of the AFC on the sharp reduction of real transaction value of 
overall property market since early 1998.  
 
Table 5.3 : Dependent Variable : Transaction Volume of Secondary Property 
Market (SPMVOL) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 9 Equation 10 Equation 11 Equation 12 
Constant term 38929.39 
(7.72***) 
37654.83 
(9.82***) 
38599.23 
(10.211***) 
38192.62 
(10.61***) 
AFCDUMMY - 12246.55 
(- 3.55***) 
- 9203.35 
(- 2.06*) 
- 10285.23 
(- 2.35**) 
- 9990.34 
(- 2.35**) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 22938.76 
(- 3.15***) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 21403.21 
(- 4.82***) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 21541.31 
(- 5.27***) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 20150.26 
(- 5.51***)   
R-bar squared 0.819 0.809 0.831 0.844 
F-statistics 28.174*** 26.346*** 30.425*** 33.566*** 
DW 1.791 (AR1) 1.760 (AR1) 1.902 (AR1) 2.147 (AR1) 
* means statistically significant at 10% level 
** means statistically significant at 5% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
F-statistics are statistically significant at 1% level, with the values of R-bar squared 
more than 70% and DW with AR1 to successfully adjust the serial correlation at 5% 
level. The t-ratios for TPSDUMMY are statistically significant at 1% level but for 
AFCDUMMY, they are only statistically significant at either 5% or 10% level. 
Besides, all the slope coefficients for TPSDUMMY are much higher than that of 
AFCDUMMY. Therefore, it can be strongly concluded that the effect of TPS is much 
more serious than that of AFC on the sharp reduction of transaction volume of 
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secondary property market since early 1998. 
 
Table 5.4 : Dependent Variable : Real Transaction Value of Secondary Property 
Market (SPMRTV) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 13 Equation 14 Equation 15 Equation 16 
Constant term 102405.6 
(9.47***) 
99933.58 
(10.22***) 
111563.4 
(6.83***) 
107345.1 
(6.52***) 
AFCDUMMY - 22915.18 
(- 2.24***) 
- 12461.59 
(- 1.19) 
- 31339.69 
(- 2.10*) 
- 32277.97 
(- 2.22**) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 72321.34 
(- 5.27***) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 69625.57 
(- 5.59***) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 73078.01 
(- 4.37***) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 62944.81 
(- 4.20***)   
R-bar squared 0.886 0.877 0.838 0.845 
F-statistics 33.982*** 31.315*** 31.988*** 33.720*** 
DW 2.223 (AR1&2) 2.096 (AR1&2) 1.596 (AR1) 1.782 (AR1) 
* means statistically significant at 10% level 
** means statistically significant at 5% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.4 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
F-statistics are statistically significant at 1% level, with the values of R-bar squared 
more than 80% and DW with AR1 and AR1/AR2 to successfully adjust the serial 
correlation at 5% level. All the slope coefficients for TPSDUMMY are much higher 
than that of AFCDUMMY. Like table 5.3, it can be strongly concluded that the effect 
of TPS is much more serious than that of the AFC on the sharp reduction of real 
transaction value of secondary property market since early 1998.  
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Table 5.5 : Dependent Variable : Transaction Volume of Second-hand HOS 
Market (SHHOSVOL) (Inclusive of HOS secondary market and HOS free 
market ) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 17 Equation 18 Equation 19 Equation 20 
Constant term 2090.18 
(7.67***) 
2122.20 
(8.06***) 
2183.65 
(8.14***) 
2218.06 
(8.26***) 
AFCDUMMY - 515.81 
(- 1.38) 
- 487.07 
(- 1.34) 
- 493.57 
(- 1.38) 
- 474.11 
(- 1.35) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 229.75 
(- 0.72) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 284.70 
(- 0.92) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 366.16 
(- 1.21) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 409.12 
(- 1.41)   
R-squared 0.310 0.325 0.352 0.376 
F-statistics 2.246 2.408 2.719* 3.007* 
DW 2.210 (AR1) 2.245 (AR1) 2.309 (AR1) 2.346 (AR1) 
* means statistically significant at 10% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.5 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
t-ratios for AFCDUMMY and TPSDUMMY, and the majority of F-statistics are 
statistically insignificant at 5% level, with the values of R-squared more than 30% 
and DW with AR1 to successfully adjust the serial correlation at 5% level. However, 
all the AFCDUMMIES and the TPSDUMMIES have the expected negative sign.  
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Table 5.6 : Dependent Variable : Real Transaction Value of Second-hand HOS 
Market (SHHOSRTV) (Inclusive of HOS secondary market and HOS free 
market ) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 21 Equation 22 Equation 23 Equation 24 
Constant term 3673.12 
(5.29***) 
3679.67 
(5.83***) 
3786.72 
(5.96***) 
3809.67 
(6.23***) 
AFCDUMMY - 531.19 
(- 0.80) 
- 313.12 
(- 0.50) 
- 445.02 
(- 0.71) 
- 443.75 
(- 0.74) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 1683.89 
(- 2.15**) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 1721.86 
(- 2.44**) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 1772.13 
(- 2.67**) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 1730.65 
(- 2.92)   
R-bar squared 0.488 0.518 0.553 0.591 
F-statistics 6.710*** 7.452*** 8.412*** 9.700*** 
DW 1.956 (AR1) 2.017 (AR1) 2.200 (AR1) 2.254 (AR1) 
** means statistically significant at 5% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.6 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
F-statistics are statistically significant at 1% level, with the values of R-bar squared 
more than 50% (except model 21) and DW with AR1 to successfully adjust the serial 
correlation at 5% level. All the t-ratios for AFCDUMMY are statistically 
insignificant at 5% level but for TPSDUMMY, all are significant at 5% level. All the 
slope coefficients for AFCDUMMY and TPSDUMMY have expected negative sign. 
However, all the slope coefficients for TPSDUMMY are much higher than that of 
AFCDUMMY. As a result, it can be strongly concluded that the effect of TPS is 
much more serious than that of the AFC on the sharp reduction of real transaction 
value of second-hand HOS market since early 1998.  
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Table 5.7 : Dependent Variable :  Transaction Volume of HOS Free Market 
(HOSFMVOL) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 25 Equation 26 Equation 27 Equation 28 
Constant term 2069.42 
(9.67***) 
2040.88 
(10.68***) 
2081.35 
(11.70***) 
2067.05 
(12.63***) 
AFCDUMMY - 518.77 
(- 1.89*) 
- 397.28 
(- 1.51) 
- 412.53 
(- 1.65) 
- 357.80 
(- 1.47) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 1012.11 
(- 4.04***) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 981.14 
(- 4.39***) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 1001.82 
(- 5.07***) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 965.95 
(- 5.47)***   
R-bar squared 0.691 0.700 0.739 0.749 
F-statistics 14.435*** 14.974*** 17.969*** 18.894*** 
DW 2.147 (AR1) 2.144 (AR1) 2.253 (AR1) 2.351 (AR1) 
* means statistically significant at 10% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.7 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. The 
majority of the F-statistics are statistically significant at 1% level, with the values of 
R-bar squared more than 70% and DW with AR1 to successfully adjust the serial 
correlation at 5% level. All the t-ratios for TPSDUMMY are statistically significant 
at 1% level. As to AFCDUMMY, they are only statistically significant at 10% for 
model 25. Furthermore, the slope coefficients for TPSDUMMY are higher than that 
of AFCDUMMY by approximately 3 times on average. Therefore, it can be strongly 
concluded that the effect of TPS is much more serious than that of the AFC on the 
sharp reduction of transaction volume of HOS free market since early 1998.  
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Table 5.8 : Dependent Variable : Real Transaction Value of HOS Free Market 
(HOSFMRTV) (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 Equation 29 Equation 30 Equation 31 Equation 32 
Constant term 3616.40 
(5.97***) 
3496.02 
(5.97***) 
3589.73 
(6.84***) 
3541.57 
(6.96***) 
AFCDUMMY - 684.50 
(- 1.16) 
- 358.89 
(- 1.16) 
- 494.76 
(- 0.86) 
- 477.55 
(- 0.84) 
TPSDUMMY1 - 2439.99 
(- 3.59***) 
- - - 
TPSDUMMY2 - 
 
- 2310.85 
(- 3.59***) 
- - 
TPSDUMMY3 - 
 
- - 2309.68 
(- 4.22***) 
- 
TPSDUMMY4 - 
 
- - - 2147.40 
(- 4.34***)   
R-bar squared 0.734 0.740 0.760 0.773 
F-statistics 17.552*** 18.065*** 19.977*** 21.427*** 
DW 1.825 (AR1) 1.836 (AR1) 2.011 (AR1) 2.143 (AR1) 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table 5.8 shows that the 4 multiple regression models provide similar results. All the 
F-statistics are statistically significant at 1% level, with the values of R-bar squared 
more than 70% and DW with AR1 to successfully adjust the serial correlation at 5% 
level. All the t-ratios for TPSDUMMY are statistically significant at 1% level. In the 
contrast, all the t-ratios for AFCDUMMY are statistically insignificant at 10% level. 
Furthermore, all the slope coefficients for TPSDUMMY are much higher than that of 
AFCDUMMY. Specifically, the slope coefficients for TPSDUMMY are higher than 
that of AFCDUMMY by 4 to 5 times on average. Therefore, it can be strongly 
concluded that the effect of TPS is much more serious than that of the AFC on the 
sharp reduction of real transaction value of HOS free market since early 1998. 
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Table 5.9 : The Linkage of Transaction Volume Equations (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 (Equation 33) 
OPMVOL  
(Equation 34) 
SPMVOL 
(Equation 35) 
SPMVOL 
Constant term 9713.61 
(4.79***) 
464.02 
(0.05) 
-4779.60 
(-2.93***) 
SPMVOL 0.95 
(11.70***) 
- 
 
- 
SHHOSVOL - 
 
12.27 
(2.56**) 
- 
HOSFMVOL - 
 
- 20.13 
(17.86***) 
R-bar squared 0.877 0.226 0.944 
** means statistically significant at 5% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table 5.9 shows that there is a linkage of transaction volume among the overall 
property market, the secondary property market and the second-hand HOS market 
(focusing on the HOS free market). Model 33 indicates that with the value of R-bar 
squared more than 80% and t-ratio for SPMVOL statistically significant at 1%, 
OPMVOL highly depends on SPMVOL. On the other hand, model 34 shows that 
with the value of R-bar squared just 22.6% and SHHOSVOL statistically significant 
at 5%, SPMVOL slightly depends on SHHOSVOL. This model apparently reveals 
that the linkage of transaction volume between secondary property market and 
second-hand HOS market is not so strong. However, this result is distorted by the 
existence of HOS secondary market and can be explained by model 35. Model 35 
reveals that the association between SPMVOL and HOSOMVOL is very strong, with 
R-bar squared more than 90%. Combined with all these models, it can be concluded 
that the linkage of transaction volume among the overall property market, the 
secondary property market and the second-hand HOS market is very strong.  
 
With the evidence of strong linkage of these markets, it reinforces the conclusion 
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drawn previously that the effect of TPS is much serious than that of the AFC on the 
transaction volume in the overall property market, the secondary property market and 
the second-hand HOS market since early 1998.   
 
Table 5.10 : The Linkage of Real Transaction Value Equations (1996 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
 (Equation 37) 
OPMVOL  
(Equation 38) 
SPMVOL 
(Equation 39) 
SPMVOL 
Constant term 28314.84 
(6.34***) 
- 28304.10 
(- 1.99*) 
-7145.05 
(-1.62) 
SPMVOL 1.02 
(17.33***) 
- 
 
- 
SHHOSVOL - 
 
37.32 
(6.91***) 
- 
HOSFMVOL - 
 
- 35.67 
(18.49***) 
R-bar squared 0.940 0.711 0.947 
* means statistically significant at 10% level 
*** means statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5.10 shows that there is a linkage of real transaction value among the overall 
property market, the secondary property market and the second-hand HOS market 
(focusing on the HOS free market). Model 36 indicates that with the value of R-bar 
squared more than 90% and t-ratio for SPMRTV statistically significant at 1%, 
OPMRTV highly depends on SPMRTV. On the other hand, model 37 shows that with 
the value of R-bar squared more than 70% and t-ratio for SHHOSRTV statistically 
significant at 1%, SPMRTV also highly depends on SHHOSRTV. However, this 
result is still distorted by the existence of HOS secondary market to a certain extent. 
Model 38 reveals that the association between SPMRTV and HOSOMRTV is very 
strong, with R-bar squared more than 90%. Combined with all these models, it can be 
strongly concluded that the linkage of real transaction value among the overall 
property market, the secondary property market and the second-HOS market is very 
strong.  
 
                                                                                   
 68 
 
With the same analysis for model 33 – 35, it can be strongly concluded that the effect 
of TPS is much serious than that of the AFC on the real transaction value in the 
overall property market, the secondary property market and the second-hand HOS 
market since early 1998.   
 
5.2 Research Empirical Findings for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
All the statistical findings for the cross-sectional analysis are presented into eleven 
parts and they are analyzed in this chapter. Part 1 provides the descriptive statistical 
figures on personal particulars and household characteristics while Part 2 provides 
the same as housing conditions. Part 3 records the data concerning households’ 
aspirations of buying a PRH and reasons for and against it. Part 4 records the data 
concerning households’ aspirations of buying a HOS flat without TPS and reasons 
for and against it. Part 5 records the data concerning households’ aspirations of 
buying a HOS flat after the resale of PRH is permitted. Reasons for and against it are 
also analyzed. Part 6 records the data concerning those not buying a TPS flat. 
Reasons for and against applying for a HOS flat are analyzed from 1994 to 1998 
while Part 7 records the reasons for and against applying for a HOS flat since the 
implementation of TPS in 1998 for the same respondents. Part 8 records the 
respondents’ views towards the performance of the TPS. Part 9 focuses on the 
analysis of the relationship between the socio-demographic and the economic factors 
of household, and the tenure choice. Part 10 looks into the possible relationship 
between the collapse of HOS market and the TPS while the effect of policy efficiency 
of resource allocation by TPS is shown in part 11. 
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Regarding the survey, the distribution of the 950 observation samples drawn from the 
eighteen TPS estates is shown in Table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11 Distribution of Households in the Samples 
                   Estate Frequency Percent 
Valid Wah Kwai Estate 46 4.8 
 Fung Tak Estate 60 6.3 
 Hang On Estate 23 2.5 
 Cheung On Estate 60 6.3 
 Wan Tau Tong Estate 60 6.3 
 Kin Sang Estate 60 6.3 
Sub-total Phase 1 309 32.5 
 Yiu On Estate 55 5.8 
 Wah Ming Estate 58 6.1 
 Tsui Wan Estate 60 6.3 
 Tin King Estate 60 6.3 
 Chuk Yuen North Estate 48 5.1 
 Tak Tin Estate 40 4.2 
Sub-total Phase 2 321 33.8 
 Choi Ha Estate 60 6.3 
 Hin King Estate 52 5.5 
 Fung Wah Estate 37 3.9 
 Tai Woo Estate 60 6.3 
 Fu Hang Estate 53 5.6 
 Tin Ping Estate 58 6.1 
Sub-total Phase 3 320 33.7 
Total  950 100.0 
 
5.21   Household Characteristics 
 
Household characteristics concern demographic variables including sex, age, 
education level, occupation, PRH status and income of the household. In addition, the 
size of family and their earning capacity are also included. Overall, the household 
characteristics mainly focus on the profile of the respondents and their family so as to 
provide the background analysis. They are shown from Table 5.12 to Table 5.22.  
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Table 5.12  Sex of the Respondents 
 Sex Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Male 339 35.7 35.7 
 Female 611 64.3 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.12 shows that 339 (35.7%) respondents are male while 611 (64.3%) are 
female. The outcome is not surprising because women usually spend most of their 
time at home and thus more likely to be interviewed. 
 
Table 5.13  Age of the Respondents 
 Age Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 30 or Below 81 8.5 8.5 
 31 – 40 265 27.9 36.4 
 41 – 50 365 38.4 74.8 
 51 – 60 137 14.4 89.3 
 61 or Above 102 10.7 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
As indicated in table 5.13, all the respondents are over the age of 18. More than 620 
(66%) respondents are within the age group of 31-50 and close to 11% is aged over 
61. 
 
Table 5.14  Level of Education Attainment 
 Level of Education 
Attainment 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not Educated 86 9.1 9.1 
 Primary 418 44.0 53.1 
 Secondary 410 43.2 96.2 
 Tertiary or Above 36 3.8 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
As shown in Table 5.14, most respondents have a standard of either primary or 
secondary education. Far less than 4% is within the tertiary segment. 
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Table 5.15  Occupation of the Respondents 
 Occupation Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
Valid Blue Collar 128 13.5 13.5 
 White Collar 61 6.4 19.9 
 Services 78 8.2 28.1 
 Self-employed 9 0.9 29.1 
 Managerial 9 0.9 30.0 
 Professional 21 2.2 32.2 
 Housewife 431 45.4 77.6 
 Unemployed 44 4.6 82.2 
 Retired 83 8.7 90.9 
 Others 86 9.1 100.0 
Total  950 100.0  
 
Table 5.15 shows that 431 (45.4%) respondents are housewives. Not surprisingly, 
4.6% of the respondents have been unemployed since the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Table 5.16  PRH Status of the Respondents 
 PRH Status Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Tenant 569 59.9 59.9 
 Spouse of Tenant 279 29.4 89.3 
 Parents of Tenant 20 2.1 91.4 
 Others 82 8.6 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
According to table 5.16, 569 (nearly 60%) respondents are tenants and 279 (nearly 
30%) respondents are the spouses of tenants. Since either the tenant or the spouse of 
tenant is the decision-maker for the tenure choice of buying a HOS flat without TPS, 
the survey appears to be representative enough of the family. 
 
Table 5.17  Family Size 
 Family Size Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 Person 7 0.7 0.7 
 2 Person 43 4.5 5.3 
 3 Person 155 16.3 21.6 
 4 Person 407 42.8 64.4 
 5 Person or Above 338 35.6 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
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Table 5.17 shows that most (42.8%) families are 4 persons while 338 (35.6%) 
respondents are families comprising more than 5 persons. 
 
Table 5.18  Earning Household Members 
 Earning Household 
Members 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid None 49 5.2 5.2 
 1 Person 496 52.2 57.4 
 2 Person 254 26.7 84.1 
 3 Person 101 10.6 94.7 
 4 Person or Above 50 5.3 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
As indicated in table 5.18, nearly 50 (5.2%) respondents have no earners, but most 
have one or two persons in paid employment. 750 (more than 78%) respondents have 
one or two persons and 50 households (5.3%) have earning members of four persons 
or above. 
 
Table 5.19  Have You Ever Been Laid Off Since the AFC ? 
 Laid Off Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Yes 273 28.7 28.7 
 No 677 71.3 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.19 demonstrates that nearly 30% of the respondents have been laid off since 
the AFC. 
    
Table 5.20  Have You Had Your Salary Reduced Since the AFC ? 
 Income Stability Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Yes 222 23.4 23.4 
 No 728 76.6 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
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According to table 5.20, the salary for nearly 25% of them has been reduced since the 
AFC.    
 
Table 5.21  Number of Years Living in Public Rental Housing 
 No. of Years in PRH Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1-5 Years 38 4.0 4.0 
 6-10 Years 340 35.8 39.8 
 11-15 Years 266 28.0 67.8 
 16 Years or Above 306 32.2 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.21 shows that approximately 40% of the respondents has lived in the PRH for 
less than 10 years while 32.2% (306 respondents) has lived in the PRH for more than 
16 years. 
 
Table 5.22  Ownership of Other Premises Except the PRH 
 Ownership of Premises 
Other than the PRH 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Yes 46 4.8 4.8 
 No 904 95.2 95.2 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
As indicated in table 5.22, 4.8% of the respondents reported owning other premises 
but 95.2% of them does not have. 
 
5.22  Housing Conditions 
 
Variables capturing different dimensions of housing conditions may include estate 
district, completion date, age of the building, saleable area, rent, nature of rent, 
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satisfaction of rent level, decoration cost at assumption of ownership27 and degree of 
satisfaction. The household data mainly focuses on the profile of the living conditions 
of respondents and their family, and they are indicated from Table 5.23 to Table 5.31. 
 
Table 5.23  Estate District 
 Estate District  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Hong Kong Island 143 15.1 15.1 
 Kowloon 208 21.8 36.9 
 New Territorities 599 63.1 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.23 indicates that 143 (15.1%) respondents are located in Hong Kong Island, 
21.8% located in Kowloon and 63.1% located in New Territorities. 
 
Table 5.24  Completion Date 
 Completion Date Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1990 or Before 484 50.9 50.9 
 After 1990 466 49.1 1000.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
According to table 5.24, the completion date is nearly fifty-fifty of the respondents 
before and after 1990. 
 
Table 5.25  Age of the Building 
 Age of the Building Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 6-10 Years 416 43.8 43.8 
 11-15 Years 534 56.2 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.25 shows that 43.8% of the building age is in the range of 6-10 years while 
56.2% of the flats is 11-15 years. The age of the building units provides clues about 
its condition since buildings decline in condition as they age. Older buildings tend to 
                                                   
27 This refers to the decoration cost that the tenant moves into the public rental estate for the first time. 
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be more costly to maintain. 
 
Table 5.26  Saleable Area 
 Saleable Area Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid < 250 Feet  7 0.7 0.7 
 250-300 Feet 50 5.3 6.0 
 301-400 Feet 405 42.6 48.6 
 401-500 Feet 374 39.4 88.0 
 > 501 Feet 114 12.0 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
As indicated in table 5.26, more than 80% of the flats is within the range of 301-500 
sq. ft while just 12.0% (114 respondents) is above 501 sq. ft. Most of the flats have 
one or two bedrooms. 
 
Table 5.27  Rent 
 Rent Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid $500 or Below 4 0.4 0.4 
 $501-$1000 103 10.8 11.2 
 $1001-$1500 568 59.8 71.0 
 $1501-$2000 216 22.7 93.7 
 $2001-$2500 50 5.3 99.0 
 > $2501  9 1.0 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.27 shows that a majority (82.5%) of respondents reported monthly rents is 
within the range of $1001-$2000 while only 1.4% reported is either below $500 or 
above $2501. 
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Table 5.28  Nature of Rent 
 Nature of Rent Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Original Rent 906 95.4 95.4 
 1.5 Fold of the Original 
Rent 
10 1.0 96.4 
 Double Rent 12 1.3 97.7 
 Market Rent 22 2.3 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
According to table 5.28, a majority (95.4%) of respondents pays original rent while 
only 4.6% of them need to pay extra rent. 
 
5.29  Satisfaction of Rent Level 
 Satisfaction of Rent 
Level 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Very Expensive 14 1.5 1.5 
 Expensive 159 16.7 18.2 
 Reasonable 721 75.9 94.1 
 Cheap 53 5.6 99.7 
 Very Cheap 3 0.3 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.29 shows that the majority of (75.9%) respondents reported the rent paid is  
“Reasonable” while only 1.5% and 0.3% of the respondents reported either “Very 
Expensive” or “Very Cheap”.   
 
Table 5.30  Decoration Cost at Assumption of Ownership 
 Decoration Cost at  
Assumption of 
Ownership 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid $25,000 or Below 332 34.9 34.9 
 $25,001-$50,000 377 39.7 74.6 
 $50,001-$75,000 137 14.4 89.0 
 $75,001-$100,000 41 4.4 93.4 
 > $100,001 63 6.6 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
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As indicated in table 5.30, nearly 35% of the respondents spends less than $25,000 
for decoration. 89% of the respondents spends less than $75,000 in decoration at 
assumption of ownership several years ago. Fewer than 7% spends more than 
$100,000 for decoration.  
 
Table 5.31  Level of Satisfaction (Overall Condition) 
 Level of Satisfaction 
(Overall Condition) 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Very Satisfactory 22 2.3 2.3 
 Satisfactory 455 47.9 50.2 
 Acceptable 333 35.1 85.3 
 Unsatisfactory 129 13.7 98.8 
 Very Unsatisfactory 11 1.2 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.31 shows that 50.2% of the respondents are satisfied with the overall 
condition of the estate and the flat. While 13.7% and 1.2% of the respondents 
indicate “Unsatisfactory” and “Very Unsatisfactory” respectively. 
 
5.23 Aspiration for Buying a PRH and Reasons  
 
This part concerns information in relation to the answers of the respondents in respect 
of their housing tenure choices i.e. to rent or to buy. In the survey, sitting tenants and 
owners were asked about their decisions. Among these, reasons (both buy or not buy) 
for their decisions were collected for analysis.  
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Table 5.32  Tenure Choice 
 Tenure Choice Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Decide to Buy 129 13.6 13.6 
 Bought Already 601 63.3 76.8 
 Decide Not to Buy 220 23.2 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
According to table 5.32, 730 respondents, who account for 76.8% of the total sample, 
express a desire for home ownership (either decided to buy or has bought the TPS 
flats) before the survey. Conversely, only 220 respondents (23.2%) indicate that they 
do not have interest to buy the flats. 
 
The following table presents the reasons behind their tenure choice. 
 
Table 5.33  (Reasons For Buying a PRH) 
Ranking Reason  Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
 Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Reasonable Price  209 28.6% 
2 Desire to Own  203 27.8% 
3 Fear of Paying Extra-Rent  79 10.8% 
4 Habitation of Living 
Environment  
58 7.9% 
5 Fear of No Inheritance  37 5.1% 
6 Autonomy  35 4.8% 
7 Avoidance of Cumbersome  
Housing Policy (Mean Test)  
25 3.4% 
8 Others  23 3.2% 
9 Good Traffic Network  20 2.7% 
10 Good Location  15 2.1% 
11 Avoidance of Reporting Family 
Member Every Two Years  
9 1.2% 
12 Good Environment  
& Adequate Facilities  
8 1.1% 
13 Good Neighbourhood  4 0.5% 
14 Ideal Financial Arrangement  4 0.5% 
15 Good Physical Condition  2 0.3% 
16 Good Management  1 0.1% 
17 New Estate  0 0% 
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Out of 730 respondents who decided to buy or have bought their flats, table 5.33 lists 
the reasons for the respondents for purchasing a PRH in descending order of 
significance. Among the 17 reasons, “Reasonable Price” accounts for 28.6% of the 
730 samples (who decided to buy) and provided the most important motivation for 
the tenants/homemakers to buy their flats. While “Desire to Own” takes the second 
ranking at 27.8% citing it as the most important motivation and “Fear of Paying 
Extra-rent28” takes the third ranking at 10.8%. 
 
Table 5.34  (Reasons Against Buying a PRH) 
Ranking Reason  Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Not Affordable Now 66 30.0% 
2 Flat Size Too Small 33 15.0% 
3 Poor Physical Quality 32 14.5% 
4 Others 17 7.7% 
5  Afraid of Not Being Able 
 to Afford In Future 
12 5.5% 
6 Estate Too Old 11 5.0% 
7 Unreasonably High Price 10 4.5% 
8 Dissatisfaction of Taking the 
Expenses of Public Facilities and 
the Slope Maintenance As Burden 
8 3.6% 
9 Bad Estate Management 7 3.2% 
10 Anxiety of Maintenance Problem  
In Future 
5 2.3% 
11 Bad Environment  
& Inadequate Facilities 
4 1.8% 
12 Not Ideal Orientation 4 1.8% 
13 No Large Difference between  
Renting & Purchasing the PRH 
4 1.8% 
14 Reasonable Rent At Present 2 0.9% 
15 Dissatisfaction of Taking Part of 
Management Fee  
As Maintenance Reserve  
1 0.5% 
16 Poor Traffic 1 0.5% 
17 Unsuitable Financial Arrangement 1 0.5% 
18 Poor Social Network 1 0.5% 
19 Unsuitable Transfer Restriction 0 0% 
 
As seen in table 5.34, it lists the reasons for the respondents against purchasing a 
                                                   
28 Since early 1987, a policy had been in place to double the rent for PRH tenants with a rental history of 
more than 10 years and incomes in excess of three times the eligibility threshold.  
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PRH in descending order of significance. Among the 19 reasons, “Not Affordable 
Now” accounts for 30.0% of the 220 samples (who decided not to buy) and is the 
most vital intent for the tenants/homemakers not to buy their flats. While “Flat Size 
Too Small” takes the second ranking at 15.0% and “Poor Physical Quality” takes the 
third ranking at 14.5%. 
 
5.24  Aspiration for Buying a HOS Flat Without TPS and Reasons  
 
This part concerns information in relation to the answers of the respondents in respect 
of their housing tenure choices of HOS flat without TPS. Among these, reasons for 
purchasing HOS flat in the short run, the long run and not purchasing at all are 
analyzed.   
 
Table 5.35  Tenure Choice of HOS Flat Without the TPS 
 Tenure Choice of HOS 
Flat 
Without TPS 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Buy in the Short Run 97 13.3 13.3 
 Buy in the Long Run 84 11.5 24.8 
 Not Buy At All 549 75.2 100.0 
Total Total 730 100.0  
 
Table 5.35 indicates that 97 (13.3%) respondents would purchase a HOS flat in the 
short run if there had not been the TPS while 84 (11.5%) respondents would purchase 
a HOS flat in the long run. The remaining 549 (75.2%) respondents would not 
purchase a HOS flat both in the short run and the long run.  
 
The following tables present the reasons why the tenants/homeowners would make 
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such a decision. 
 
Table 5.36 (Reasons for Buying A HOS Flat in the Short Run If There Had Not Been 
the TPS) 
Ranking Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Desire to Own 44 45.4% 
2 Others 17 17.5% 
3 Avoidance of No Inheritance 15 15.5% 
4 Autonomy 7 7.2% 
5 Mortgage Cost Approximately 
Same  
As Rent In the Short Run 
7 7.2% 
6 Property Price Fall of HOS 
Market  
In Recent Years 
5 5.2% 
7 Enhancement of  
Security and Satisfaction 
2 2.1% 
8 Favourable Loan Scheme  
Provision by HKHA 
0 0% 
9 Asset Appreciation 0 0% 
10 Enhancement of Social Status 0 0% 
 
As indicated in table 5.36, it lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for 
the respondents to buy the HOS flat in the Short Run if there had not been the TPS. 
Among the 10 reasons, “Desire to Own” accounts for 45.4% of the 97 target tenants 
and takes the first rank. “Others” takes the second ranking at 17.5% while 
“Avoidance of No Inheritance29” takes the third ranking at 15.5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
29 Under the new public housing policy, once both the tenant and his/her spouse are dead, the remaining 
family members have to formally apply the PRH again.  
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Table 5.37 (Reasons for Buying A HOS Flat in the Long Run If There Had Not Been the 
TPS) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Desire to Own 31 36.9% 
2 Others 21 25.0% 
3 Enhancement of  
Security and Satisfaction 
10 11.9% 
4 Avoidance of No Inheritance 8 9.5% 
5 Autonomy 5 6.0% 
6 Mortgage Cost Approximately Same 
As Rent in the Long Run 
4 4.8% 
7 Asset Appreciation 3 3.6% 
8 Stand-By of the Present HOS 
Market 
2 2.4% 
9 Favourable Loan Scheme  
Provision by HKHA 
0 0% 
10 Enhancement of Social Status 0 0% 
 
According to table 5.37, among the 10 reasons listed, “Desire to Own” accounts for 
36.9% of the 84 target tenants and takes the first rank. Surprisingly, “Others” takes 
the second ranking at 25.0% while “Enhancement of Security and Satisfaction” takes 
the third ranking at 11.9%. 
 
Table 5.38 (Reasons for Not Buying A HOS Flat in both the Short Run and the 
Long Run Even If There Had Not Been the TPS) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Not Affordable Now 321 58.5% 
2 Unreasonably High Price  
of HOS Flat 
91 16.6% 
3 Habitation of Living 
Environment 
41 7.5% 
4 Others 34 6.2% 
5 Afraid of Not Being Able  
to Afford In Future 
34 6.2% 
6 Mortgage Cost for PRH Greatly 
Different from that of HOS Flat 
17 3.1% 
7 Unwilling to Change  
the Consumption Pattern 
8 1.5% 
8 Prediction of Further Property  
Price Fall of HOS Market 
3 0.5% 
  
Table 5.38 lists, in descending order of the significance, the reasons for the 
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respondents not to buy the HOS flat in both the Short Run and the Long Run even if 
there had not been the TPS. Among the 10 reasons, “Not Affordable Now” accounts 
for 58.5% of the 549 target tenants and takes the first rank. “Unreasonably High Price 
of HOS Flat” takes the second ranking at 16.6% while “Habitation of Living 
Environment” takes the third ranking at 7.5%. 
 
5.25  Aspiration for Buying a HOS Flat After the Resale of PRH Is 
Permitted and Reasons 
 
This part concerns information in relation to the answers of the respondents in respect 
of their housing tenure choices of HOS flat after the resale of PRH is permitted. 
Among these, reasons for and against purchasing HOS flats are analyzed.   
 
Table 5.39  Tenure Choice of HOS Flat After the Resale of PRH Is Permitted 
 Tenure Choice of HOS Flat 
After the Resale of PRH is 
Permitted 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 83 11.4 11.4 
 No 647 88.6 100.0 
Total Total 730 100.0  
 
Table 5.39 shows that 83 (11.4%) respondents intend to purchase a HOS flat after the 
resale of PRH is permitted. While 647 (88.6%) respondents do not intend to purchase 
a HOS flat. 
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Table 5.40 (Reasons of Purchasing of HOS Flat After the Resale of PRH Is 
Permitted) 
Ranking Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Others 25 30.1% 
2 Better Living Environment 
and Adequate Facilities of 
HOS Flat 
23 27.7% 
3 Better Physical Quality  
of HOS Flat 
16 19.3% 
4 More Value-Added of 
Purchasing 
HOS Flat Than That of PRH 
13 15.7% 
5 Better Estate Management  
of HOS Flat 
6 7.2% 
6 More Upgrading the Social 
Status  
of Purchasing HOS Flat Than  
That of PRH 
0 0% 
 
As seen in table 5.40, it lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the 
respondents to buy the HOS flat after the Resale of PRH is permitted. Among the 6 
reasons, surprisingly, “Others” accounts for 30.1% of the 83 target tenants and takes 
the first rank. It may probably include “Purchasing for Investment and Saving”. 
“Better Living Environment and Adequate Facilities of HOS Flat” takes the second 
ranking at 27.7% while “Better Physical Quality of HOS Flat” takes the third ranking 
at 19.3%. 
 
Table 5.41 (Reasons of Not Purchasing of HOS Flat After the Resale of PRH 
Is Permitted) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Not Affordable Now 194 30.0% 
2 Adequate Satisfaction 
In Self-Purchase 
168 26.0% 
3 Others 74 11.4% 
4 Habitation of Living Environment 65 10.0% 
5 Unreasonably High Price 
of HOS Flat 
53 8.2% 
6 Less Attraction of Buying the 
HOS Flat Due to The TPS 
43 6.6% 
7 Afraid of Not Being Able  
to Afford In Future 
35 5.4% 
8 Unwilling to Change the 
Consumption Pattern 
10 1.5% 
9 Prediction of Further Property 
Price Fall of HOS Market 
4 0.6% 
10 Mortgage Cost for PRH Greatly 
Different From That of HOS Flat 
1 0.2% 
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Table 5.41 lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the respondents 
not to buy the HOS flat after the resale of PRH is permitted. Among the 10 reasons, 
“Not Affordable Now” accounts for 30.0% of the 647 target tenants and takes the 
first rank and “Adequate Satisfaction In Self-Purchase” takes the second ranking at 
26.0%. It should be remarkable that the nature of “Less Attraction of Buying the 
HOS Flat Due to the TPS” and “Adequate Satisfaction In Self-Purchase” are the 
same in which they both imply the HOS market is adversely affected by the TPS. 
Their only difference is that the former implies explicitly while the latter implies 
implicitly. Their sums account for 32.6% of the 647 target tenants and overwhelm 
‘Not Affordable Now’ as the first rank. Through this descriptive explanation, it 
supports the 4 calculations estimated later that the TPS greatly paralyzes the HOS 
market.  
 
5.26 Aspiration of Applying for a HOS Flat from 1994 to 1998 for 
those Respondents Not Buying the TPS flat and Reasons  
 
This part concerns information in relation to the answers of the aspirations of 
applying for and not applying for a HOS flat from 1994 to 1998 for those respondents 
not buying the TPS flat. Among these, reasons for and against purchasing it are 
analyzed.   
 
Table 5.42  Decision to Apply for a HOS Flat from 1994 to 1998 
 Decision to Apply for a  
HOS Flat from 1994 to 1998 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 32 14.5 14.5 
 No 188 85.5 100.0 
Total Total 220 100.0 100.0 
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Table 5.42 shows that 32 (14.5%) respondents had applied to purchase a HOS flat 
from 1994 to 1998 while 188 (85.5%) respondents had not applied to purchase a 
HOS flat in the same period. 
 
The following tables present the reasons for and against to apply for a HOS flat from 
1994 to 1998 for those respondents not buying the PRH.  
 
Table 5.43 (Reasons for Applying for a HOS Flat from 1994 to 1998) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank only 
1 Desire to Own 12 37.5% 
2 Others 9 28.1% 
3 Avoidance of No Inheritance 3 9.4% 
4 Autonomy 3 9.4% 
5 Enhancement of 
Security and Satisfaction 
3 9.4% 
6 Property Price Fall of HOS 
Market 
In Recent Years 
1 3.1% 
7 Mortgage Cost 
Approximately Same As Rent 
1 3.1% 
8 Asset Appreciation 0 0% 
9 Favourable Loan Scheme 
Provision by HKHA 
0 0% 
10 Enhancement of Social Status 0 0% 
 
Table 5.43 lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the respondents 
to apply for a HOS flat from 1994 to 1998. Among the 10 reasons, “Desire to Own” 
accounts for 37.5% of the 32 target tenants and takes the first rank. Surprisingly, 
“Others” takes the second ranking at 28.1% while “Avoidance of No Inheritance”, 
“Autonomy” and “Enhancement of Security and Satisfaction” are same to take the 
third ranking at 9.4%.  
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Table 5.44 (Reasons for NOT Applying for a HOS Flat From 1994 to 1998) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Not Affordable Now 114 60.6% 
2 Afraid of Not Being Able  
to Afford In Future 
23 12.2% 
3 Others 20 10.6% 
4 Habitation of Living Environment 10 5.3% 
5 Unreasonably High Price  
of HOS Flat 
8 4.3% 
6 Mortgage Cost for PRH Greatly 
Different From That of HOS Flat 
7 3.7% 
7 Prediction of Further Property  
Price Fall of HOS Market 
2 1.1% 
8 Unwilling to Change  
the Consumption Pattern 
2 1.1% 
9 No Potential of Asset  
Appreciation of HOS Flat 
2 1.1% 
 
Table 5.44 lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the respondents 
not to apply for the purchase of the HOS flat from 1994 to 1998. Among the 9 
reasons, “Not Affordable Now” accounts for 60.6% of the 210 target tenants and 
takes the first rank. “Afraid of Unaffordable In Future” takes the second ranking at 
12.2% while “Others” takes the third ranking at 10.6%.  
 
5.27 Aspiration of Applying for a HOS Flat since the Implementation 
of TPS in 1998 for those Respondents Not Buying the TPS flat 
and Reasons 
 
This part concerns information in relation to the answers of the housing aspirations of 
applying for and not applying for a HOS flat since the implementation of TPS in 
1998 for those respondents not buying the TPS flat. The reasons for and against 
purchasing it are analyzed.   
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Table 5.45  Decision to Apply for a HOS Flat since 1998 
 Decision to Apply the 
HOS Flat since 1998 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 9 4.1 4.1 
 No 211 95.9 100.0 
Total Total 220 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.45 shows that only 9 (4.1%) respondents have applied to purchase a HOS flat 
since 1998 while 188 (95.9%) respondents have not applied to purchase a HOS flat in 
the same period. 
 
The following table presents the reasons for and against applying to buy a HOS flat 
since 1998 for those respondents not buying the PRH. 
 
Table 5.46 (Reasons for Applying for a HOS Flat Since the Implementation of TPS 
In 1998) 
Ranking Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Desire to Own 4 44.4% 
2 Enhancement of  
Security and Satisfaction 
2 22.2% 
3 Recent Sharp Property  
Price Fall of HOS Market 
2 22.2% 
4 Avoidance of No Inheritance 1 11.1% 
5 Others 1 11.1% 
6 Autonomy 0 0% 
7 Asset Appreciation of HOS Flat 0 0% 
8 Fear of Paying Extra-Rent 0 0% 
9 Favourable Loan Scheme  
Provision by HKHA 
0 0% 
10 Enhancement of  
Security and Satisfaction 
0 0% 
 
Table 5.46 lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the respondents 
to apply for a HOS flat since the implementation of TPS in 1998. Among the 10 
reasons, “Desire to Own” accounts for 44.4% of the 10 target tenants and takes the 
first rank.  Both “Enhancement of Security and Satisfaction” and “Recent Sharp 
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Property Price Fall of HOS Market” take the second ranking at 22.2%.  
 
Table 5.47 (Reasons for NOT Applying the HOS Flat Since the Implementation of TPS 
In 1998) 
Ranking Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Not Affordable Now 141 66.8% 
2 Others 21 10.0% 
3 Afraid of Not Being Able  
to Afford In Future 
15 7.1% 
4 Unreasonably High Price of HOS 
Flat 
10 4.7% 
5 Habitation of Living Environment 8 3.8% 
6 Mortgage Cost for PRH Greatly  
Different From That of HOS Flat 
5 2.4% 
7 No Potential of Asset Appreciation 
of HOS Market 
4 1.9% 
8 Prediction of Further Property  
Price Fall of HOS Market 
3 1.4% 
9 Less Attraction of Buying HOS 
Flat  
Due to The TPS 
2 0.9% 
10 Unwilling to Change the  
Consumption Pattern 
2 0.9% 
 
Table 5.47 lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the respondents 
not to apply for a HOS flat since the implementation of TPS in 1998. Among the 9 
reasons, “Not Affordable Now” accounts for 66.8% of the 210 target tenants and 
takes the first rank. “Others” takes the second ranking at 10.6% while “Afraid of 
Unaffordable In Future” takes the third ranking at 12.2%. 
 
5.28  Other Opinions Towards the Performance of the TPS. 
 
This part concerns the general views of the respondents towards TPS comprising the 
degree of acceptance and opinion on desirability of speeding up TPS sales and 
extending TPS scale. 
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Table 5.48  Degree of Acceptance 
 Degree of 
Acceptance 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Welcome 575 60.5 60.5 
 Not Welcome 131 13.8 74.3 
 No Idea 244 25.7 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 5.48 shows that 575 (60.5%) respondents welcome the Scheme. Strikingly, 
only 131 respondents (13.8%) do not go with the TPS while 244 (25.7%) respondents 
have no idea. Generally, TPS receives a good response. 
 
Table 5.49 Opinion on Desirability of Speeding Up TPS Sales 
 Speed of  
Future Development 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Speed Up 526 55.4 55.4 
 Not Speed Up 171 18.0 73.4 
 No Idea 253 26.6 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
As indicated in table 5.49, 526 (55.4%) respondents wish the Scheme to be speeded 
up while 171 (18%) respondents hold the opposite view. 253 (26.6%) respondents 
have no comment. Overall the Scheme is wished to be speed up.  
 
Table 5.50  Opinion on Desirability of Extending TPS Scale 
 Extension of  
Future Development 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Should Extend 469 49.4 49.4 
 Should Not Extend 245 25.8 75.2 
 No Idea 236 24.8 100.0 
Total  950 100.0 100.0 
 
According to table 5.50, 49.4% of the respondents wishes the Scheme to be extended 
while 25.8% holds the opposite view. 24.8% of the respondents has no comment. 
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5.29  Cross-tabulation 
 
The preceding part looks at the aspiration to buy a home and the reasons for the 
tenants/homemakers’ tenure choices. To have a more comprehensive study, it is now 
using the Cross-tabulation Analysis, a type of statistical tools, for analyzing the 
correlation between a variable and other variable. Besides, it is further used to 
analyze the net ownership effect of TPS on HOS market and the policy efficiency of 
resource allocation. 
 
After running the multiple Cross-tabulations, it has been found that except Earning 
Household Members, Flat Size, Rent and Decoration Cost at Assumption of 
Ownership and Family Size, all the other independent variables do not have any 
correlation with Tenure Choice. The reason is that all variables have probability 
values under a 2-tailed Chi-Square Test30 either larger than 0.05 or approximately 
equal to zero with relevant Directional Measures31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
30 The Chi-Square Test is the most general hypothesis testing in Social Sciences. It is a test that determines 
whether the relationship between a variable and ano h r is statistically significant. 
31 There are generally four kinds of Directional Measures, Lambda, Goodman & Kruskai Tau (nominal by 
nominal), Lambda (ordinal by ordinal) and Eta (nominal by interval). 
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Table 5.51 Cross-tabulation between Earning Household Members and Tenure Choice of 
Buying a PRH 
      Earning Household 
Member 
   None 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person Total 
       or 
Above 
 
tenure 
choice 
Decided to Buy/ Count 16 356 219 92 47 730 
 Has Already Bought Expected Count  37.7 381.1 195.2 77.6 38.4 730.0 
  % within tenure choice 2.2 48.8 30.0 12.6 6.4 100.0 
  % within Earning Household Members 32.7 71.8 86.2 91.1 94.0 76.8 
  % of Total 1.7 37.5 23.1 9.7 4.9 76.8 
 Decided Not to Buy Count 33 140 35 9 3 220 
  Expected Count  11.3 114.9 58.8 23.4 11.6 220.0 
  % within tenure choice 15.0 63.6 15.9 4.1 1.4 100.0 
  % within Earning Household Members 67.3 28.2 13.8 8.9 6.0 23.2 
  % of Total 3.5 14.7 3.7 0.9 0.3 23.2 
Total  Count 49 496 254 101 50 950 
  Expected Count  49.0 496.0 254.0 101.0 50.0 950.0 
  % within tenure choice 5.2 52.2 26.7 10.6 5.3 100.0 
  % within Earning Household Members 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  % of Total 5.2 52.2 26.7 10.6 5.3 100.0 
 
Test Value df Asymp.Sig (2-sided) 
Chi-Square 101.050 8 0.000 
 
Directional Measure Dependent Value 
Eta Tenure Choice as Dependent 0.313 
 
Table 5.51 indicates that under the Chi-square Test, the 2-tailed test probability value 
is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05, and it can be concluded that the variables of 
Earning Household Members and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH are related. 
Further, the Directional Measure, Eta, indicates that their relationship is moderate as 
the value is 0.313. 
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Table 5.52  Cross-tabulation between Flat Size and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH 
       Flat Size   
   250ft 250-300
ft 
301-400
ft 
401-500
ft 
501ft Total 
   or below    or 
Above 
 
tenure 
choice 
Decided to Buy/ Count 1 26 288 315 100 730 
 Has Already Bought Expected Count  5.4 38.4 311.2 287.4 87.6 730.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.1 3.6 39.5 43.2 13.7 100.0 
  % within Flat Size 14.3 52.0 71.1 84.2 87.7 76.8 
  % of Total 0.1 2.7 30.3 33.2 10.5 76.8 
 Decided Not to Buy Count 6 24 117 59 14 220 
  Expected Count  1.6 11.6 93.8 86.6 26.4 220.0 
  % within tenure choice 2.7 10.9 53.2 26.8 6.4 100.0 
  % within Flat Size 85.7 48.0 28.9 15.8 12.3 23.2 
  % of Total 0.6 2.5 12.3 6.2 1.5 23.2 
Total  Count 7 50 405 374 114 950 
  Expected Count  7.0 50.0 405.0 374.0 114.0 950.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.7 5.3 42.6 39.4 12.0 100.0 
  % within Flat Size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  % of Total 0.7 5.3 42.6 39.4 12.0 100.0 
 
Test Value df Asymp.Sig (2-sided) 
Chi-Square 59.243 4 0.000 
 
Directional Measure Dependent Value 
Eta Tenure Choice as Dependent 0.250 
 
Table 5.52 indicates that under the Chi-square Test, the 2-tailed test probability value 
is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05, and it can be concluded that the variables of Flat 
Size and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH are related. Further, the Directional 
Measure , Eta, indicates that their relationship is weak as the value is only 0.250. 
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Table 5.53  Cross-tabulation between Rent and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH 
       Re nt    
   $500 $501 $1,001 $1,501 $2,001 $2,501 Total 
   or below -$1,000 -$1,500 -$2,000 -$2,500 or Above  
tenure 
choice 
Decided to Buy/ Count 2 66 427 180 47 8 730 
 Has Already 
Bought 
Expected Count  3.1 79.1 436.5 166.0 38.4 6.9 730.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.3 9.0 58.5 24.7 6.4 1.1 100.0 
  % within Rent 50.0 64.1 75.2 83.3 94.0 88.9 76.8 
  % of Total 0.2 6.9 44.9 18.9 4.9 0.8 76.8 
 Decided Not to Buy Count 2 37 141 36 3 1 220 
  Expected Count  0.9 23.9 131.5 50.0 11.6 2.1 220.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.9 16.8 64.1 16.4 1.4 0.5 100.0 
  % within Rent 50.0 35.9 24.8 16.7 6.0 11.1 23.2 
  % of Total 0.2 3.9 14.8 3.8 0.3 0.1 23.2 
Total  Count 4 103 568 216 50 9 950 
  Expected Count  4.0 103.0 568.0 216.0 50.0 9.0 950.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.4 10.8 59.8 22.7 5.3 0.9 100.0 
  % within Rent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  % of Total 0.4 10.8 59.8 22.7 5.3 0.9 100.0 
 
Test Value df Asymp.Sig (2-sided) 
Chi-Square 26.057 5 0.000 
 
Directional Measure Dependent Value 
Eta Tenure Choice as Dependent 0.166 
 
 
Table 5.53 indicates that under the Chi-square Test, the 2-tailed test probability value 
is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05, and it can be concluded that the variables of 
Rent and Tenure Choice are related. Further, the Directional Measure, Eta, indicates 
that their relationship is weak as the value is only 0.166. 
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Table 5.54  Cross-tabulation between Decoration Cost At Assumption of 
Ownership  and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH 
         Decoration Cost At Assuption of Ownership 
   $25,000 $25,001 $50,001 $75,001 $100,001 Total 
   or below -$50,000 -$75,000 -$100,000 or Above  
tenure 
choice 
Decided to Buy/ Count 229 301 113 31 56 730 
 Has Already Bought Expected Count  255.1 289.7 105.3 31.5 48.4 730.0 
  % within tenure choice 31.4 41.2 15.5 4.2 7.7 100.0 
  % within Decoration 
Cost 
69.0 79.8 82.5 75.6 88.9 76.8 
  % of Total 24.1 31.7 11.9 3.3 5.9 76.8 
 Decided Not to Buy Count 103 76 24 10 7 220 
  Expected Count  76.9 87.3 31.7 9.5 14.6 220.0 
  % within tenure choice 46.8 34.5 10.9 4.5 3.2 100.0 
  % within Decoration 
Cost 
31.0 20.2 17.5 24.4 11.1 23.2 
  % of Total 10.8 8.0 2.5 1.1 0.7 23.2 
Total  Count 332 377 137 41 63 950 
  Expected Count  332.0 377.0 137.0 41.0 63.0 950.0 
  % within tenure choice 34.9 39.7 14.4 4.3 6.6 100.0 
  % within Decoration 
Cost 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  % of Total 34.9 39.7 14.4 4.3 6.6 100.0 
 
Test Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Chi-Square 21.071 4 0.000 
 
Directional Measure Dependent Value 
Eta Tenure Choice as Dependent 0.149 
 
Table 5.54 indicates that under the Chi-square Test, the 2-tailed test probability value 
is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05, and it can be concluded that the variables of 
Decoration Cost at Assumption of Ownership and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH 
are related. Further, the Directional Measure, Eta, indicates that their relationship is 
weak as the value is only 0.149. 
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Table 5.55 Cross-tabulation between Family Size and Tenure Choice of 
Buying a PRH 
      Family Size   
   1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person Total 
        or Above  
tenure 
choice 
Decided to Buy/ Count 3 25 118 304 280 730 
 Has Already Bought Expected Count  5.4 33.0 119.1 312.7 259.7 730.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.4 3.4 16.2 41.6 38.4 100.0 
  % within Family Size 42.9 58.1 76.1 74.7 82.8 76.8 
  % of Total 0.3 2.6 12.4 32.0 29.5 76.8 
 Decided Not to Buy Count 4 18 37 103 58 220 
  Expected Count  1.6 10.0 35.9 94.3 78.3 220.0 
  % within tenure choice 1.8 8.2 16.8 46.8 26.4 100.0 
  % within Family Size 57.1 41.9 23.9 25.3 17.2 23.2 
  % of Total 0.4 1.9 3.9 10.8 6.1 23.2 
Total  Count 7 43 155 407 338 950 
  Expected Count  7.0 43.0 155.0 407.0 338.0 950.0 
  % within tenure choice 0.7 4.5 16.3 42.8 35.6 100.0 
  % within Family Size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  % of Total 0.7 4.5 16.3 42.8 35.6 100.0 
 
Test Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Chi-Square 20.930 4 0.000 
 
Directional Measure Dependent Value 
Eta Tenure Choice as Dependent 0.148 
 
Table 5.55 indicates that under the Chi-square Test, the 2-tailed test probability value 
is 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05, and it can be concluded that the variables of 
Family Size and Tenure Choice of Buying a PRH are related. Further, the Directional 
Measure, Eta, indicates that their relationship is weak as the value is only 0.148. 
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5.30 Analysis of the Net Ownership Effect of TPS on the HOS Market 
 
This part focuses on the analysis of the net ownership effect of TPS on the HOS 
market. By doing so, the cross-tabulation analysis is used to estimate key parameters 
in the model. For the sake of ensuring the quality of the empirical findings, both the 
interval estimation of proportion and the maximum error of estimate are firstly 
calculated. Then, four calculations are done for measuring the impact of TPS on HOS 
market by cross-sectional analysis. It suggests that the HOS will have led to a loss of 
more than 82,000 potential buyers over a period of ten years as a result of the 
introduction of TPS.   
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Table 5.56 Cross-Tabulation Table 
If There Had Not Been The TPS, Would You Buy A HOS Flat ? * After The Resale Of PRH Is Permitted, Will You
Buy A HOS Flat ? Crosstabulation
21 76 97
21.6% 78.4% 100.0%
25.3% 11.7% 13.3%
2.9% 10.4% 13.3%
25 59 84
29.8% 70.2% 100.0%
30.1% 9.1% 11.5%
3.4% 8.1% 11.5%
37 512 549
6.7% 93.3% 100.0%
44.6% 79.1% 75.2%
5.1% 70.1% 75.2%
83 647 730
11.4% 88.6% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
11.4% 88.6% 100.0%
Count
% within If There Had Not
Been The TPS, Would
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% within After The Resale
Of PRH Is Permitted, Will
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% of Total
Count
% within If There Had Not
Been The TPS, Would
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% within After The Resale
Of PRH Is Permitted, Will
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% of Total
Count
% within If There Had Not
Been The TPS, Would
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% within After The Resale
Of PRH Is Permitted, Will
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% of Total
Count
% within If There Had Not
Been The TPS, Would
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% within After The Resale
Of PRH Is Permitted, Will
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
% of Total
Buy in the Short Run
(Within 3 Years)
Buy in the Long Run
(Beyond 3 Years)
Not Buy Both in the Short
Run and the Long Run
If There Had
Not Been The
TPS, Would
You Buy A
HOS Flat ?
Total
Yes No
After The Resale Of
PRH Is Permitted, Will
You Buy A HOS Flat ?
Total
 
 
Test Value df Asymp. Sig (2-sided) 
Chi-Square 50.049 2 0.000 
 
The Cross-tabulation table 5.56 is used to analyze the “Time-Shift 
Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model” developed in Chapter 3. It shows that the 
Short-Run Negative Coefficient is equal to 76/730 = 0.1041, the Long-Run Negative 
Coefficient equal to 59/730 = 0.0808, the Long-Run Positive Coefficient equal to 
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37/730 = 0.0507, the Short-Run Negative but the Long-Run Positive Coefficient 
equal to 21/760 = 0.0288, the First Neutral Coefficient equal to 25/730 = 0.0342 and 
the Second Neutral Coefficient equal to 512/730 = 0.7014. Apparently, it indicates 
that the implementation of TPS does have the neutral effect on purchasing the HOS 
flat for 73.56% of the respondents. As a result, it is easy for one to conclude that the 
TPS may not adversely affect (or lead to a collapse of) the HOS market. However, to 
have an in-depth analysis of the remaining 26.44% of the respondents with the 
Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Effects, the reverse is shown to be true. 
 
5.31  Interval Estimation of Proportion and the Maximum Error of 
Estimate 
 
Before analyzing the net ownership effect of the TPS on the HOS market, it is 
essential to calculate the Interval Estimation of Proportion32 and the Maximum Error 
of Estimate33 for the answers of the questions of “If there had not been the TPS, 
would you buy a HOS flat ?” & “After the resale of PRH is permitted, will you buy a 
HOS flat ?”. 
   
For the Interva l Estimation of Proportion for the question of “Whether you would 
buy a HOS flat in the short run/long run or not if there had not been the TPS?”, the 
Large-sample Confidence Interval for p is adopted for both the answers of buying in 
the short run and the long run. The equation is as follows : 
                                                 
32 Interval Estimation of Proportion refers t  the estimate in the form of a confidence interval by 
proportion. 
33 Maximum Error of Estimate means the maximum error made when a sample proportion is used to 
estimate the population portion. 
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  p - Z?/2  p(1-p)/n < p < p + Z?/2  p(1-p)/n 
 
Substituting n =730, p = 97/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into the confidence- interval 
formula for estimating “if there had not been the TPS, the population proportion of 
the target tenants would buy a HOS flat in the short run”, it gets 
 
     0.1329 - 1.96 (0.1329)(0.8671)/730< p < 0.1329 + 1.96 0.1329)(0.8671)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the short run is : 
 
0.1083 < p < 0.1575 
 
And given the equation of Maximum Error of Estimate : 
 
  E = Z?/2  p(1-p)/n 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
E  = 1.96 (0.1329)(0.8671)/730 
        = 0.0246 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for “if there had not been the TPS, the 
target tenant would buy a HOS flat in the short run” is small, the sample proportion 
of this category can be used to infer the population proportion of the same category.  
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By the same method, substituting n =730, p  = 84/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into the 
confidence- interval formula for estimating “if there had not been the TPS, the 
population proportion of the target tenants would buy a HOS flat in the long run”, it 
gets 
 
   0.1151 - 1.96  (0.1151)(0.8849)/730 < p < 0.1151 + 1.96  (0.1151)(0.8849)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0920 < p < 0.1382 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is :  
 
         E  = 1.96 (0.1151)(0.8849)/730 
        = 0.0231 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for “if there had not been the TPS, the 
target tenant would buy a HOS flat in the long run” is small, the sample proportion of 
this category can be used to infer the population proportion of the same category.  
 
By the same method, substituting n =730, p = 549/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into the 
confidence- interval formula for estimating “if there had not been the TPS, the 
population proportion of the target tenants would not buy a HOS flat in both the short 
run and the long run”, it gets 
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  0.7521 - 1.96 (0.7521)(0.2479)/730 < p < 0.7521 + 1.96  0.7521)(0.2479)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.7208 < p < 0.7834 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
         E  = 1.96  (0.1151)(0.8849)/730 
        = 0.0313 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for “if there had not been the TPS, the 
target tenant would not buy a HOS flat in both the short run and the long run” is 
small, the sample proportion of this category can be used to infer the population 
proportion of the same category.  
 
With the same analysis, both the formulae of Large-sample Confidence Interval for p 
and the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for p can be applied for the answers of 
“Whether you will buy HOS or not after the resale of PRH is permitted”. 
 
Substituting n =730, p = 83/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into the confidence- interval 
formula for estimating “After the resale of PRH is permitted, the population 
proportion of the target tenants will buy a HOS flat”, it gets 
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   0.1137 - 1.96  (0.1137)(0.8863)/730 < p < 0.1137 + 1.96  (0.1137)(0.8863)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0907 < p < 0.1367 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
         E = 1.96  (0.1137)(0.8863)/730 
        = 0.0230 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for “After the resale of PRH is 
permitted, the target tenant will buy a HOS flat” is small, the sample proportion of 
this category can be used to infer the population proportion of the same category.  
 
Substituting n =730, p  = 647/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into the confidence- interval 
formula for estimating ‘After the resale of PRH is permitted, the population 
proportion of the target tenants will not buy a HOS flat’, it gets 
 
   0.8863 - 1.96  (0.8863)(0.1137)/730 < p < 0.1137 + 1.96  (0.8863)(0.1137)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
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0.8633 < p < 0.9093 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
         E  = 1.96  (0.8863)(0.1137)/730 
        = 0.0230 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for “After the resale of PRH is 
permitted, the target tenant will not buy a HOS flat” is small, the sample proportion 
of this category can be used to infer the population proportion of the same category.  
 
Combined with the formulae of Large-sample Confidence Interval for p and the 
Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for p for the above-captioned two main 
questions for the Cross-tabulation Analysis (or referred as the Contingency Table), 
the sample size for separate experimental group can be controlled. Therefore, 
accurate population proportion estimations can be made through the sample 
proportions for each separate group for the net ownership effect of TPS on the HOS 
market. 
 
The Time-Shift Multi-Dimensional Housing Ladder Model mainly focuses six effects 
(or Measured by Six Coefficients), that are, the Short-Run Negative Coefficient, the 
Long-Run Negative Coefficient, the Long-Run Positive Coefficient, the Short-Run 
Negative But Long-Run Positive Coefficient, the First Neutral Coefficient and the 
Second Neutral Coefficient for the target tenant. Therefore, their significance by the 
combinations of the above-mentioned analysis can be estimated. 
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For the Short-Run Negative Coefficient, substituting n =730, p = 76/730, and Z0.025 = 
1.96 into the confidence- interval formula for estimating the population proportion of 
the target group from the sample proportion of the same target group. 
  
   0.1041 - 1.96  (0.1041)(0.8959)/730 < p < 0.1041 + 1.96  (0.1041)(0.8959)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0820 < p < 0.1262 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
        E  = 1.96  (0.1041)(0.8959)/730 
    = 0.0221 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for the Short-Run Negative 
Coefficient is small, the sample proportion of this category can be used to infer the 
population proportion of the same category.  
 
For the Long-Run Negative Coefficient, substituting n =730, p = 59/730, and Z0.025 = 
1.96 into the confidence- interval formula for estimating the population proportion of 
the target group from the sample proportion of the same target group. 
 
   0.0808 - 1.96  (0.0808)(0.9192)/730 < p < 0.0808 + 1.96  (0.0808)(0.9192)/730 
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Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0610 < p < 0.1006 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
    E  = 1.96   (0.1041)(0.8959)/730 
        = 0.0198 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for the Long-Run Negative 
Coefficient is small, the sample proportion of this category can be used to infer the 
population proportion of the same category.  
 
For the Long-Run Positive Coefficient, substituting n =730, p = 37/730, and Z0.025 = 
1.96 into the confidence- interval formula for estimating the population proportion of 
the target group from the sample proportion of the same target group. 
  
   0.0507 - 1.96  (0.0507)(0.9493)/730 < p < 0.0507 + 1.96  (0.0507)(0.9493)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0348 < p < 0.0667 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
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E  = 1.96  (0.1041)(0.8959)/730 
        = 0.0159 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for the Long-Run Positive Coefficient 
is small, the sample proportion of this category can be used to infer the population 
proportion of the same category. 
 
For the Short-Run Negative but Long-Run Positive Coefficient, substituting n =730, 
p = 21/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into the confidence-interval formula for estimating the 
population proportion of the target group from the sample proportion of the same 
target group. 
 
   0.0288 - 1.96  (0.0288)(0.9712)/730 < p < 0.0288 + 1.96  (0.0288)(0.9712)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0167 < p < 0.0409 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
  E  = 1.96  (0.0288)(0.9712)/730 
        = 0.0121 
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Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for the Short-Run Negative but 
Long-Run Positive Coefficient is small, the sample proportion of this category can be 
used to infer the population proportion of the same category.  
 
For the First Neutral Coefficient, substituting n =730, p = 512/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 
into the confidence- interval formula for estimating the population proportion of the 
target group from the sample proportion of the same target group. 
  
   0.7014 - 1.96  (0.7014)(0.2986)/730 < p < 0.7014 + 1.96  (0.7014)(0.2986)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.6684 < p < 0.7344 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
  E   = 1.96  (0.7014)(0.2986)/730 
          = 0.033 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for the First Neutral Coefficient is 
small, the sample proportion of this category can be used to infer the population 
proportion of the same category.  
 
For the second neutral effect, substituting n =730, p = 25/730, and Z0.025 = 1.96 into 
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the confidence- interval formula for estimating the population proportion of the target 
group from the sample proportion of the same target group. 
  
  0.0342 - 1.96  (0.0342)(0.9658)/730 < p < 0.0342 + 1.96  (0.0342)(0.9658)/730 
 
Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the long run is : 
   
0.0210 < p < 0.0474 
 
The maximum error for the above interval estimate is : 
 
  E   = 1.96  (0.7014)(0.2986)/730 
          = 0.0132 
 
Since the Maximum Error of Interval Estimate for the second neutral effect is small, 
the sample proportion of this category can be used to infer the population proportion 
of the same category. 
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Table 5.57 Summary of Interval Estimation of Proportion & Maximum Error of 
Estimate 
Effect Interval Estimation of 
Proportion 
Maximum Error of 
Estimate 
1 0.1083 < p <0.1575 0.0246 
2 0.0920 < p < 0.1382 0.0231 
3 0.7208 < p < 0.7834 0.0313 
4 0.0907 < p < 0.1367 0.0230 
5 0.8633 < p < 0.9093 0.0230 
Short Run Negative Coefficient 0.0820 < p < 0.1262 0.0221 
Long Run Negative Coefficient 0.0610 < p < 0.1006 0.0198 
Long Run Positive Coefficient 0.0348 < p < 0.0667 0.0159 
Short Run Negative,  
Long Run Positive Coefficient 
0.0167 < p < 0.0409 0.0121 
First Neutral Coefficient 0.6684 < p < 0.7344 0.033 
Second Neutral Coefficient 0.0210 < p < 0.0474 0.0132 
* The Interval Estimation of Proportion & the Maximum Error of Estimate take 
95% confidence interval. 
 
1 = If there had not been the TPS, the sample proportion of the target tenants would 
buy the HOS in the short run. 
 
2 = If there had not been the TPS, the sample proportion of the target tenants 
would buy the HOS in the long run. 
 
3 = If there had not been the TPS, the sample proportion of the target tenants 
would not buy the HOS in both the short run and the long run. 
 
4 = After the resale of PRH is permitted, the sample proportion of the target 
tenants will buy the HOS. 
 
5 = After the resale of PRH is permitted, the sample proportion of the target tenants 
will not buy the HOS. 
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Short Run Negative Coefficient = Combination of 1 & 5 
Long Run Negative Coefficient = Combination of 2 & 5 
Long Run Positive Coefficient = Combination of 3 & 4 
Short Run Negative but Long Run Positive Coefficient = Combination of 2 & 4  
First Neutral Coefficient = Combination of 3 & 5 
Second Neutral Coefficient = Combination of 2 & 4  
 
After doing the population proportions estimation from the sample proportions and 
estimating the maximum errors of such estimates, it is statistically significant for the 
sample proportions to infer for the population proportions of the target groups. 
 
5.32 Empirical Findings of the Impact of TPS on HOS Market 
 
Based on the equation 2 built up in Chapter 3 for the estimation of the net ownership 
effect of TPS on the HOS market, the results are shown in Table 5.61.  
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Table 5.58 First Calculation (Calculate all the Effects of TPS on the HOS Market 
by ONE Year As A Base) 
Year  Short-Run  
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run  
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run  
Positive Coefficient 
Short-Run Negative, but 
Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient 
(Focus on Short-Run ) 
Short-Run Negative,  
but Long-Run Positive  
Coefficient 
(Focus on Long-Run ) 
Total 
1998 – 1999 76/730*27525*730/950 = 2202 Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950 = 608 Nil 2 8 1 0 
 
1999 – 2000 76/730*27161*730/950 = 2173 Nil Nil 21/730*27161*730/950 = 600 Nil 2 7 7 3 
2000 – 2001 76/730*28218*730/950 = 2257 Nil Nil 21/730*28218*730/950 = 624 Nil 2 8 8 1 
2001 – 2002 76/730*27444*730/950 = 2196 59/730*27525*730/950 = 1709 37/730*27525*730/950 = 1072 21/730*27444*730/950 = 607 21/730*27525*730/950 = 608 2 83 2 
2002 – 2003 76/730*26486*730/950 = 2119 59/730*27161*730/950 = 1687 37/730*27161*730/950 = 1058 21/730*26486*730/950 = 585 21/730*27161*730/950 = 600 2 7 3 3 
early 2003 – 
late 2003 
76/730*26312*730/950 = 2105 59/730*28218*730/950 = 1752 37/730*28218*730/950 = 1099 21/730*26312*730/950 = 582 21/730*28218*730/950 = 624 27 1 6 
late 2003 – 
2005 
76/730*23451*730/950 = 1876 59/730*27444*730/950 = 1704 37/730*27444*730/950 = 1069 21/730*23451*730/950 = 518 21/730*27444*730/950 = 607 2 4 2 2 
2005 – 2006 76/730*21134*730/950 = 1691 59/730*26486*730/950 = 1645 37/730*26486*730/950 = 1032 21/730*21134*730/950 = 467 21/730*26486*730/950 = 585 2 1 8 6 
2006 – 2007 76/730*21134*730/950 = 1691 59/730*26312*730/950 = 1634 37/730*26312*730/950 = 1025 21/730*21134*730/950 = 467 21/730*26312*730/950 = 582 2 1 8 5 
2007 – 2008 76/730*21134*730/950 = 1691 59/730*23451*730/950 = 1456 37/730*23451*730/950 = 913 21/730*21134*730/950 = 467 21/730*23451*730/950 = 518 2 1 8 3 
Total      25721 
 
Table 5.58 shows that the HOS market will lose 25721 PRH buyers over a period of 
10 years if the TPS continues to be implemented. Since the number of successful 
green form applicants living in the Public Rental Estate is 9347 in 1998 and 4489 in 
1999, and the transaction volume of second-hand HOS market is 6556 in 1998 and 
8702 in 1999, the TPS reduces approximately 17.67% and 21.02% of the transaction 
volume of whole HOS market. This is just equal to approximately 30.06% and 
61.78% of the transaction volume of first-hand HOS market or approximately 
42.86% and 31.87% of the transaction volume of second-hand HOS market in 1998 
and 1999 respectively. So, based on the empirical findings for the cross-sectional 
analysis, the TPS is shown to have greatly paralyzed the HOS market. Furthermore, it 
is not difficult to understand that the TPS estates are quite old-fashioned. Therefore, 
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even if the PRH owners intend to sell their flats after the resale is permitted, there is 
very likely to have inadequate demand for it. As a result, the Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient may be lowered. And it is explained as the Demand Side Leakage Effect. 
Suppose the Long-Run Positive Coefficient is lowered by 50% by the Demand Side 
Leakage Effect. The collapsing effect of TPS on the HOS market is higher. Table 
5.59 shows the results.    
 
Table 5.59 Second Calculation (Calculate all the Effects of TPS on the HOS Market With 
the Consideration of the Demand Side Leakage Effect by ONE year as a base) 
Year  Short-Run  
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run  
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run  
Positive Coefficient 
Short-Run Negative, but 
Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient 
Short-Run Negative,  
but Long-Run Positive  
Coefficient 
Total 
1998 – 1999 76/730*27525*730/950 = 2202 Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950 = 608 Nil 2 8 1 0 
1999 – 2000 76/730*27161*730/950 = 2173 Nil Nil 21/730*27161*730/950 = 600 Nil 2 7 7 3 
2000 – 2001 76/730*28218*730/950 = 2257 Nil Nil 21/730*28218*730/950 = 624 Nil 2 8 8 1 
2001 – 2002 76/730*27444*730/950 = 2196 59/730*27525*730/950 = 1709 18.5/730*27525*730/950 = 536 21/730*27444*730/950 = 60721/730*27525*730/950 = 608 3 3 6 8 
2002 – 2003 76/730*26486*730/950 = 2119 59/730*27161*730/950 = 1687 18.5/730*27161* 30/950 = 529 21/730*26486*730/950 = 58521/730*27161*730/950 = 600 3 2 6 2 
early 2003 – 
late 2003 
76/730*26312*730/950 = 2105 59/730*28218*730/950 = 1752 18.5/730*28218*730/950 = 549.5 21/730*26312*730/950 = 58221/730*28218*730/950 = 624 326 5 . 5 
late 2003 – 
2005 
76/730*23451*730/950 = 1876 59/730*27444*730/950 = 1704 18.5/730*27444* 30/950 = 534.5 21/730*23451*730/950 = 518 21/730*27444*730/950 = 607 2 9 5 6 . 5 
2005 – 2006 76/730*21134*730/950 = 1691 59/730*26486*730/950 = 1645 18.5/730*26486*730/950 = 516 21/730*21134*730/950 = 46721/730*26486*730/950 = 585 2 7 0 2 
2006 – 2007 76/730*21134*730/950 = 1691 59/730*26312*730/950 = 1634 18.5/730*26312*7 0/950 = 512.5 21/730*21134*730/950 = 46721/730*26312*730/950 = 582 2 6 9 7 . 5 
2007 – 2008 76/730*21134*730/950 = 1691 59/730*23451*730/950 = 1456 18.5/730*23451*730/950 = 456.5 21/730*21134*730/950 = 46721/730*23451*730/950 = 518 2 6 3 9 . 5 
Total      29355
                                                                                   
 114 
 
Table 5.59 shows that with the Demand Side Leakage Effect, the HOS market will 
lose 29355 PRH buyers over a period of 10 years if the TPS continues to be 
implemented. As explained in Chapter 3, the equation 2 only calculates the Short Run 
Just Within One Year As a Base, it may be somewhat not so precise because the 
Short Run may also include Within Two Years and Within Three Years. Therefore, 
the equation 3 is set to take Just Within Three Years for Short Run As a Base 
simultaneously so that the analysis is more comprehensive. The same rationale is 
applicable to the Long Run Analysis. And the results are shown in Table 5.60. 
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Table 5.60 Third Calculation (Calculate all the Effects of TPS on the HOS Market by 
THREE years as a base) 
Year      Year Short-Run 
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run 
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run 
Positive Coefficient 
Short-Run Negative, but 
Long-Run Positive  
Coefficient 
(Focus on Short-Run ) 
Short-Run Negative, 
but Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient 
(Focus on Long-Run ) 
Total 
1998 – 1999 76/730*27525*730/950/3 = 734 
 
Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 Nil 9 3 7 
1999 – 2000 76/730*27525*730/950/3 = 734 
76/730*27161*730/950/3 = 724 
Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
Nil 1 8 6 1 
2000 – 2001 76/730*27525*730/950/3 = 734 
76/730*27161*730/950/3 = 724 
76/730*28218*730/950/3 = 752 
Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
Nil 2 8 2 1 
2001 – 2002 76/730*27161*730/950/3 = 724 
76/730*28218*730/950/3 = 752 
76/730*27444*730/950/3 = 732 
59/730*27525*730/950/3 = 570 37/730*27525*730/950/3 = 357 21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 2 8 2 9 
2002 – 2003 76/730*28218*730/950/3 = 752 
76/730*27444*730/950/3 = 732 
76/730*26486*730/950/3 = 706 
59/730*27525*730/950/3 = 570 
59/730*27161*730/950/3 = 562 
37/730*27525*730/950/3 = 357 
37/730*27161*730/950/3 = 353 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
2 8 1 5 
early 2003  
– late 2003 
76/730*27444*730/950/3 = 732 
76/730*26486*730/950/3 = 706 
76/730*26312*730/950/3 = 702 
59/730*27525*730/950/3 = 570 
59/730*27161*730/950/3 = 562 
59/730*28218*730/950/3 = 584 
37/730*27525*730/950/3 = 357 
37/730*27161*730/950/3 = 353 
37/730*28218*730/950/3 = 366 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
2 7 6 1 
late 2003 – 
2005 
76/730*26486*730/950/3 = 706 
76/730*26312*730/950/3 = 702 
76/730*23451*730/950/3 = 625 
59/730*27161*730/950/3 = 562 
59/730*28218*730/950/3 = 584 
59/730*27444*730/950/3 = 568 
37/730*27161*730/950/3 = 353 
37/730*28218*730/950/3 = 366 
37/730*27444*730/950/3 = 356 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
2 6 2 3 
2005 – 2006 76/730*26312*730/950/3 = 702 
76/730*23451*730/950/3 = 625 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
59/730*28218*730/950/3 = 584 
59/730*27444*730/950/3 = 568 
59/730*26486*730/950/3 = 548 
37/730*28218*730/950/3 = 366 
37/730*27444*730/950/3 = 356 
37/730*26486*730/950/3 = 344 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
2 4 4 2 
2006 – 2007 76/730*23451*730/950/3 = 625 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
59/730*27444*730/950/3 = 568 
59/730*26486*730/950/3 = 548 
59/730*26312*730/950/3 = 545 
37/730*27444*730/950/3 = 356 
37/730*26486*730/950/3 = 344 
37/730*26312*730/950/3 = 342 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
2 2 6 5 
2007 – 2008 76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 564 
59/730*26486*730/950/3 = 548 
59/730*26312*730/950/3 = 545 
59/730*23451*730/950/3 = 485 
37/730*26486*730/950/3 = 344 
37/730*26312*730/950/3 = 342 
37/730*23451*730/950/3 = 304 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
2 2 8 6 
Total      23640
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Table 5.60 shows that the HOS market will lose 23,640 PRH buyers over a period of 
10 years if the TPS continues to be implemented. This figure is just similar to the first 
calculation of 25,721. However, based on this calculation, the TPS only reduces 
approximately 5.89% and 14.11% of the transaction volume of whole HOS market. 
This is just equal to approximately 10.02% and 41.46% of the transaction volume of 
first-hand HOS market or approximately 14.29% and 21.39% of the transaction 
volume of second-hand HOS market in 1998 and 1999 respectively. Suppose the 
Long-Run Positive Coefficient is lowered by 50% by the Demand Side Leakage 
Effect like the Calculation 2, the dampening effect of TPS on the HOS market is 
higher. Table 5.61 shows the results.    
 
Table 5.61 Fourth Calculation (Calculate all the Effects of TPS on the HOS Market With the 
Consideration of the Demand Side Leakage Effect by THREE Year As A Base) 
Year  Short-Run  
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run  
Negative Coefficient 
Long-Run  
Positive Coefficient 
Short-Run Negative, but 
Long-Run Positive 
Short-Run Negative,  
but Long-Run  
Total 
1998 – 
1999 
76/730*27525*730/950/3 = 734 Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 Nil 9 3 7 
1999 – 
2000 
76/730*27525*730/950/3 = 734 
76/730*27161*730/950/3 = 724 
Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
Nil 1 8 6 1 
2000 – 
2001 
76/730*27525*730/950/3 = 734 
76/730*27161*730/950/3 = 724 
76/730*28218*730/950/3 = 752 
Nil Nil 21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
Nil 2 8 2 1 
2001 – 
2002 
76/730*27161*730/950/3 = 724 
76/730*28218*730/950/3 = 752 
76/730*27444*730/950/3 = 732 
59/730*27525*730/950/3 = 570 18.5/730*27525*730/950/3 = 178.521/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 3 0 0 7 . 5 
2002 – 
2003 
76/730*28218*730/950/3 = 752 
76/730*27444*730/950/3 = 732 
76/730*26486*730/950/3 = 706 
59/730*27525*730/950/3 = 570 
59/730*27161*730/950/3 = 562 
18.5/730*27525*730/950/3 = 178.5
18.5/730*27161* 30/950/3 = 176.5
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
3 1 7 0 
early 
2003 – late 
2003 
76/730*27444*730/950/3 = 732 
76/730*26486*730/950/3 = 706 
76/730*26312*730/950/3 = 702 
59/730*27525*730/950/3 = 570 
59/730*27161*730/950/3 = 562 
59/730*28218*730/950/3 = 584 
18.5/730*27525*730/950/3 = 178.5
18.5/730*27161* 30/950/3 = 176.5
18.5/730*28218*730/950/3 = 183 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*27525*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
3 2 9 9 
late 2003 
– 2005 
76/730*26486*730/950/3 = 706 
76/730*26312*730/950/3 = 702 
76/730*23451*730/950/3 = 625 
59/730*27161*730/950/3 = 562 
59/730*28218*730/950/3 = 584 
59/730*27444*730/950/3 = 568 
18.5/730*27161* 30/950/3 = 176.5
18.5/730*28218*730/950/3 = 183 
18.5/730*27444* 30/950/3 = 178 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
21/730*27161*730/950/3 = 200 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
3 1 6 0 . 5 
2005 – 
2006 
76/730*26312*730/950/3 = 702 
76/730*23451*730/950/3 = 625 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
59/730*28218*730/950/3 = 584 
59/730*27444*730/950/3 = 568 
59/730*26486*730/950/3 = 548 
18.5/730*28218*730/950/3 = 183 
18.5/730*27444* 30/950/3 = 178 
18.5/730*26486*730/950/3 = 172 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*28218*730/950/3 = 208 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
2 9 7 5 
2006 – 
2007 
76/730*23451*730/950/3 = 625 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
59/730*27444*730/950/3 = 568 
59/730*26486*730/950/3 = 548 
59/730*26312*730/950/3 = 545 
18.5/730*27444* 30/950/3 = 178 
18.5/730*26486*730/950/3 = 172 
18.5/730*26312*7 0/950/3 = 171 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*27444*730/950/3 = 203 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
2 7 8 6 
2007 – 
2008 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
76/730*21134*730/950/3 = 64 
59/730*26486*730/950/3 = 548 
59/730*26312*730/950/3 = 545 
59/730*23451*730/950/3 = 485 
18.5/730*26486*730/950/3 = 172 
18.5/730*26312*7 0/950/3 = 171 
18.5/730*23451*730/950/3 = 152 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*21134*730/950/3 = 156 
21/730*26486*730/950/3 = 195 
21/730*26312*730/950/3 = 194 
21/730*23451*730/950/3 = 173 
2 6 8 1 
Total      26698
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Table 5.61 shows that with the Demand Side Leakage Effect, the HOS market will 
lose 26698 PRH buyers over a period of 10 years if the TPS continues to be 
implemented. It should be noted that all of these four calculations are all conservative. 
As a matter of fact, the implementation of TPS in 1998 is very likely to affect other 
TPS estates beside the tenants who live in Phase 1. The reason behind is that other 
tenants who live in public rental estates may think that the estates they live will 
eventually be selected as TPS estates. As a result, the base for all the 
above-mentioned four calculations should be enlarged so that the results have to be 
higher. If the base for estimation covers all the PRH tenants, the HOS market will 
lose more than 82,000 PRH potential buyers. So, all the above calculations are said to 
be “Extremely Conservative”. 
 
5.33 Analysis of the Effect of TPS on the Efficiency of Resource 
Allocation  
 
As mentioned earlier, both the Short-Run Negative Coefficient and the Long-Run 
Negative Coefficient refer to the target tenants who would have purchased a HOS flat 
in the short run and the long run respectively if the TPS had not been implemented. 
As a result of implementation of TPS, they will not purchase the HOS flat. 135 
respondents in the survey fall into this category. On the other hand, the Long-Run 
Positive Coefficient refers to the target tenants who would not purchase a HOS flat 
both in the short run and the long run. However, after the resale of PRH is permitted, 
they will purchase the HOS flat. In other words, these tenants are not going to 
purchase the HOS flat without TPS. 37 respondents in the survey are in this category.  
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To compare some of their occupation structures, the number of income earners and 
the employment status after the Asian Financial Crisis, it has been found that the TPS 
induces serious inefficiency of resource allocation. Table 5.62, 5.63 and 5.64 
illustrate the situation. 
 
Table 5.62 (Occupation Structure) 
 Tenants Refer To Both the Short-Run Negative 
Coefficient and the Long-Run Negative 
Coefficient 
Tenants Refer to the Long-Run 
Positive Coefficient 
Occupation Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Blue Collar 27 20.0 5 13.5 
White Collar 11 8.1 5 13.5 
Services 13 9.6 3 8.1 
Self-employed 2 1.5 0 0 
Managerial 3 2.2 0 0 
Professional 1 0.7 1 2.7 
Housewife 54 40.0 14 37.8 
Unemployed 5 3.7 2 5.4 
Retired 8 5.9 3 8.1 
Others 11 8.1 4 10.8 
Total 135 100.0 37 100.0 
 
Table 5.62 shows that the occupation structures are similar for the tenants referring to 
both the Short-Run & the Long-Run Negative Coefficient and the Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient. Therefore, once the number of income earners for the former is by far 
higher than the later, the resource allocation is said to be “extremely inefficient”34. It 
is because based on the principle of resource allocation, the wealthier PRH tenants 
should shift to buy HOS flat while the poorer PRH tenants should enjoy the subsidy 
and remain as either PRH renter or become PRH owner. Table 5.63 and 5.64 show 
that the implementation of TPS up to this moment has perverse effects in this regard.  
 
 
                                                   
34 This means that the resource allocation spent by TPS has edistributed effects among the TPS tenants.  
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Table 5.63 (Number of Income Earners) 
 Tenants Refer To Both the 
Short-Run Negative Coefficient 
 and the Long-Run Negative Coefficient 
Tenants Refer to the  
Long-Run Positive Coefficient 
No. of Income 
Earners 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
None 1 0.7 3 8.1 
One 52 38.5 18 48.6 
Two 42 31.1 13 35.1 
Three 25 18.5 3 8.1 
Four 15 11.1 0 0 
Total 135 100.0 37 100.0 
 
Table 5.63 shows that the number of income earners are significantly different for the 
target tenants referring to both the Short-Run & the Long-Run Negative Coefficient 
and the Long-Run Positive Coefficient. For the former, it takes 29.6% for the 
household who has at least 3 income earners. However, for the latter, it only takes 
8.1% for the household who has at least 3 income earners. Combined with the similar 
occupation structures shown in table 5.65, one can logically infer that the household 
income for the former is by far higher than that of the later on the average. Therefore, 
it is not difficult to understand that the policy efficiency35 is low.  
 
Table 5.64 (Have You Been Laid Off After the Asian Financial Crisis) 
 Tenants Refer To Both  
the Short-Run Negative Coefficient 
and the Long-Run Negative 
Coefficient 
Tenants Refer to  
the Long-Run Positive Coefficient 
Have you Been 
Laid Off since the 
AFC 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Yes 32 23.7 13 35.1 
No 103 76.3 24 64.9 
Total 135 100.0 37 100.0 
 
                                                   
35 Policy inefficiency, as defined by Ho (1995), means a stipulated policy objective using a given amount of 
public resources. 
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Table 5.64 reveals that the employment status for the tenants referring to both the 
Short-Run & the Long-Run Negative Coefficient and the Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient are quite different. For the former, it takes 23.7% of the former 
respondents who have ever been unemployed since the AFC. However, for the latter, 
the figure is 35.1%. So, one can see that the employment status is more stable for the 
former than the later. As a result, it can be concluded that it is the former tenants, but 
not the latter one, should purchase the HOS flat. Both table 5.65 and table 5.66 
demonstrates that the inefficiency of resource allocation is induced by TPS. 
 
Table 5.65, 5.66, 5.67 and 5.68 altogether provide a more comprehensive study for 
the reasons inducing the inefficiency of resource allocation for the above-mentioned 
two target tenants. 
 
Table 5.65 (Reasons for Buying A HOS Flat in the Short Run/Long Run If There 
Had Not Been the TPS For the WEALTHIER Tenants whom They 
are Referred To Both the Short-Run Negative Coefficient and the 
Long-Run Negative Coefficient) 
Ranking Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Desire to Own 57 42.2% 
2 Others 24 17.8% 
3 Avoidance of No Inheritance 20 14.8% 
4 Mortgage Cost Approximately 
Same  
As Rent In the Short Run 
9 6.7% 
5 Autonomy 8 5.9% 
6 Enhancement of  
Security and Satisfaction 
8 5.9% 
7 Property Price Fall of HOS Market 
In Recent Years 
6 4.4% 
8 Asset Appreciation 3 2.2% 
9 Favourable Loan Scheme  
Provision by HKHA 
0 0% 
10 Enhancement of Social Status 0 0% 
 
As indicated in table 5.65, it lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for 
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the respondents to buy the HOS flat in the Short Run if there had not been the TPS 
for the WEALTHIER Tenants whom they are referred to both the Short-Run 
Negative Coefficient and the Long-Run Negative Coefficient. Among the 10 reasons, 
“Desire to Own” accounts for 42.2% of the 135 target tenants and takes the first rank. 
Surprisingly, “Others” takes the second ranking at 17.8% while “Avoidance of No 
Inheritance” takes the third ranking at 14.8%. 
 
Table 5.66 (Reasons of Not Purchasing of HOS Flat After the Resale of PRH Is 
Permitted For the WEALTHIER Tenants whom They are Referred 
To Both the Short-Run Negative Coefficient and the Long-Run 
Negative Coefficient) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Adequate Satisfaction 
In Self-Purchase 
36 26.7% 
2 Others 27 20.0% 
3 Not Affordable Now 19 14.1% 
4 Habitation of Living Environment 15 11.1% 
5 Unreasonably High Price 
of HOS Flat 
13 9.6% 
6 Less Attraction of Buying the 
HOS Flat Due to The TPS 
12 8.9% 
7 Afraid of Not Being 
Able to Afford In Future 
6 4.4% 
8 Unwilling to Change the 
Consumption Pattern 
5 3.7% 
9 Prediction of Further Property 
Price Fall of HOS Market 
1 0.7% 
10 Mortgage Cost for PRH Greatly 
Different From That of HOS Flat 
1 0.7% 
 
Table 5.66 lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the respondents 
not to buy the HOS flat after the resale of PRH is permitted for the WEALTHIER 
Tenants whom they are referred to both the Short-Run Negative Coefficient and the 
Long-Run Negative Coefficient. Among the 10 reasons, “Adequate Satisfaction in 
Self-Purchase” accounts for 26.7% of the 135 target tenants and takes the first rank. 
“Others” takes the second ranking at 20.0% while “Not Affordable Now” takes the 
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third ranking at 14.1%. It should be remarkable that the nature of “Less Attraction of 
Buying the HOS Flat Due to the TPS” and “Adequate Satisfaction In Self-Purchase” 
are the same in which they both imply the HOS market is adversely affected by the 
TPS. Their only difference is that the former imply explicitly while the latter 
implicitly. They sum to account for 35.6% of the 135 target tenants. 
 
Table 5.67 (Reasons for Not Buying A HOS Flat in both the Short Run and the 
Long Run Even If There Had Not Been the TPS for the POORER 
TENANTS whom They are Referred To the Long-Run Positive 
Coefficient) 
Ranking Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Not Affordable Now 21 56.8% 
2 Unreasonably High Price  
of HOS Flat 
12 32.4% 
3 Habitation of Living 
Environment 
3 8.1% 
4 Afraid of Not Being Able  
to Afford In Future 
1 2.7% 
5 Others 0 0.0% 
6 Mortgage Cost for PRH Greatly  
Different from that of HOS Flat 
0 0.0% 
7 Unwilling to Change  
the Consumption Pattern 
0 0.0% 
8 Prediction of Further Property  
Price Fall of HOS Market 
0 0.0% 
 
Table 5.67 lists in descending order of significance of the reasons for the respondents 
not to buy the HOS flat in both the Short Run and the Long Run even if there had not 
been the TPS for the POORER TENANTS whom they are referred to the Long-Run 
Positive Coefficient. Among the 10 reasons, “Not Affordable Now” accounts for 
56.8% of the 37 target tenants and takes the first rank. “Unreasonably High Price of 
HOS Flat” takes the second ranking at 32.4% while “Habitation of Living 
Environment” takes the third ranking at 8.1%. 
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Table 5.68 (Reasons of Purchasing of HOS Flat After the Resale of PRH Is 
Permitted for the POORER TENANTS whom They are Referred To 
the Long-Run Positive Coefficient) 
Rankin
g 
Reason Frequency for 1st Rank 
only 
Percentage for 1st Rank 
only 
1 Others 14 37.8% 
2 Better Living Environment and 
Adequate Facilities of HOS Flat 
7 18.9% 
3 More Value-Added of 
Purchasing 
HOS Flat Than That of PRH 
7 18.9% 
4 Better Physical Quality  
of HOS Flat 
6 16.2% 
5 Better Estate Management  
of HOS Flat 
3 8.1% 
6 More Upgrading the Social Status 
of Purchasing HOS Flat Than  
That of PRH 
0 0% 
 
As seen in table 5.68, it lists, in descending order of significance, the reasons for the 
respondents to buy the HOS flat after the Resale of PRH is permitted. Among the 6 
reasons, surprisingly, “Others” accounts for 37.8% of the 37 target tenants and takes 
the first rank. Both “Better Living Environment and Adequate Facilities of HOS Flat” 
and “More Value-Added of Purchasing HOS Flat Than That of PRH” take the second 
ranking at 18.9%. 
 
Both table 5.65 and 5.66 altogether account for the reasons behind for the wealthier 
tenants who prefer to remain as PRH owners rather than HOS buyers. While table 
5.67 and 5.68 altogether account for the reasons behind for the poorer tenants who 
prefer to promoting to be HOS buyers rather than remaining as PRH owners so that 
the resource is inefficiently allocated. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6. POLICY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The time-series analysis reported in previous chapter shows that the TPS, rather than 
the AFC, is the more important factor that caused the collapse of Hong Kong’s entire 
housing market since 1998. Actually, the TPS seriously disrupts the entire housing 
market through a domino effect. The initial impact is on the second-hand HOS free 
market. Afterwards, the damage is spread to secondary property market and finally 
the overall property market. The cross-sectional analysis also suggests that the TPS 
has eliminated approximately 30,000 potential HOS buyers over a ten-year period. 
The true figure is very likely to be more than 82,000 potential HOS buyers. On 
deeper analysis, it shows that “Reasonable Price”, “Desire to Own” and “Fear of 
Paying Extra-Rent are the first three reasons for the target TPS tenants to purchase 
the PRH. The major reason for them to buy HOS flats both in the short run and in the 
long run without TPS is the same, that is, “Desire to Own”. On the other hand, 
“Adequate Satisfaction in Self-Purchase” and “Less Attraction of Buying the HOS 
Flat due to the TPS” were cited as to the most important reasons not to buy the HOS 
flat after PRH has become open to purchase. Clearly, their responses show that PRH 
and HOS flat are highly substitutes. 
 
On the other hand, it shows that both the household incomes and the tenants’ 
employment status are greatly different for various target groupings of TPS buyers.  
In particular, the poorer TPS buyers (who refer to the Long-Run Positive Coefficient) 
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are inclined to buy the HOS flats but the wealthier TPS buyers (who refer to the 
Short-Run Negative Coefficient and the Long-Run Negative Coefficient) are inclined 
to remain as permanent TPS buyers. This reverse result reflects the TPS to be 
policy-inefficient. The reasons behind are as follows. For the wealthier TPS buyers, 
they express that adequate satisfaction in self-purchase is the most important reason 
for them not to purchase HOS flat after the resale of PRH is permitted. However, for 
the poorer TPS buyers, they show that there are three reasons for them to strive to 
buy HOS flats after the resale of PRH is permitted. The first one is “Others”, which 
is probably “the wealth accumulation by TPS”, the second one is “the better living 
environment and adequate facilities of HOS flat” and the third one is “more 
value-added of purchasing HOS flat than that of PRH”.    
 
All the empirical findings are both consistent and persuasive enough to draw a 
conclusion that the TPS is the culprit for both the break down of Hong Kong’s 
housing market and the policy inefficiency of resource allocation.  
 
In fact, the analysis of the details of the prevalent TPS is contributory to 
understanding its adverse effect on the ecology of Hong Kong’s housing market and 
the policy inefficiency of resource allocation. Based on the criteria of economic 
efficiency, policy efficiency and equity discussed in Chapter 2, the pitfalls made by 
HKHA are first analyzed. After that, three policy recommendations are discussed and 
their merits and drawbacks are compared with each other so that the most appropriate 
policy is finally selected. 
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6.1  The Pitfalls of TPS 
 
The HKHA introduced the TPS to assist tenants of the HKHA to buy the flats they 
are currently renting. At least 250,000 public housing flats will be offered for sale 
over a ten-year period, commencing with 27,525 in early 1998. The TPS obviously is 
in line with the Chief Executive’s (CE) pledge to raise the proportion of home 
ownership to 70% by 2007. 
 
There are two criteria for the HKHA to select the sale of estates. Firstly, the HKHA 
assumes that tenants of older public rental estates may have concerns about the cost 
of maintenance and the possibility of redevelopment. On the other hand, new tenants 
in estates may have difficulty in finding increased monthly outgoings. The HKHA 
has therefore targeted for the estates for the first three phases between 1985 and 1992 
(principally Trident blocks) in as wide a range of districts as possible. Other types of 
block in selected estates will also be sold. The patterns of response will be analyzed 
for assisting the future selection of appropriate estates for sale, too. 
 
Lee (2000) pointed out that out of the existing 650,000 PRH tenants, the HKHA 
would like to turn 38% into homeowners through the TPS over a period of ten years. 
Clearly, it is extremely inequitable for the remaining 62% of PRH tenants, whom 
they are given less chance to purchase their own flats even there is redevelopment at 
a later stage. On deeper analysis, different pace for the implementation of TPS 
among different prospective buyers in different estates is also inequitable. It is 
because the faster the TPS estate is implemented, the faster the PRH units can be 
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sold under the present time-based resale restrictions 36 . The transaction value, 
therefore, may be higher. 
 
As to the sale price of the TPS flat for the first phase in 1998, it states that a “list 
price” has been calculated for each flat to be sold, representing a discount of 70% on 
market value. Flats are offered for sale at this price less a “tenant’s credit” at 60% of 
the “list price”. A purchaser may, if he/she wishes, select for a lower discount of 50% 
or 60%. This effect would reduce the premium payable to the HKHA in the event of 
future sale of the flat in the open market. Regardless of the discount selected, the 
amount of tenant’s credit will remain the same. With slight difference of discount 
rate, the sale price for the second phase and the third phase is just similar with that of 
the first phase. Clearly, such a “central price-setting scheme” induces policy 
inefficiency because both the wealthier tenants and the poorer tenants enjoy the same 
benefit once their estates are selected to join the TPS. Therefore, the motivation for 
the better-off tenants to buy HOS flat is sharply reduced. As a result, the TPS greatly 
paralyzes the HOS market since 1998. 
 
The present time-based resale restrictions lead to economic inefficiency because it 
reduces the attractiveness of the scheme to tenants and reduces the price at which 
tenants are willing to purchase the units. Besides, the greater majority of 
                                                   
36 It states that for the first two years, resale is permitted only to the HA at the original price. However, it is 
subject to the return of the “tenant’s credit” received during the initial purchase to the HA. During the 
subsequent three years, flats may be resold to the Authority at the prevailing TPS price (subject to return of 
the tenant’s credit) or in the secondary market. After five years, flats may be sold in the open market 
subject to payment of a premium to the HA equivalent to the current value of the discount offered on 
market value at the time of initial sale. 
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tenants-turned-homeowners would rather wait through the 5 years in order to realize 
any capital gain. Therefore, it is unlikely that the HKHA will stand to gain anything 
with this provision. The present TPS is certainly economically inefficient relative to 
one without any restrictions. The restrictions generate a cost without any offsetting 
benefit. The only advantage of these resale restrictions is that it serves to discourage 
profit seekers from joining the queue.  
 
On the other hand, TPS purchasers can only retain the right to apply for HOS flats as 
White Form (private sector) applicants under the present regulations. Those 
successful in applying for HOS can proceed to purchase subject to resale of their 
TPS flats either to the HA or in the secondary market to Green Form purchasers from 
the third year onwards. Since the subscription rate for White Form applicant is 
generally more than that of Green Form applicant by several times37, the TPS 
purchasers are less likely to successfully purchase the HOS flat even if they would 
like to. This also lowers the incentive for TPS owners to apply for HOS flats.  
 
To sum up, the collapse of Hong Kong’s entire housing market and the inefficiency 
of resource allocation among PRH buyers are caused by the economic inefficiency, 
policy inefficiency and inequity under the present TPS. While the inefficiencies and 
inequity are induced by its centrally planned sale price, time-based resale restrictions, 
partial implementation of TPS in public rental estates with different phases and less 
chance for TPS owners to successfully apply for HOS flats.   
                                                                                                                                                
 
37 The subscription rates for Green Form applicants and White Form applicants are 4.7 times and 20.8 times 
0in 1995/96, 5.2 times and 39.5 times in 1996/97, 4.5 times and 21.7 times in 1997/98, 4 times and 13 
times in 1998/99. 
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6.2  Policy Recommendations for Implementation of TPS 
 
In this part, three alternative privatization schemes are discussed. They are :  
 
1. The HKCER Model (Richard Wong, HKCER Letters, July 1990 and 
September 1992 ; Alan Siu, HKCER Letters, Nov. 1990) 
  
2.  The Wong Model (Richard Wong, On Privatizing Public Housing, The 
Hong Kong Economic Policy Studies Series, 1998)  
 
3. The Ho Model (Lok Sang Ho, Towards an Optimal Public Housing 
Policy, Urban Studies, 1988 ; Privatization of Public Housing : An 
Analysis of Policy Alternatives, Contemporary Economic Policy, July 
1995)   
 
6.21  The HKCER Model 
 
During the first attempt of the implementation of TPS in 1991, Hong Kong Centre 
for Economic Research38 (HKCER) had proposed that privatization would proceed 
with no restriction whatsoever on resale. (Alan Siu, Nov. 1990 ; Richard Wong, July 
1990 , Sept. 1992) There are two basic considerations for removing all restrictions on 
sale. Siu (1990) considered that it should give public housing units a chance to 
realize their full value in the open market. Wong (1992) argued that land on which 
                                                   
38 Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research (HKCER) is a privately-funded research institute advocating 
free enterprise and small government.
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these massive estates sit had already been given away and it was only a matter of 
permitting them to realize their full market value. He explained that the main 
obstacle to successful privatization was really restrictions to transferability. Actually, 
successful privatization would make available “vast resources” to provide more 
public housing and home ownership units. 
 
These two fundamental considerations are both valid and strong. It is clear that 
removing all resale restrictions allows each housing unit to realize its full potential 
value in the open market, thus maximizing wealth and achieving economic efficiency. 
It should be noted that their analyses take static consideration only. In fact, from the 
dynamic point of view, there is possible fallacy of competition. In addition, the 
HKCER model also boosts the ranks of the eligible target tenants, that is, the promise 
of a sizeable arbitrage profit attracts households to apply for public housing 
independent of the real need.  
 
On the other hand, Ho (1995) analyzed that if any restriction was to apply (implying 
there is an economic cost), the restriction had to serve some recognized and 
acceptable public objectives (implying that the cost must be at least offset by a 
recognized benefit). He believed that it was unrealistic to expect that the time-based 
restrictions would help conserve the resources of the HKHA. The reason was that 
any purchaser would strive to hold on his property through the restriction period in 
order to realize the capital gain.  
 
As a matter of fact, the HKCER model is subject to other vital drawbacks. Firstly, Ho 
explained that if the PRH was sold to the target group(s) at low and subsidized prices 
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without any restriction for resale, the potential arbitrage profit might well prompt 
households to disguise themselves as members of target group. Perhaps they will 
apply for public housing even if they have little need. Secondly, he added that the 
expectation for large capital gains might well prompt households to hold on to their 
units even when they were ready to move out. To avoid these problems, establishing 
a set of eligibility in favour of the lower income households will be necessary.  
Furthermore, the quality of the public housing has to be kept low enough compared 
with the HOS flat. Therefore, this would make PRH less attractive to the better-off 
households so that the incentive for them to purchase a HOS flat or even private 
housing would be higher.  
 
6.22  The Wong Model 
 
Wong wrote a book, entitled “On Privatizing Public Housing” in 1998 and he 
explored the proper ways of privatizing public housing, in which they were still 
fundamental of achieving economic efficiency through the free market mechanism. 
However, he analyzed it with the consideration of political economy simultaneously. 
In designing a scheme to privatize the public housing, Wong (1998) indicated that it 
was necessary to take into account of five related issues. (p.104)  
 
1. The treatment of restrictions on subsequent transfers.  
 
2. No privatization scheme could be set without making reference to the 
existing policies governing the initial sales and subsequent transfers of 
HOS units. 
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3. The initial sales price of the units. 
 
4. The number and selection of units to be privatized. 
 
5. The future redevelopment opportunities of public housing estates to be 
privatized.  
 
Here it would highlight the discussion of the first four issues as they are probably the 
most critical factors to be considered for the success of TPS’ implementation. 
  
1.  Relaxation of Subsequent Transfer Restrictions 
 
Wong (1998) considered that any attempt to privatize public housing units had to 
include removing or at least relaxing restrictions on subsequent transfer. Otherwise, 
there was little reason to privatize at all. Obviously, restrictions on subsequent 
transfers have extremely vital consequences for the value of public rental housing 
units to be privatized. If public housing units cannot be subsequently transferred, 
they are much less valuable to prospective buyers. He considered that even if the 
sitting tenant inclined to remain as permanent TPS owners, the right to transfer the 
unit freely was still valuable because the plans of the tenant-turned-owner might 
change in the future. 
 
He estimated that if one were unable to subsequently transfer privatized public 
housing units, the average public housing tenants valued their units at only from 60% 
to 70% of the units’ market value. He further added that the median public housing 
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tenant would probably value the unit at an even lower percentage level. In fact, the 
gap between a household’s personal valuation of the unit and its market value will 
vary across households. The difference between the gross subsidy and the net benefit 
reflects the underlying inefficiency of the public housing programme. 
 
He believed that in the presence of severe restrictions on transfers and on the basis of 
the above-mentioned estimation, it was possible that less than half of the units could 
be sold if their prices were set at 50% of the market value. Moreover, households in 
old public housing estates are less likely to buy their units. Besides, these estates are 
very difficult to be successfully sold unless the prices are set at very low levels. He 
added that this effect was independent of the quality or age of the unit. This was 
because the latter affected only the market value but not the gap between the 
household’s personal valuation of the unit and its market value. 
 
Wong conjectured that prices could not be set at more than 25% if a majority of the 
units in old public housing estates were to be sold unless all restrictions are removed. 
In contrast, the household’s personal valuation of the worth of the unit would 
coincide with its market value if there were no transfer restrictions. Under such a 
circumstance, a moderate discount from market prices would make the units 
sufficiently attractive to most tenants. 
 
2. Convergence with HOS Transfer Regulations 
 
Wong expressed that resale restriction for the privatizing PRH units and the HOS 
flats could not be set independently. This is because convergence in transfer 
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regulations avoids making false institutional distinctions between the two types of 
units. As a matter of fact, the present resale restrictions for the TPS flats and the 
HOS flats are the same. However, the present convergence of TPS with HOS transfer 
regulations cannot realize the full benefits of privatization. Based on the previous 
analysis, the benefits will rise if HOS regulations are further relaxed.  
 
Wong pointed out that this could occur in a number of ways. Firstly, the first 
three-year period could be reduced. Secondly, the three-to five-year (based on the 
most updated regulation) could be shortened. Here the time periods refer to the date 
when the units were first occupied and not to the date when they were privatized. 
Thirdly, further discount on the payment of land premium to the government is 
permitted when the units are sold in the open market. Fourthly, the sale price of PRH 
units could be lowered. 
 
From an economic perspective, relaxing the first two of these four regulations allows 
the economy to reap more benefits sooner and achieve economic efficiency. 
 
3. Determination of the Sales Price 
 
It is extremely controversial and complex for the determination of the sales price of 
privatized public housing units. The market value of a unit consists of two 
components. The first one is the replacement cost of the structure while the second 
one is the market value of the land. Under the current arrangements for the sale of 
HOS flats, 50% of the land premium is paid to the government at the time of the sale 
and 50% is fully subsidized when the units are first released. Afterwards, owners 
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who later sell the HOS units in the open market return to the government the updated 
value of the fully subsidized portion of the land premium. 
 
Wong agreed the rationale of determination of PRH flats could be same as that of 
HOS. By taking the same type of determination, the sale price of the PRH flats could 
be set at a level that was equal to the replacement cost of the structure plus 50% of 
the value of the land premium at the time of the sale. Certainly, the price of the unit 
will vary with the age, quality and location of the estate, and other specific attributes 
of the unit within the estate. 
 
Actually, it is a difficult task to determine the sales price based on all these factors. 
For simplification, Wong proposed a workable benchmark. He used the present 
discounted value of the rental payments of the public housing units as the sales price. 
This replaces the previous implied sales price that the replacement cost of the 
structure plus 50% of the value of the land premium. He supplemented that the 
appropriate period over which the rental payments should be discounted for tenants 
in the public housing programme should be close to infinity. Besides, the age of the 
unit might be taken into account to a certain degree because a permanent entitlement 
with privatization was exchanged for a marketable unit whose value depended partly 
on its age. 
 
He took an operational definition of the appropriate time horizon between 10 and 30 
years. The discount rate to be adopted was 5%. Three kinds of rent levels were 
distinguished. The first one was high monthly rents of $2,500, the second one was 
medium monthly rents of $1,500 and the third one was low monthly rents of $500. 
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Table 6.1 shows the estimated sales price for public housing units that are charging 
different rents. 
 
Table 6.1  Present Discounted Value of Public Housing Rental Payments 
Current Monthly 
Rent 
Present Value 
(Years = 10) 
Present Value 
(Years = 20) 
Present Value 
(Years = 30) 
  Low      = $500 60,000 120,000 180,000 
  Medium  = 
$1,500 
180,000 360,000 540,000 
  High     = 
$2,500 
300,000 600,000 900,000 
Note : The discount rate and the future rental growth rate are both assumed to 
be 5%. 
Source : Wong, Y.C. (1998) On Privatizating Public Housing. Hong Kong : City 
University of Hong Kong Press 
 
4. Scope and Pace of Privatization 
 
Based on the present TPS, almost 40% of the entire public housing stock will be 
privatized over a ten-year period. Clearly, it poses an extreme inequity for the 
remaining approximately 60% public housing tenants who may not have the chance 
to buy their PRH flats. On the other hand, it is also inequitable for the tenants 
selected for latter phases because the tenants selected for the earlier phases tend to 
enjoy more benefits from privatization. 
 
Wong considered that an equitable way of privatizing the public housing stock and 
ensuring an active and stable market in these units required the privatization process 
to be completed within a short span of time and to involve as many units as possible. 
On grounds of economic efficiency and equity, he believed that there was no obvious 
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reason why the units could not be privatized in one instance. 
 
In fact, an active and stable secondary market for ex-public housing units can only 
emerge when a substantial number of units that are differentiated in terms of their 
selection placed on the market. As a result, it will help greater and more immediate 
efficiency gains and will also seem more equitable. One should bear in mind that 
given the available quality and selection of public housing units, the potential buyers 
are primarily those living in the public housing sector. Since both the buyers and the 
sellers are largely either the same PRH tenants or owners, it is essential to privatize a 
large number of public housing units so that an active market can be created. Wong 
added that households on the waiting list for public housing could constitute a second 
group of potential buyers. Nevertheless, their numbers only took a small proportion 
when compared with the total stock of public housing households.   
 
If only a small number of units are available on the market in the beginning, the 
transaction will be low. Clearly, the gradual privatization, in addition to proportional 
implementation of TPS, also makes the active and stable secondary market 
impossible. At the same time, it will pose a random element on the welfare gains for 
all public housing households. Indeed, the present TPS is so unfair that it leads the 
households in early privatization to result in considerable gains while the later one to 
induce serious losses.  
 
Summary of Policy Recommendations    
 
Out of ten main policy recommendations of Wong’s model, six of them are 
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considered to be more important, are summarized as follows. (p.119) 
 
1. Permit all public housing units that are at least three years old to be 
privatized immediately and as quickly as possible. Gradual privatization 
must be avoided. 
 
2. Relax transfer restrictions and ensure that they converge with those that 
apply to HOS units. 
 
3. Revise transfer restrictions on all privatized public housing units and HOS 
units to allow all units that are three years old to be transferred at 
market-determined prices among ex-public housing tenants and applicants 
for public housing units on the waiting list. 
 
4. Revise transfer restrictions on all privatized public housing units and HOS 
units to allow all units that are five years old to be transferred in the open 
market at market-determined prices. The updated value of the subsidized 
portion of the land premium should be returned to the government. The 
subsidized portion is typically 50% of the market value for both public 
housing and HOS units. 
 
5. The sales price of the privatized units should be set at a level roughly equal 
to the present discounted value of future rental payments over a 20-year to 
30-year period. 
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6. The implied sales prices for the units with different levels of rents are given 
at Table 6.1. It should be emphasized that these are for illustrative purposes 
and could be further refined to take into account other relevant factors. 
 
One should bear in mind that although the above-mentioned summary of policy 
recommendation exerts certain time-related resale restrictions and centrally-designed 
sales price, the nature of Wong Model is still similar to that of HKCER Model to a 
certain extent. That is, trying to keep the least restrictions on resale and inclining to 
set reasonably subsidized sales price based on the present discounted value of future 
rental payments. Their major difference is that the Wong Model also considers the 
aspect of political economy at the same time. 
 
The Ho Model  
 
Ho (1995) proposed “conditional bidding” mechanism for optimal public housing 
policy. The “conditional bidding” mechanism refers to a mechanism in which the 
public housing units are either rented or sold in the free market (but not entirely open) 
to prospective “eligible target group households only”. Here the target group 
households refer to the lower income group as the PRH is originally designed for 
assisting the poor people in the society. It is possible to imagine more than one target 
group (but certainly not a large number), each have access to a category of assisted 
housing. As discussed before, Ho divided equity into two types: horizontal equity 
and vertical equity. Putting households in the same target group on an equal footing 
ensures horizontal equity while putting households in different target groups with 
different requirements on different footings ensures vertical equity (p.58). And under 
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Ho model (1995), privatization of public housing units is both policy-efficient and 
equitable in the following way. After purchase, all TPS’ households can resell their 
public housing units at any time in the free market on the condition that resale must 
be to the designated target group members only as determined by the government. 
There are no additional strings attached to the sale, and no requirement in terms of a 
waiting period before transfer. Moreover, the sale price is to be determined freely in 
the market designated for target group members through the interplay of supply and 
demand.      
 
The Ho model eliminates the time-related resale restrictions but specifies that resale 
must be for certified eligible purchasers only. From the policy efficiency perspective, 
it seems that eligible purchasers should be identical with the same target group for 
public housing assistance. It is logical that privatized housing units continue to serve 
the target group indefinitely under the “conditional bidding” mechanism. Although 
no additional strings are attached to the sale other than the condition that buyers must 
be certified “eligible”, Ho indicated that the supply of public housing for the target 
group was higher than under the “pure” free market. As both sale prices and resale 
prices are determined in the market, he explained that his model eliminated queues 
more successfully than did the HKCER model. 
 
However, compared with the HKCER model, the Ho model would not realize the 
“full potential value” of the housing unit because it had to place some restrictions on 
transfer. As illustrated by Ho, the HKCER model provided that the housing units 
fetched a value reflecting the bid price of the last household successfully outbidding 
all other households. The Ho model, on the other hand, provided that the housing 
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units fetched a value reflecting the bid price of the last household successfully 
outbidding all other households among qualified target group members. This means 
that the Ho model allows the units to realize the maximum value among the target 
group households. 
 
Since the PRH units have been originally built for assisting the target group, 
realizing the maximum value among the target group households brings closer to the 
policy objective of helping the target group than does the HKCER Model. 
 
Another merit for the Ho model is that the HKCER Model allows resources intended 
for the target group to spill out for non-target group members (when the flats are 
resold in the open market), more public housing may have to be built under the 
HKCER Model than the Ho Model. Nevertheless, the Ho Model has the 
disadvantage that the proceeds from the privatization will be less than that of the 
HKCER Model. 
 
“Conditional Sale” of publicly assisted housing units to target group households in 
the open market will greatly improve efficiency in allocating housing units. It limits 
any capital gains that may accrue to buyers even if it may bot eliminate them 
altogether. Ho explained capital gains might arise as a result of absolute 
improvement in household incomes among the target groups. Capital gains or losses 
also may arise because of changes in expectations and preferences. However, the Ho 
Model eliminates pure arbitrage profit that may arise if households are free to sell the 
units openly on assumption of the title. 
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Apparently, the Ho Model is not as efficient as the HKCER Model because 
restricting free bidding for public housing units to the target group households only 
implies restricting resale by purchasers. However, it is only true for the consideration 
of static aspect. As to the dynamic aspect, the HOS market is less likely to be 
adversely affected by the PRH market as suggested by the Ho Model because his 
model only allows eligible target buyers, the low-income households to purchase and 
resale among themselves. This means that it is economically efficient when 
dynamics are considered. Besides, it is more policy-efficient when compared with 
the HKCER Model and the Wong Model. As a policy analyst, the Ho Model seems 
to be the most appropriate policy for the implementation of TPS. This is because his 
model considers all the policy efficiency, economic efficiency and equity and based 
on all these criteria, this model provides the optimal solution when compared with 
the HKCER Model and the Wong Model. Furthermore, the target group households 
can be further divided into two types, that are, the lowest income households and the 
second lowest income households through the means test so that the policy 
efficiencies can be achieved for the two different target groups. 
 
Since all of these models are largely based on the market force, it should be noted 
that the government’s target for increasing ownership to 70% by 2007 is not probably 
achieved. Nevertheless, facing with the economic downturn, this target seems to be 
indefensible.  
 
If the HKHA does not modify the details of the implementation of TPS, that are, 
time-based resale restrictions, setting of sales price and scope and pace of 
privatization, it will continue to adversely affect our entire housing market and 
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economy. So, it suggests that the HKHA should change the criteria of TPS’ 
implementation as soon as possible.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Before ending up the concluding chapter, an introductory paragraph here is a good 
chance to have a quick review of the preceding chapters. Chapter One gives a general 
background and significance of this research, and the outline of the dissertation. 
Having explored the range of literature in Chapter Two, it goes on to explain the 
theoretical frameworks for both the time-series analysis and the cross-sectional 
analysis. Chapter Four provides the research methodologies for them, which contains 
data collection, data manipulation and data processing of time-series analysis and 
sampling method, sampling procedure, questionnaire, employment of part-time 
enumerators, briefing and training, pilot survey and main survey, and data processing 
of cross-sectional analysis. Central to this research is the empirical findings for them, 
which is recorded in Chapter Five. Following that, Chapter Six tries to synthesize 
and analyze relevant data to discuss the pitfalls of the present TPS and introduce 
policy recommendations to it. 
 
7.2 The Effect of TPS on Hong Kong Housing Market 
 
This study clearly demonstrates that the TPS not only greatly paralyzed the entire 
housing market since the AFC, but it also induced policy inefficiency in resource 
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allocation. Both the time-series regression analysis and the cross-sectional statistical 
analysis provide strong empirical support for this hypothesis. The empirical findings 
for the time-series regression analysis are on the macro level. They consistently 
suggest that the adverse effects of TPS on both the transaction volume and real 
transaction value are much higher than that of the AFC in the second-hand HOS 
market, the secondary property market and the whole property market. And the 
collapse of entire property market has been shown to firstly work through the 
collapse of HOS free market, and then to the secondary property market and finally 
to the overall property market. On the other hand, the empirical findings for the 
cross-sectional statistical analysis from the survey are on the micro level and they 
clearly testify the adverse effect of TPS on both the HOS market and the policy 
inefficiency of resource allocation.  
 
7.3 Policy Analysis and Recommendation 
 
There is no doubt that there are many serious pitfalls in the present TPS. The main 
problem appears to be the overly centralized implementation of TPS by HKHA, 
especially the sale price, resale constraints and scope and pace of privatization, with 
neglecting the Scheme to be implemented, or at least mainly regulated by free market 
mechanism. Clearly, the PRH and the HOS flat have become close substitute given 
that the quality of present PRH has been getting higher and higher while the quality 
of present HOS has been getting lower and lower. It is suggested that the 
implementation of TPS in the forthcoming phases with persistent improvement of the 
quality of PRH will not only adversely affect the HOS market, but also probably the 
private housing market directly. 
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Therefore, the regulations of the TPS have to be altered as soon as possible to avoid 
further damages to the housing markets and to the economy. All the three models, the 
HKCER model, the Wong Model and the Ho model, as outlined previously, seem to 
be an improvement over what had prevailed. However, both the HKCER and the 
Wong model only considers the implementation of public housing privatization on 
“economic efficiency” by the aspect of “free market mechanism” and “political 
economy”. As a result, their recommendations are very likely not to finally benefit 
the target PRH tenants, the lower income households. Therefore, as a policy analyst, 
it is recommended that the Ho model is the best policy for the change of present TPS 
because the policy efficiency is the highest when compared with the HKCER model 
and the Wong Model. And this model is still based on the criteria of economic 
efficiency and equity. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, if the HKHA does not modify the details of the present TPS, it will 
continue to adversely affect our entire housing market and economy. Therefore, the 
HKHA is urged to alter the conditions for sale of PRH as soon as possible.        
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Appendix I 
 
Questions & Answers of Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) Provided by Housing 
Department 
 
Q1 What is the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) ? 
  
The TPS is a scheme introduced by the Housing Authority (HA) to assist 
tenants of the HA to buy the flats they currently rent. At least 250,000 public 
housing flats will be offered for sale over the next ten years, commencing with 
27,000 in early 1998. 
 
Q2 What is the thinking behind the scheme ? 
 
 The Government has set a target of increasing the proportion of home 
ownership to 70% by 2007. Home Ownership helps foster a sense of belonging 
and gives owners greater security. It also provides purchasers with a first step on 
the housing ladder, and by providing added opportunities for upward mobility 
promotes the release of scarce public housing resources for those in need. 
  
Q3 What are the benefits of home ownership ? 
 
 As a home owner, you have a stake in the land and reap the benefits of capital 
appreciation. Although initially monthly costs will be higher, within ten years 
inflation may mean that buying is cheaper than renting. Greater certainty on 
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housing expenses assists personal financial planning. Ownership also gives you 
a stronger voice in shaping your local environment. 
 
Q4 How is the Housing Authority (HA) selecting the estates for sale ? 
 
 It is accepted that tenants of the older HA estates may have concerns about the 
cost of maintenance, and the possibility of redevelopment. On the other hand, 
tenants in estates recently occupied may have difficulty in finding increased 
monthly outgoings. The HA has therefore targeted for the first phase estates 
built between 1985 and 1992 (principally Trident blocks) in as wide a range of 
districts as possible. Other types of block in selected estates will also be sold 
and the pattern of response analyzed for assistance in selecting estates for future 
sales. 
 
Q5 Who is eligible to purchase ? 
 
 All sitting tenants in the selected estates in self-contained flats will be offered 
the opportunity for purchase providing there is no breach of the existing tenancy 
agreement, except  1. Housing for Senior Citizens  2. Caretakers flats 3. 
Flats let to non-domestic tenants 4. Flats exceeding 22 meters square  5. 
Those on Use and Occupation Licenses or where Notice to Quit has been served 
 
Q6 What are the costs of purchase ? 
 
 In addition to the purchase price, you will also need to pay Stamp Duty and 
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Legal Costs, Details of these costs will be available when you are invited to buy. 
 
Q7 As an owner, what monthly costs will I have to pay ? 
 
 As a tenant, your monthly rent includes rates, management and maintenance 
charges in one payment. An owner makes payments separately. You will be 
billed direct from the Commissioner of Rating and Valuation for rates and 
Government rent. If you borrow part of the purchase price from a bank or 
deposit-taking company, you will make monthly repayments. You will also pay 
a monthly management fee, which pays for the costs of management and 
maintenance of your estate. Details of these expenses will be available when 
your are invited to buy.  
 
Q8 How can I get mortgage finance ? 
 
 The Authority has negotiated with a number of banks and deposit-taking 
companies to provide mortgages of up to 95% of the purchase price for up to 25 
years, at competitive rates of interest. Further details will be made available 
when you are invited to buy. 
 
Q9 At what price will the flats be sold ? 
 
A “List Price” has been calculated for each flat to be sold, representing a 
discount of 70% on market value. Flats are offered for sale at this price less a 
“tenant’s credit” of 60% of the “List Price”. A purchaser may, if he wishes, 
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select for a lower discount of 50% or 60% ; the effect of this would be to reduce 
the premium payable to the HA in the event of future sale of the flat on the open 
market. Regardless of the discount selected, the amount of tenants credit will 
remain the same. 
 
Q10 What restrictions are imposed on resale ? 
 
 For the first two years, resale is permitted only to the HA at the original price, 
and subject to the return of the “tenant’s credit” received during the initial 
purchase to the HA. During the subsequent three years, flats may be resold to 
the Authority at the prevailing TPS price (subject to return of the “tenant’s 
credit”) or in the secondary market. After five years, flats may be sold in the 
open market subject to payment of a premium to the HA equivalent to the 
current value of the discount offered on market value at the time of initial sale. 
 
Q11 What rights are included in purchase ? 
 
 You purchase the exclusive right to occupy your flat, and the right to use the 
common parts of the estate : corridors, lobbies and lifts within your block and 
external open areas and walkways. Commercial centres, carparks, schools, bus 
termini and areas let for educational, welfare or other purposes will remain 
under the control of the HA with separate management accounts. A plan 
showing the boundary of the estate will be made available when you are invited 
to purchase. 
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Q12 What will be the arrangements for management after sale ? 
 
 The HA will encourage formation of an Owners Corporation (OC) within one 
year of the first sales and assist the OC in making suitable arrangements for 
ongoing management. The HA will attend the OC as the owner of any unsold 
flats ; as the percentage of flats sold increases the voice of the owners will 
correspondingly increase. The HA will continue to consult the Estate 
Management Advisory Committee, Mutual Aid Committees and Residents’ 
Committees on tenants’ views and represent these views to the OC where 
appropriate. The OC will be invited to consider whether the HA should continue 
as manager, or whether HA should be replaced by a private sector manager, 
within two years of the first sales. 
 
Q13 Can I be sure of the structural safety of my block ? 
 
 The HA will give a guarantee of structural safety for seven years. 
 
Q14 Will I be liable for high maintenance costs after purchase ? 
 
 Blocks in estates for sale are selected as being in good condition with no major 
maintenance works outstanding or likely to be necessary within the next few 
years. However, to reassure purchasers the HA will contribute out of the 
potential sales proceeds from the estates $14,000 per flat into an estate 
maintenance fund, to cover maintenance expenses other than routine 
maintenance for a period of about ten years. In some blocks, the HA is 
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undertaking minor upgrading works and completing ongoing programmes 
immediately before sale ; these costs will be charged to the HA and not to the 
new owners’ maintenance fund. 
 
Q15 After sale, can I revert to tenant status ? 
 
 Purchasers can revert to tenant status and remain in their flat subject to a 
recommendation from the Social Welfare Department on compassionate 
grounds and resale of their flat to HA. 
 
Q16 What if I do not wish to purchase ? 
 
 The HA accepts that some people will not wish to purchase, or may have 
financial difficulty in doing so. Such tenants can continue to occupy as prior to 
the commencement of TPS. 
 
Q17 What if my estate is not selected ? 
 
 The HA is not proposing to sell all estates, and not all tenants will get the 
chance to buy their own flat. The HA recognizes that some tenants will be 
unhappy that the opportunity to purchase is not available. However, such 
tenants will retain their “Green Form” status for purchase under the Home 
Ownership Scheme, which has recently been expanded to an annual production 
of about 30,000, or in the private sector with the assistance of the Home 
Purchase Loan Scheme. 
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Q18 Will sitting tenants be offered the purchase of vacant flats ? 
 
 A single opportunity will be offered for sitting tenants to apply to purchase 
vacant flats in their estate. In the event of multiple applications for the same flat, 
the right to purchase will be awarded by ballot. Flats in the estate vacant 
following this exercise will be offered for sale together with HOS flats to 
“Green Form” applicants in normal regular sales exercises. 
 
Q19 After I buy, can I apply for an HOS flat ? 
 
 TPS purchasers retain the right to apply for HOS flats as if they were White 
Form (private sector) applicants. Those successful in an application for HOS 
can proceed to purchase subject to resale of their TPS flat either to the HA, or in 
the secondary market to Green Form purchasers from the third year onwards. 
 
Q20 What is my status under the Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) ? 
 
 You cannot use an HPLS loan to buy a TPS flat. TPS purchasers retain the right 
to apply for an HPLS loan as if they were White Form (private sector) 
applicants. Those successful in an application for an HPLS loan can proceed to 
purchase a private sector flat subject to resale of the TPS flat either to the HA or 
in the secondary market to Green Form purchasers from the third year onwards. 
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Appendix II   
 
Estate Information 
 
Tenants Purchase Scheme 1 (Launched in 1998) 
Estates Wah 
Kwai 
Fung Tak Heng On Cheung 
On 
Wan Tau 
Tong 
Kin Sang 
Districts Aberdeen Wong Tai 
Sin 
Ma On 
Shan 
Tsing Yi Tai Po Tuen Mun 
No. of Blocks 5 7 7 10 3 4 
No. of Domestic 
Units 
3,264 5,428 6,076 7,338 2,767 2,652 
Authorized 
Population 
13,346 20,400 24,308 29,000 10,713 10,606 
Block Types Y4 Y3 ,Y4 Y3, Slab Y3, Slab, 
Linear 
Y3 Y4 
Saleable Floor 
Area from 
smallest to 
largest (sq) 
19.3 – 
55.6 
24.5 – 
55.6 
32.4 – 
49.1 
24.5 – 
53.1  
24.5 – 
49.1 
19.3 – 
55.6 
Average Price 
($) 
From lowest to 
highest 
108,800 – 
313,600 
147,000 – 
340,300 
124,400 – 
229,800  
120,600 – 
248,500 
120,600 – 
241,600 
62,500 – 
180,200 
Completion 
Dates 
1990 – 
1991 
1991- 
1992 
1987 1988 - 
1989 
1991 - 
1992 
1989 
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Tenants Purchase Scheme 2 (Launched in 1999) 
Estates Yiu On Wah 
Ming 
Tsui Wan Tin King Chuk 
Yuen 
North 
Tak Tin 
Districts Ma On 
Shan 
Fanling Chai Wan Tuen 
Mun 
Wong Tai 
Sin 
Lam Tin 
No. of Blocks 7 7 4 4 8 7 
No. of Domestic 
Units 
4,798 5,071 2,340 3,156 6,736 5,060 
Gross Floor 
Area (m) 
15.9 – 
72.3 
17.7 – 
68.4 
25.3 – 
72.9  
40.8 – 
68.2 
17.7 – 
63.6 
15.3 – 
73.5 
Full Credit Price 
($) 
42,900 – 
295,700 
41,400 – 
217,600 
84,900 – 
345,600 
70,400 – 
184,300 
66,700 – 
321,600 
53,200 – 
341,000 
Block Types New 
Slab, Y3 
& Y4 
Y3 & Y4 Y4 New 
Slab, 
Y3 & Y4 
Y3 New Slab, 
Y3 & Y4 
Year of Intake 1988 1990 1988  1989 1987 1991 
 
Tenants Purchase Scheme 3 (Launched in 2000) 
Estates Choi Ha Hin Keng Fung Wah Tai Po Fu Heng Tin Ping 
Districts Ngau Tau 
Kok 
Tai Wai Chai Wan Tai Po Tai Po Sheung 
Shui 
No. of Blocks 3 8 2 9 8 7 
No. of Domestic 
Units 
2,330 5,876 1,283 7,173 5,858 5,698 
Area of Unit (m) 9.41 – 
50.47 
30.32 – 
47.86 
13.37 – 
54.38  
9.41 – 
45.30 
9.41 – 
44.06 
16.57 – 
60.90 
Block Types Y3 & Y4 Y2, Y3 & 
Y4 
Y4 New Slab 
& Y3  
New 
Slab, Y3 
& Y4 
New Slab, 
Y2, Y3 & 
Y4 
Year of Intake 1990 1986 1991  1989 1991 1986 
                                                                                   
 156 
 
Tenants Purchase Scheme 4 (Launched in 2001) 
Estates Kwong 
Yuen 
King 
Lam 
Lower 
Wong Tai 
Sin 
Hing Tin Leung 
King 
Tsing Yi 
Districts Shatin Tseung 
Kwan O 
Wong Tai 
Sin 
Lam Tin Tuen 
Mun 
Tsing Yi 
No. of Blocks 6 7 10 3 8 4 
No. of Domestic 
Units 
4,659 5,507 4,754 2,448 6,846 3,230 
Area of Unit (m) 9.41 – 
50.47 
9.41 – 
47.86 
13.37 – 
54.38  
9.41 – 
45.30 
9.41 – 
44.06 
16.57 – 
60.90 
Block Types Y3 & Y4 New 
Slab, Y3 
& Y4 
Linear, H & 
Y4 
Y3  New 
Slab, Y3 
& Y4 
Y2, Y3 & 
Y4 
Year of Intake 1989 1990 1985  1987 1988 1986 
 
Tenants Purchase Scheme 5 (Launched in 2002) 
Estates Tung Tau 
(II) 
Pok Hong Tsui Ping 
(North)  
Lei 
Cheng 
Uk 
Tai Ping Kwai Hing 
Districts Kowloon 
Central 
Shatin Sau Mau 
Ping 
Sham 
Shui Po 
Fanling Kwai 
Chung 
No. of Blocks 20 8 12 10 4 4 
No. of Domestic 
Units 
6,820 5,479 6,398 4,832 1,429 1,528 
Block Types Y4, H & 
Linear 
Double 
H, Slab & 
Y2 
Y2, Double 
H, Slab & 
Linear 
Double 
H, Y3, 
Slab & 
Linear  
Linear Linear 
Year of Intake 1982 1982 1982  1984 1989 1991 
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Tenants Purchase Scheme 6A (Launched in Janaury 2003) 
Estates Cheung Wah Lei Tung Shan King  Po Lam 
Districts Fanling Hong Kong Tuen Mun Junk Bay 
No. of Blocks 10 8 9 7 
No. of Domestic 
Units 
5,120 7,542 8,643 5,007 
Block Types Double H,  
Slab & Y2 
Y1 & Y2 Double H, Slab, 
Y1 & Y2 
New Slab & Y2 
Year of Intake 1984 - 1986 1987 - 1988 1983 - 1986  1988 – 1989 
 
Tenants Purchase Scheme 6B (Launched in October 2003) 
Estates Cheung Fat Fu Sin Long Ping Nan 
Cheung 
Tsui Lam 
Districts Tsing Yi Tai Po Yuen Long Sam Shui 
Po 
Junk Bay 
No. of Blocks 4 8 15 7 8 
No. of 
Domestic 
Units 
2,621 5,518 8,483 1,897 4,932 
Block Types New Slab & 
Y3 
Y1 & Y2 Double H, 
New Slab 
& Y2 
Linear and 
Linear 3  
New Slab 
and Y2 
Year of Intake 1989 1985 - 
1986 
1986 - 1989 1989 1988 – 1989 
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Appendix III (Questionnaire) 
 
I am a Master of Philosophy student of Economics Department in Lingnan 
University. I am going to conduct an academic research on the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme (TPS) implemented by the Housing Authority. The Most Important 
Objective Is : Examining the Ownership Effect of TPS on the HOS market. This 
questionnaire is for academic purpose only. All data will be kept strictly confidential 
only. THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP ! 
 
Please put a tick in the appropriate box.  
 
Part One : Personal & Family Particulars 
 
1. Sex  1 ? Male  2 ? Female 
 
2. Age 1 ? 30 or below  2 ? 31-40 3 ? 41-50   
4 ? 51-60  5 ? 61 or above 
 
3.Education 1 ? Uneducated  2 ? Primary  
3 ? Secondary 4 ? Tertiary or above 
 
4.Occupation 1 ? Blue collar  2 ? White collar 3 ? Services 4 ?  Self-employed 
   5 ? Managerial  6 ? Professional  7 ? Housewife 8 ? Unemployed 
 9 ? Retired  10 ? Other 
 
5 You are  1 ? Tenant  2 ? Spouse of Tenant  3 ? Parents of Tenant  
4 ? Other 
 
6 No. of your family member(s) in this flat  1 ? 1 2 ? 2 3 ? 3  
4 ? 4 5 ? 5 or above 
 
7 No. of your family member(s) having income  1 ? None 2 ? 1 3 ? 2  
4 ? 3  5 ? 4 or above 
 
8 Have you ever unemployed since the Asian Financial Crisis ?  1 ? Yes 2 ? No 
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9 Have you ever been reduced salary since the Asian Financial Crisis ?   
 
1 ? Yes   2 ? No 
 
10 No. of year(s) living in the public rental housing  1 ? 1-5   2 ? 6-10  
3 ? 11-15   4 ? 16 or above  
  
11. Do/Does you or/and your family member(s) has/have other premises apart from this 
flat?   
    1. Yes ?  2. No ?   
 
 
Part Two : Details of Living Conditions 
 
12. Age of your block   1 ? Below 5 years   2 ? 6-10 years  3 ?  11-15 years 
  
4 ? 16 years or above 
 
13. Area of your flat   1 ? below 250sq.ft  2 ? 250 – 300sq.ft   
3 ? 301 – 400sq.ft  4 ? 401 –500sq.ft   
5 ? 501sq.ft or above 
 
14. Monthly rent of your flat 1 ? $500 or below 2 ? $501 –1000  
       3 ? $1001 –1500  4 ? $1501 –2000  
       5 ? $2001 – 2500  6 ? $2501 or above 
 
15. The monthly rent mentioned in Q.14 is 
 
1 ? The original rent  2 ? 1.5 fold of the original rent 3 ?  Double rent 
 4 ? The market rent 
 
16. What do you think about the existing rent of your flat?  
1 ? Very Expensive  2 ? Expensive  3 ? Reasonable   
4 ? Cheap   5 ? Very cheap 
 
17. The decoration cost during intake 
1 ? $25000 or below 2 ? $25001 –50000 3 ? $50001 –75000 
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4 ? $75001 –100000 5 ? $100001 or above 
 
18. Are you satisfied with your flat?   
1 ? Very Satisfactory  2 ? Satisfactory 3 ? Acceptable   
4 ? Unsatisfactory  5 ? Very Unsatisfactory 
 
 
Part Three : Opinion about TPS 
 
19. Are you determined to buy your flat? 
  1 ? Yes (Please go to Q.20)  
2 ? Already bought (Please go to Q.20)        
3 ? No (Please go to Q.21) 
 
20. The major three reasons for you to purchase PRH (In sequential order) (Please 
go to Q.22) 
 
1 ? Desire to own  
2 ? Autonomy 
3 ? Reasonable price 
4 ? Ideal financial arrangement 
5 ? Fear of paying extra-rent 
6 ? New estate 
7 ? Good traffic network 
8 ? Good environment & adequate facilities 
9 ? Good management 
10? Good physical condition 
11? Good neighbourhood 
12? Good location 
13? Habitation of living environment 
14? Avoidance of reporting family member every two years 
15? Avoidance of cumbersome housing policy (Mean Test) 
16? Fear of no inheritance 
17? Others 
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21. The major three reasons for you NOT to purchase PRH (In sequential order) 
(Please go to Q.29) 
 
1 ? Unreasonably high price 
2 ? Not affordable now 
3 ? Unsuitable financial arrangement 
4 ? Unsuitable transfer restriction 
5 ? Dissatisfaction of slope maintenance expenses 
6 ? Dissatisfaction of taking maintenance reserve as burden 
7 ? Unable to afford in future 
8 ? Estate too old 
9 ? Poor traffic 
10? Bad environment and inadequate facilities 
11? Bad estate management 
12? Poor physical quality 
13? Anxiety of maintenance problem in future 
14? Flat size too small 
15? Not ideal orientation 
16? Reasonable rent at present 
17? Poor social network 
18? No large difference between renting and purchasing the PRH 
19? Others 
 
22. If there had not been the TPS, would you buy HOS flat?  
 
1 ? Yes, I would buy in a short run ( within 3 years ) (Please go to Q.23) 
2 ? Yes, I would buy in a long run (after 3 years or more) (Please go to Q.24) 
3 ? No, I would not buy both in the short run and the long run.(Please go to Q.25)  
 
23. The major three reasons for you to buy HOS flat in a short run if there had not 
been the TPS. (In sequential order) (Please go to Q.26) 
 
1 ? Desire to own  
2 ? Enhancement of security and satisfaction 
3 ? Autonomy 
4 ? Asset appreciation 
5 ? Enhancement of social status 
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6 ? Avoidance of no inheritance 
7 ? Favourable loan scheme provision by HKHA 
8 ? Mortgage cost approximately same as rent in the short run 
9 ? Property price fall of HOS market in recent years 
10? Others 
 
24. The major three reasons for you to buy HOS flat in a long run if there had not 
been the TPS. (In sequential order) (Please go to Q.26) 
 
1 ? Desire to own  
2 ? Enhancement of security and satisfaction 
3 ? Autonomy 
4 ? Asset appreciation 
5 ? Enhancement of social status 
6 ? Avoidance of no inheritance 
7 ? Favourable loan scheme provision by HKHA 
8 ? Mortgage cost approximately same as rent in the long run 
9 ? Stand-by of the present HOS market 
10? Others 
 
25. The major three reasons for you NOT to buy HOS flat both in the short run and 
the long run if there had not been the TPS. (In sequential order) (Please go to 
Q.26) 
 
1 ? Unreasonably high price  
2 ? Unwilling to change the consumption pattern 
3 ? Not affordable now 
4 ? Afraid of unaffordable in future 
5 ? Mortgage cost for PRH greatly different from that of HOS flat 
6 ? Habitation of living environment 
7 ? Prediction of further property price fall of HOS market 
8 ? Others 
 
26. After the resale of PRH is permitted, will you buy HOS flat? 
   
1 ? Yes, I will buy. ( Please go to Q.27 ) 
 2 ? No, I will not buy. ( Please go to Q.28 ) 
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27. With reference to Q.26, the major three reasons for you to buy HOS flat are (In 
sequential order) (Please go to Q.35) 
 
1 ? More value-added of purchasing HOS flat than that of PRH  
2 ? More upgrading the social status of purchasing HOS flat than that of PRH 
3 ? Better living environment and adequate facilities of HOS flat 
4 ? Better physical quality of HOS flat 
5 ? Better estate management of HOS flat 
6 ? Others 
 
28. With reference to Q.26, the major three reasons for you NOT to buy HOS flat are 
(In sequential order) (Please go to Q.35) 
 
1 ? Less attraction of buying HOS flat due to the TPS  
2 ? Adequate satisfaction in self-purchase 
3 ? Unreasonably high price  
4 ? Unwilling to change the consumption pattern 
5 ? Not affordable now 
6 ? Afraid of unaffordable in future 
7 ? Unsuitable installment and mortgage mode 
8 ? Habitation of living environment 
9 ? Prediction of further property price fall of HOS market 
10? Others 
 
29. Have you applied HOS from 1994 to 1998?   
 
1 ? Yes (Please go to Q.30)  2 ? No (Please go to Q.31) 
 
30. The major three reasons for APPLYING to buy HOS. (In sequential order) 
(Please go to Q.32) (In sequential order) (Please go to Q.26) 
 
1 ? Desire to own  
2 ? Enhancement of security and satisfaction 
3 ? Autonomy 
4 ? Asset appreciation 
5 ? Enhancement of social status 
6 ? Avoidance of no inheritance 
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7 ? Favourable loan scheme provision by HKHA 
8 ? Mortgage cost approximately same as rent 
9 ? Property price fall of HOS market in recent years 
10? Others 
 
 
31.  The major three reasons for NOT APPLYING to buy HOS flat are (In 
sequential order) (Please go to Q.32) 
 
1 ? Less attraction of buying HOS flat due to the TPS  
2 ? No potential of asset appreciation of HOS flat 
3 ? Unreasonably high price  
4 ? Unwilling to change the consumption pattern 
5 ? Not affordable now 
6 ? Afraid of unaffordable in future 
7 ? Mortgage cost for PRH greatly different from that of HOS flat 
8 ? Habitation of living environment 
9 ? Prediction of further property price fall of HOS market 
10? Others 
 
32. Have you applied HOS since the implementation of TPS in 1998?   
 
1 ? Yes (Please go to Q.33)  2 ? No (Please go to Q.34) 
 
33. The major three reasons for APPLYING to buy HOS . (In sequential order)  
     
1 ? Desire to own  
2 ? Enhancement of security and satisfaction 
3 ? Autonomy 
4 ? Asset appreciation 
5 ? Enhancement of social status 
6 ? Avoidance of no inheritance 
7 ? Favourable loan scheme provision by HKHA 
8 ? Mortgage cost approximately same as rent 
9 ? Property price fall of HOS market in recent years 
10? Others 
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34. The major three reasons for NOT APPLYING to buy HOS flat are (In sequential 
order) 
 
1 ? Less attraction of buying HOS flat due to the TPS  
2 ? No potential of asset appreciation of HOS market 
3 ? Unreasonably high price  
4 ? Unwilling to change the consumption pattern 
5 ? Not affordable now 
6 ? Afraid of unaffordable in future 
7 ? Mortgage cost for PRH greatly different from that of HOS flat 
8 ? Habitation of living environment 
9 ? Prediction of further property price fall of HOS market 
10? Others 
 
35. Overall, do you think that TPS is welcome to the public rental housing’s tenants? 
 1 ? Yes   2 ? No   3 ? No opinion 
 
36. Do you think that TPS should be carried out more quickly?  
1 ? Yes   2 ? No   3 ? No opinion 
 
37 Do you think that TPS should be carried out in all public rental estates ?  
1 ? Yes   2 ? No   3 ? No opinion 
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